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#11
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I've played almost 10k sitgnos and am still having problems with this. Every time I plug a hand like this into sngpt or sngwiz I get frustrated and don't come away with any conclusion on what my range should be. Example: Blinds: 100/200 BB: 1780 SB (you): 1760 BUTTON: 1855 CO: 1945 CO+1: 1570 CO+2: 4590 It folds to you in the SB. The BB is a great player that you've played with a lot before. Say your typical shoving range is 70%. He knows this so he's calling with 29.9%, but I now know that he knows this. so now I'm shoving 51.1% but now he knows that I know that he knows so now he's calling with 21%, but now I know..... etc,etc for infinity. It obviously gets insanely more complicated when it's not just two players but I'll just start with the previous example. [/ QUOTE ] It's not an exact science, don't make your head explode. Know your SNGPT for different calling ranges, know his "general" calling range, know your recent history together, know his rough threshold/tolerance for making adjustments, know his probable current state of mind/any adjustments he seems to be making off his normal game, and push accordingly (okay, it can get close to exploding, just don't go all the way with it). As long as you're on top of things and not making huge mistakes, you're well ahead of the curve. In general, it's hard to make huge mistakes pushing in the SB with 10 BB stacks unless BB is very spiteful (or very aware you're going any 2/near any 2 and making good value calls). In contrast, it's pretty easy to make huge mistakes by folding. That doesn't mean you go batsh-t crazy pushign with no discretion b/c that can have bad collateral consequences on top of being somewhat incorrect, but it's probably the safer side to err on if you're unsure in the moment. |
#12
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[ QUOTE ] I've played almost 10k sitgnos and am still having problems with this. Every time I plug a hand like this into sngpt or sngwiz I get frustrated and don't come away with any conclusion on what my range should be. Example: Blinds: 100/200 BB: 1780 SB (you): 1760 BUTTON: 1855 CO: 1945 CO+1: 1570 CO+2: 4590 It folds to you in the SB. The BB is a great player that you've played with a lot before. Say your typical shoving range is 70%. He knows this so he's calling with 29.9%, but I now know that he knows this. so now I'm shoving 51.1% but now he knows that I know that he knows so now he's calling with 21%, but now I know..... etc,etc for infinity. It obviously gets insanely more complicated when it's not just two players but I'll just start with the previous example. [/ QUOTE ] It's not an exact science, don't make your head explode. Know your SNGPT for different calling ranges, know his "general" calling range, know your recent history together, know his rough threshold/tolerance for making adjustments, know his probable current state of mind/any adjustments he seems to be making off his normal game, and push accordingly (okay, it can get close to exploding, just don't go all the way with it). As long as you're on top of things and not making huge mistakes, you're well ahead of the curve. In general, it's hard to make huge mistakes pushing in the SB with 10 BB stacks unless BB is very spiteful (or very aware you're going any 2/near any 2 and making good value calls). In contrast, it's pretty easy to make huge mistakes by folding. That doesn't mean you go batsh-t crazy pushign with no discretion b/c that can have bad collateral consequences on top of being somewhat incorrect, but it's probably the safer side to err on if you're unsure in the moment. [/ QUOTE ] He knows. He just wants to do the NE calc, which I'd check, but don't have SNGPT anymore. Did you see my post about your 4 min 8 second beer bong record? I thought it was pretty funny. That pic of you drinking a beer and doing your Dizzy Gillespie impression was pretty funny too. |
#13
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[ QUOTE ] [ QUOTE ] I've played almost 10k sitgnos and am still having problems with this. Every time I plug a hand like this into sngpt or sngwiz I get frustrated and don't come away with any conclusion on what my range should be. Example: Blinds: 100/200 BB: 1780 SB (you): 1760 BUTTON: 1855 CO: 1945 CO+1: 1570 CO+2: 4590 It folds to you in the SB. The BB is a great player that you've played with a lot before. Say your typical shoving range is 70%. He knows this so he's calling with 29.9%, but I now know that he knows this. so now I'm shoving 51.1% but now he knows that I know that he knows so now he's calling with 21%, but now I know..... etc,etc for infinity. It obviously gets insanely more complicated when it's not just two players but I'll just start with the previous example. [/ QUOTE ] It's not an exact science, don't make your head explode. Know your SNGPT for different calling ranges, know his "general" calling range, know your recent history together, know his rough threshold/tolerance for making adjustments, know his probable current state of mind/any adjustments he seems to be making off his normal game, and push accordingly (okay, it can get close to exploding, just don't go all the way with it). As long as you're on top of things and not making huge mistakes, you're well ahead of the curve. In general, it's hard to make huge mistakes pushing in the SB with 10 BB stacks unless BB is very spiteful (or very aware you're going any 2/near any 2 and making good value calls). In contrast, it's pretty easy to make huge mistakes by folding. That doesn't mean you go batsh-t crazy pushign with no discretion b/c that can have bad collateral consequences on top of being somewhat incorrect, but it's probably the safer side to err on if you're unsure in the moment. [/ QUOTE ] He knows. He just wants to do the NE calc, which I'd check, but don't have SNGPT anymore. Did you see my post about your 4 min 8 second beer bong record? I thought it was pretty funny. That pic of you drinking a beer and doing your Dizzy Gillespie impression was pretty funny too. [/ QUOTE ] I have a problem with running with a bunch of beer in my gut, so I sucked whenever we did the beer mile at the end of x-country season, I don't think I ever broke 10 minutes even though some people did in the 6's (out of cans/bottles too, more foam issues), and even though I could put away my fair share of liquid back in the day. |
#14
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fold and wait for the next hand
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#15
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Interesting thought. Is it possible to find a mixed strategy that defeats a non-mixed Nash Eq. strategy? Seems like no. Seems like when you are not pushing hands in the non-mixed Nash Eq. range you are -EV and when you push hands outside of that range you are also -EV. [/ QUOTE ] I havent taken game theory for awhile but i think there might be assuming the game is played multiple times. what about a strategy in which the SB always folds his BB? in the 1000s of hands they play together this has to happen the other way around too of course. as soon as one player deviates you can then "punish" them by calling correctly. this might be similiar to two players colluding on the bubble so both their equities increase. i know this probably isnt what youre looking for but w/e thinking about this more this has a good chance of being correct. after all, everyone else gains when these 2 players collide and this would prevent that from happening. |
#16
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[ QUOTE ] Interesting thought. Is it possible to find a mixed strategy that defeats a non-mixed Nash Eq. strategy? Seems like no. Seems like when you are not pushing hands in the non-mixed Nash Eq. range you are -EV and when you push hands outside of that range you are also -EV. [/ QUOTE ] I havent taken game theory for awhile but i think there might be assuming the game is played multiple times. what about a strategy in which the SB always folds his BB? in the 1000s of hands they play together this has to happen the other way around too of course. as soon as one player deviates you can then "punish" them by calling correctly. this might be similiar to two players colluding on the bubble so both their equities increase. i know this probably isnt what youre looking for but w/e thinking about this more this has a good chance of being correct. after all, everyone else gains when these 2 players collide and this would prevent that from happening. [/ QUOTE ] Yeah, we're really talking about strategies for SB vs. BB, not SB and BB vs. the rest of the table. If both SB and BB always play NE vs each other, they are 0EV in those situations. They should be able to cooperatively play together so they both are +EV. It seems pretty obvious that this is collusion if it's a strategy that includes many SNGs as opposed to something like checking down when shorty is AI and two middle stacks want to bust him. Also, obviously, I know you're just talking academically and wouldn't do this. |
#17
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How would a Nash equilibrium apply to poker. Since there is a rake we have no Nash equilibrium since both players (or the players onvolved in the hand/tournament) would be losing in the long run no matter which strategy the community of players would would choose when playing. unless someone willingly would make a bad choise. We would have a situation where the participants would be losers if they ever achieved a Nash equilibrium!
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#18
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[ QUOTE ]
How would a Nash equilibrium apply to poker. Since there is a rake we have no Nash equilibrium since both players (or the players onvolved in the hand/tournament) would be losing in the long run no matter which strategy the community of players would would choose when playing. unless someone willingly would make a bad choise. We would have a situation where the participants would be losers if they ever achieved a Nash equilibrium! [/ QUOTE ] If both players are playing NE they're 0-EV but if the expectation of the game itself is negative then their EV is the expectation of the game (but never less than that). And I think there are situations where player1 can have an edge on player2 even if they both played NE. Mathematics of poker had some examples of this stuff I think. |
#19
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[ QUOTE ] How would a Nash equilibrium apply to poker. Since there is a rake we have no Nash equilibrium since both players (or the players onvolved in the hand/tournament) would be losing in the long run no matter which strategy the community of players would would choose when playing. unless someone willingly would make a bad choise. We would have a situation where the participants would be losers if they ever achieved a Nash equilibrium! [/ QUOTE ] If both players are playing NE they're 0-EV but if the expectation of the game itself is negative then their EV is the expectation of the game (but never less than that). And I think there are situations where player1 can have an edge on player2 even if they both played NE. Mathematics of poker had some examples of this stuff I think. [/ QUOTE ] Yeah, there are tons of spots where the SB has a big edge even if they both play according to NE. Like when SB is the big stack, BB has a healthy stack and there is one really short stack on the bubble. Even if SB is pushing ATC, BB should often call tight enough that SB can keep pushing ATC if BB calls perfectly. |
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