Parfit on Personal Identity

[Philo]

In Reasons and Persons and in some other writings Derek Parfit argues that our identity over time in itself does not really matter to us--that it is irrational for me to care about or be concerned about whether or not I will continue to exist. Instead, Parfit claims that what really matters is that there be someone in the future who is psychologically continuous with me, and whether or not I still exist makes very little difference.

I'm curious what those who are familiar with Parfit's view think about his claim that it is not really our identity that matters to us.

[FortunaMaximus]

It matters to me, personally.

I'm not familiar with the author, although I'm familiar with the philosophy. There's resonance with Buddhist and Shinto aspects in that view, albeit not necessarily the "future" portion of it.

To sum up: I like being aware. I want to be continously aware, most days. I don't have a choice in the matter, but if I see an opportunity, I'll take it.

End result for me: Whether personal identity matters to me or not, all I can do is hold on to it as long as I possibly can.

[Davidius]

I'm interested in this theory, mainly because it makes no intuitive sense to me. Also, I'm wondering what the term "personal identity" is defined as. How does the author use it?

[evolvedForm]

I'm also interested in this idea. I have been thinking about identity, and I personally don't think we have lasting concrete identities; identities are rather short lived. But like the author says, we can be psychologically continuous throughout our whole lives. Who "I" was 2 days ago matters little to who "I" am now. It may matter as far as memories go, or if something happened that drastically affected who I was. But, that said, it shouldn't affect my present happiness, which is what is really at issue here. There's no reason to care about my past or future identity when I can only live in the now.

[Philo]

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I'm interested in this theory, mainly because it makes no intuitive sense to me. Also, I'm wondering what the term "personal identity" is defined as. How does the author use it?

[/ QUOTE ]

That's the interesting thing about Parfit's view--it completely goes against our intuition that our own death matters greatly to us.

The sense of 'identity' involved is strict numerical identity. If a and b are numerically identical, then they are the same thing. So, Samuel Clemens and Mark Twin are numerically identical.

The problem of personal identity involes trying to figure out what constitutes our identity over time. For example, you were once five years old. That's an identity claim. When you get out a picture of yourself at five and you say, "Look at how awful my hair looked..." you are claiming that it is you in the picture. But you've obviously changed a lot since you were five, and the question is, what makes it the case that you in fact are that five year old? That's one way to describe the problem of personal identity.

Parfit argues that our own identity over time does not really matter. It doesn't matter whether or not there is someone around a week from now who is me, but only if there is someone around a week from now who is psychologically continuous with me.

[chezlaw]

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Parfit argues that our own identity over time does not really matter. It doesn't matter whether or not there is someone around a week from now who is me, but only if there is someone around a week from now who is psychologically continuous with me.

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I'm not sure exactly what's meant so can I ask some questions to get more idea what's going on.

If I have a dream that I'm napolean, a cockroach or just stop thinking or have a temporary mental disorder and then wake up/recover then I'm still me aren't I. So continuous doesn't seem necessary or even possible.

If in the future, I think I'm you (in the way I normally think I'm me) then I'm wrong. How does the psychological view distinguish between the two without reference to something non-psychological or does it claim that if I believe I'm you then I am.

chez

[Philo]

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[ QUOTE ]
Parfit argues that our own identity over time does not really matter. It doesn't matter whether or not there is someone around a week from now who is me, but only if there is someone around a week from now who is psychologically continuous with me.

[/ QUOTE ]
I'm not sure exactly what's meant so can I ask some questions to get more idea what's going on.

If I have a dream that I'm napolean, a cockroach or just stop thinking or have a temporary mental disorder and then wake up/recover then I'm still me aren't I. So continuous doesn't seem necessary or even possible.

If in the future, I think I'm you (in the way I normally think I'm me) then I'm wrong. How does the psychological view distinguish between the two without reference to something non-psychological or does it claim that if I believe I'm you then I am.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

Paradigmatic examples of psychological continuity would be the forming of experiential memories and the later recalling of those experiences, or the forming of intentions and the later carrying out of those intentions.

Psychological continuity does not require that our consciousness be uninterrupted. I don't have to be continually conscious in order to have memories of my past that connect me psychologically to that past person who had those experiences.

Just thinking that I am Napolean does not make me psychologically continuous with Napolean. If, however, Napolean's complete mental states had been recorded by a machine and then transferred to my brain then I would be psychologically continuous with Napolean. If my own mental contents were erased beforehand, then we can imagine that after the mental state transfer I have Napolean's personality, memories (maybe), dispositions, and such.

Since according to Parfit we do not have a basic, non-derivative concern for our own identity over time, this would be about as good for Napolean as if he had actually survived himself.

[chezlaw]

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Just thinking that I am Napolean does not make me psychologically continuous with Napolean. If, however, Napolean's complete mental states had been recorded by a machine and then transferred to my brain then I would be psychologically continuous with Napolean. If my own mental contents were erased beforehand, then we can imagine that after the mental state transfer I have Napolean's personality, memories (maybe), dispositions, and such.

[/ QUOTE ]
So if your mental mental states were recorded by a machine and transferred to me, we would both be you?

chez

[HLMencken]

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It doesn't matter whether or not there is someone around a week from now who is me, but only if there is someone around a week from now who is psychologically continuous with me.

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Neither matters.

[chezlaw]

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It doesn't matter whether or not there is someone around a week from now who is me, but only if there is someone around a week from now who is psychologically continuous with me.

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Neither matters.

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It matters to most people. e.g. Why do some people who enjoy smoking want to give up?

chez