Origin of Life and Evolution

[Borodog]

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OK, I realize that "will to survive" and "sense of self" are subjective terms that cannot be verified, so if I rephrased the statements to say: all forms of life act as if they had a will to survive or act as if they had a sense of self, would that hold up?

Considering factors like metabolism and reproduction, is it safe to say that certain combinations of base elements act as if they have an identity and will?

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No. No more so than the fact that my TV is showing a football game implies that it has a will to show football games.

Replicators replicate becuase that's what replicators do, they replicate. It's a molecular machine (a very complex one, to be sure) that assembles copies of itself. It's every bit as much a physical machine as a car is, it just has a different function. Cars go zoom when you push this pedal and turn left and right when you turn this wheel thing and stop when you push that other pedal. Self-replicators make copies of themselves*.

*Of course, that's not actually what a good number of them do, which is still one of the greatest mysteries of evolution, i.e. the "Twofold Cost of Sex."

[madnak]

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OK, I realize that "will to survive" and "sense of self" are subjective terms that cannot be verified, so if I rephrased the statements to say: all forms of life act as if they had a will to survive or act as if they had a sense of self, would that hold up?

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No, the reason many forms of life "act as if" they have a will to survive is that those forms of life that act in such a way are generally more likely to survive, and thus they tend to propagate more.

[John21]

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Replicators replicate becuase that's what replicators do, they replicate.

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What's being replicated isn't replicators - it's informantion that's being replicated.

I'm not trying to interject meaning or purpose into the process, anymore than I'd claim a meaning or purpose for one body of mass to attract another. What I'm trying to get at is the principle behind this process.

As to identity and will, I'm not proposing that they have some sort of objective existence. So in the context of your post, what I'm trying to get at is: those bundles of information seem to act as if they had identity and will. Not in an absolute sense, but in a relative sense compared to other elements of matter that do not display those characteristics.

[FortunaMaximus]

Uh, if we're von Neumann machines, fine. I tend to think we're more than that, because give two organisms the same set of information, they will both do different things with it. That alone introduces the element of conscious choice in their choices. (yikes, what a sentence) That's identity. As for will, well, Boro put it best up there, it just has to not die.

[Borodog]

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Replicators replicate becuase that's what replicators do, they replicate.

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What's being replicated isn't replicators

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It isn't? I suggest you read this statement again and reconsider.

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- it's informantion that's being replicated.

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Uh, that's like saying I'm not printing out my term paper, I'm printing out the information contained in my term paper on paper. It's a meaningless distinction.

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I'm not trying to interject meaning or purpose into the process, anymore than I'd claim a meaning or purpose for one body of mass to attract another. What I'm trying to get at is the principle behind this process.

As to identity and will, I'm not proposing that they have some sort of objective existence. So in the context of your post, what I'm trying to get at is: those bundles of information seem to act as if they had identity and will. Not in an absolute sense, but in a relative sense compared to other elements of matter that do not display those characteristics.

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But that's just it, they don't. This is why we can't prove consciousness exists in anyone but ourselves (via direct apprehension), because they behave exactly as machines would.

Life is a molecular machine that is built to create copies of itself. Answer me this: what would be the externally observable difference between a machine that built copies of itself because that's what it's built to do, and a machine that built copies of itself because that's what it's built to do AND it also "wants" to build copies of itself?

[John21]

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But that's just it, they don't. This is why we can't prove consciousness exists in anyone but ourselves (via direct apprehension), because they behave exactly as machines would.

Life is a molecular machine that is built to create copies of itself. Answer me this: what would be the externally observable difference between a machine that built copies of itself because that's what it's built to do, and a machine that built copies of itself because that's what it's built to do AND it also "wants" to build copies of itself?

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Believe it or not, I'm not arguing the points. There would be no objectively verifiable difference between the two machines.

From the basis of your argument, is there a reason why we cannot infer certain attributes (identity, will, etc...) to all living organisms for the sole reason that those attributes are present in our own subjective experience?

For expedience sake, is it impossible to concede that I am conscious or that I have a sense of identity? Or to use your example: if I'm a copy machine that wants/wills to reproduce itself; you're a copy machine that wants/wills to reproduce itself; all the other copy machines we communicate with and observe also display the same characteristic; and we're not aware of any copy machines that do not display that characteristic - what would be the basis 'not' to infer that particular attribute?

[madnak]

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What's being replicated isn't replicators - it's informantion that's being replicated.

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What's happening is that there are molecules that are arranged in just such a way that the proper series of reactions results in two identical copies of the molecule. That's basically it. Of course, it quickly gets more involved than that, but the "information" you're talking about is just what we call the result of the physical structure of these molecules. It's important that the physical structure of the molecules is "copied," that the replicants themselves are copied.

This doesn't work like a computer, in which the same information can be encoded according to different cyphers. The specific shape of the molecule, the specific combination of atoms, is very critical.

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I'm not trying to interject meaning or purpose into the process, anymore than I'd claim a meaning or purpose for one body of mass to attract another. What I'm trying to get at is the principle behind this process.

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The principle is just that, given a variety of replicators in an environment in which there are only enough resources for some of the replicators to replicate, some of the varieties of replicators will be better-able to replicate in the environment than others (typically those most likely to "find" the relevant resources). Therefore, these types of replicators will propagate, while the other types won't. I'm really not sure what you're getting at here.

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As to identity and will, I'm not proposing that they have some sort of objective existence. So in the context of your post, what I'm trying to get at is: those bundles of information seem to act as if they had identity and will. Not in an absolute sense, but in a relative sense compared to other elements of matter that do not display those characteristics.

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That really depends on what you mean by "identity and will." Does an electron emit photons because of its will? Does it perhaps "want" to get rid of energy and thus "choose" to emit photons? At what point does a certain particle or group of particles acting in an ordered way begin to have a "will?"

It also depends on the situation. The thing about evolution is that everything is adapted to a certain environment. In that environment the given organism may have an uncanny ability to "act in its interest," but in another environment its action may simply be absurd.

[madnak]

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For expedience sake, is it impossible to concede that I am conscious or that I have a sense of identity?

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Yes, it is impossible. That may be the crux of the issue. Is it possible that every organism has certain "qualia" associated with it? Sure, but qualia are inherently metaphysical or extraphysical, they can't be empirically verified. By definition. And they can't be associated with certain specific characteristics - an electron or a rock or a star might just as well experience subjective states in the philosophic sense.

But the actions of humans that we are most willing to ascribe to these qualia come from the prefrontal cortex - a relatively recent and relatively exclusive development. Moving away from, or toward, a certain stimulus is a property or inorganic as well as organic matter. The ability to say "I am" is a property only of the outer core of the complex brain.

[Borodog]

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But that's just it, they don't. This is why we can't prove consciousness exists in anyone but ourselves (via direct apprehension), because they behave exactly as machines would.

Life is a molecular machine that is built to create copies of itself. Answer me this: what would be the externally observable difference between a machine that built copies of itself because that's what it's built to do, and a machine that built copies of itself because that's what it's built to do AND it also "wants" to build copies of itself?

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Believe it or not, I'm not arguing the points. There would be no objectively verifiable difference between the two machines.

From the basis of your argument, is there a reason why we cannot infer certain attributes (identity, will, etc...) to all living organisms for the sole reason that those attributes are present in our own subjective experience?

For expedience sake, is it impossible to concede that I am conscious or that I have a sense of identity?

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Oh, I absolutely concede it. But I concede it on grounds of parsimony, and because I am uninterested in philosophical masturbations. I do not find it parsimonious to assume that a bacterium has consciousness or "will", and since there is no evidence that it does, I will not bother to postulate so, and will have no intellectual truck with anyone who does. Does that make sense?

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Or to use your example: if I'm a copy machine that wants/wills to reproduce itself; you're a copy machine that wants/wills to reproduce itself; all the other copy machines we communicate with and observe also display the same characteristic; and we're not aware of any copy machines that do not display that characteristic - what would be the basis 'not' to infer that particular attribute?

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Like I said. It seems unparsimonious to presume that paramecea have "wills". It does not seem unparsimonius to presume that for example dogs have a will.

Where is the dividing line? Damned if I know. But it seems parsimonious to think that it is very much closer to a dog than to a parameceum.

[John21]

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Oh, I absolutely concede it. But I concede it on grounds of parsimony, and because I am uninterested in philosophical masturbations . I do not find it parsimonious to assume that a bacterium has consciousness or "will", and since there is no evidence that it does, I will not bother to postulate so, and will have no intellectual truck with anyone who does.

Does that make sense?


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It makes complete sense. On future posts, I'll put a disclaimer that it is not scientific fact and simply a theory. And add to it that if you're expending a great deal of energy theorizing in other areas (political) - your palms may be too hairy to proceed further.

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Like I said. It seems unparsimonious to presume that paramecea have "wills". It does not seem unparsimonius to presume that for example dogs have a will.

Where is the dividing line? Damned if I know. But it seems parsimonious to think that it is very much closer to a dog than to a parameceum.


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All I was proposing was that maybe that dividing line doesn't exist. That attributes (identity & will) present in one form of life, though differing in degree, may be present in all forms of life.

And looking at a strand of RNA as a form of identity, rather than a set of instructions, could possibly remove some of the impasses that occur when discussing the origin of life.