Theory- Raising to Isolate

[aejones]

I've been thinking about this for a long time, and I finally think I have collected my thoughts well enough to write a post about it. Jason Strasser's (Kamikazee) post, among other things, has reminded me of situations where raising to isolate can be used profitably- I think this is a tool that isn't used often enough by most players. Basically, the situations I'm talking about come in a variety of forms. Essentially, it is a basic situation where you may not have the original bettor beat, but you are quite sure that you either have the raiser beaten, or you can take him off of his hand by the strength you've shown with a second raise.

As an example, I've got a hand that I played with two friends. We were playing 2/5 NL, and the following hand came up, which was discussed for at least two hours afterwards (slight exaggeration).

Background on the hand is this: We were staying in the same hotel room as each other, talking about each other's play all week. It was me (known to be traditionally LAGtarded in a 2/5 game), my friend DT (tries to pose as a LAG, but really he's taggish because he can't make a decision that he even THINKS MIGHT be borderline negative EV- I joke with him and call him weak tight), and my friend Gary (laggy). While I knew both of them pretty well, they had just met each other, so it's safe to say I had an advantage over both of them when we played together. On to the hand.

We're playing 8 handed, 2/5 blinds.
Gary opens from the CO for 18 (standard- in fact, he was not looking at his hole cards before he opened, ever). I look down at T [img]/images/graemlins/spade.gif[/img]T [img]/images/graemlins/club.gif[/img]; I had been reraising him often because I knew his range to open blind with was, well, pretty big (lol) (I'd reraised with AQ, KT, even 98 once earlier- we'd been playing for a few hours). So he makes it 18, and I make it 69 from the button. Then DT, from the sb, thinks for just a moment, and coldcalls... Gary then decides he's got odds and smiles and calls without looking.

I look at DT (~800) and smile and say, "Well, I know what you have." Basically, I knew his style well enough to be nearly 100% sure that he had 99 or JJ (or the other TT).

So the flop comes: 6 [img]/images/graemlins/spade.gif[/img] 4[img]/images/graemlins/club.gif[/img] 2[img]/images/graemlins/spade.gif[/img]

DT checks, Gary checks, and I check.

Turn: 2 [img]/images/graemlins/club.gif[/img]

DT now leads for 150, about 2/3 of the pot. Gary (~600 after preflop play) then thinks for a moment, and pushes all in. I have about 1500, covering both. It’s about 600 to me; and I folded relatively quickly ( I tend to act fast on my hands), but not without some thought obviously. Basically, I decided Gary’s range was HUGE- anything from quads to a straight to 7 high (for a straight draw). That said, I was pretty sure that after the turn lead DT did, in fact, have two jacks. So the uncertainty of Gary’s hand, coupled with the fact I was pretty sure I was not good vs DT, made this a clear fold for me.

DT goes into the tank. He has had about 4 drinks, and I think that might have slightly edged his decision toward a call (and the both of us constantly badgering him about being weak-tight during the week). DT calls and I say “Well, we know you have two jacks.” So he does in fact turn over two jacks. Gary had the A [img]/images/graemlins/club.gif[/img] 3[img]/images/graemlins/club.gif[/img], for the inside straight draw and backdoor club draw, and the turn was a brick- shipping DT the pot.

Afterwards, I told myself good fold, you didn’t have the best hand- but I think I was wrong, I don’t think it was such a great fold. After the hand Gary told me: “Well, you knew I didn’t have [censored], that would have been a hell of a play if you pushed DT out of the pot by shoving all in to isolate against me because you knew I had a draw.” And he was right. Exactly right.

So the more we talked about it, the more I thought about how under used this is. I had a good read on both of my opponents, I was fairly certain that it was pocket jacks and some sort of draw. According to betting pattern- I was actually given a chance to win the hand with the second best hand- because if I raise the turn, DT is pretty much resigned to fold only a pair of jacks for a second raise on the turn. I think any good player would have a nearly impossible time calling my turn push with jacks.

In another hand, the raising to isolate theory comes into play. Gary bought in to the 5k event in the Bahamas for the “Conquest Adventure.” He was at a table for a while with Shawn Rice, and this three way pot came up with Gary, Shawn Rice, and an amateur.

In the hand, Shawn Rice opened to 1325 with the blinds at 250-500 with AJ.
Gary called in the sb with 66, and the bb (amateur) completed. The pot is ~4000…
Gary blind checks.

Flop: 5 6 9
Amatuer leads for 1500.

At this point, Shawn Rice and Gary sort of look at each other- basically the entire table had a silent reaction to this weird, probably weak, bet. Shawn, sensing weakness, raises to 6000. At this point, Gary is sort of limited in his creativity with the hand because he only had about 25k in chips. So Gary three bets all in, not wanting to take any chances with the hand. They both fold, and Shawn Rice shows his AJ and says something to the effect of “I just had to take him off of anything he could bet 1500 with,” and smiles. The amateur says that he folded queens, but he thought Shawn Rice had a bigger pair anyways (basically a weak-tight-scared player).

My point in this hand is that afterwards, Gary showed me the hand and said, “In hindsight, I could have done this with nothing- I knew Shawn Rice rarely has to even have a hand to raise this incredibly weak lead from this guy.” That hand reminds me, in a way, of the hand where Strasser is talking about bluffing into two players with nothing- in spots where you “should” not be bluffing- ever. Basically, if you can assign a range to each player and they are capable of making laydowns, this could be a tremendous spot to bluff (assuming stacks are right- which I think a lot of these situations were inconvenient in the “Kamikzee” post). This feels like a spot where a lot of dead money is in the pot- specifically against good aggressive players who can fold.

I’ve been lurking and posting here for about 6 months, and I haven’t seen much written about this- I hope it provokes thought. Comments are encouraged.

[samoleus]

great post aejones. the concepts you describe here are certainly very deep and if used properly, can be very profitable. however, extreme caution should be used - as this is the kind of play that will not be +EV against most combinations of two opponents. this is one area where I don't want to reveal more detail for fear of giving away a bit too much about my thought process in these situations. but I will say that to use this play, you have to really be able to pick your opponents and your spots very judiciously. (the example you gave with the Bahamas hand is an excellent one for such a spot). again, great post.

[Lyric]

Good post sir.

[Dan BRIGHT]

This reminds me of when tourny players reraise hands like 99 huge to fold out the table after a shortstack goes allin.

Theres a bit of cross overs though... the ground between raising to knock out better hands and raising to win more with your current hand (which is probably the best atm, but otherwise vunerable).

[aejones]

Like Samo said- this is to be used with caution. That is why I plan on thinking/discussing it more with my friends (luckily, I have some who are good enough poker players to talk about this with) to figure out great situations to use it in. That's also why I pointed out how I wasn't so sure about the way Jason Strasser played that hand- in theory, it was great- but in the situation, vs the opponents he described, I wasn't sure...

Also, it is sometimes applicable to tournament play I suppose, I thought of the squeeze when I thought of this- basically only worrying about one opponent often times.

[obiedman]

great post, aejones. you and samo have both mentioned that it can only be used under certain situations... are these situations very black and white? can you think of any off the top of your head?

[aejones]

I always imagine just catching a player who raises frequently- someone who is a talented LAG, persay, and shoving out the lead in the hand, who may very well have a good hand but nothing worthy of putting his stack in on (which he is not nearly faced with). This is a very vague obviously, but it is not black and white at all- it is, as poker often is, very gray.

Basically, I think once some conditions are met (table conditions, players, etc.) then you can use it upon having an excellent read on your opponents, and "feeling" out whether or not it would work.

[tdomeski]

you also have to consider the fact that DT (or whomever this opponent is) knows you are capable of this play and will start calling you down light

[aejones]

Right, I've already considered that- but until the play becomes more popular, it will seem so completely unlikely that anyone is bluffing or making a play in this spot because the second raise signifies such a strong hand. So until I start to make this play with more frequency, it will be nearly impossible for opponents to pick it off simply because they won't be able to distinguish between it and the absolute nuts.

[JamesRea]

Reffering to the hand in the Bahamas First of all, Gary must be a very good looking guy and fabolous poker player, but anyways DT's hand is very well defined and you know Gary knows what it is so you can be sure that he was not making his bet with a hand like A6 or a small over pair that your 1010 beats. He either has a draw, or , infrequently, has you drawing very slim vs 35 or 2x.

So with the 1010 against his real hand, Ac3c, youre ahead 67-33.

It is more interesting to me though if we play back this hand but change your hole cards around. Instead of you having 1010 you have AcQc. now, if he has the same combo draw but Kc3c you are an 80-20 favorite. Even if he has As 3s you are a 61-29 favorite to win with 10% chop. now, in the rare intances he has 35 or 2x instead of you being a 9 to 1 or 20 to 1 dog you are only a 2 to 1 dog. And, if DT goes crazy and calls both of the shoves with JJ you have great equity. I think that people often think about their hand in regards to how "strong" it is as a general poker hand. a lot of people wont fold a set on a flushed and straighted board because it is a set. What makes your hand strong is how big of a favorite it is over your opponents hand. AhKh is a monster on a 6s7s8s9s board if your opponent has AcQc. Anyways I think you have much better equity with a shove in this spot with AcQc than with 1010.

In hindsight though, since the river didnt help Gary i like a fold from both you and DT... or maybe both of you call allin and then accidentally muck your hands before showdown so his A high scoops. why contribute to a 5 figure losing trip.

As to the Shawn Rice hand from the main event, I believe After raising to 6k on the flop Rice only had about 12k behind so the pot was laying him better than 2 to 1 on his call after gary shoved. Avg stack was about 20kish at this point so I think the shove on a bluff is getting called by too many hands. This play takes much deeper stacks than a lot of tournament situations allow.

Good post