My Basic Thought On Free Will

[George Rice]

My point is that there is something that prevents us from doing or thinking just anything. And it's not just because we chose not to. Unless there's something "wrong" with you, you will never be able to do these things.

And this "type" of free will differs from another which has to do with whether on not things are prederermined.

[WelshMackem]

The only thing that worries me about free will is how many whales were hurt in filming.

Might seem a glib answer, but it adds about as much new material to the debate as the rest of the thread.

[Magellan]

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Well if you are going to discuss this question rigorously, it is imperative that you define what you mean by "free will" in very precise technical terms.

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Can you give us an idea of what you personally think of as free will when you consider the subject?

[Phanekim]

I had this discussion with a social psych professor many a year ago. I wonder what DS has to say in response to this.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence

this was his arguement. i was arguing there exists free will. Over the years, I have thought otherwise. At the bottom, they talk about no limit hold 'em.

[Borodog]

I tend to agree with Rothbard about free will, at least to this extent:

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After several centuries of arrogant proclamations, no determinist has come up with anything like a theory determining all of men's actions. Surely the burden of proof must rest on the one advancing a theory, particularly when the theory contradicts man's primary impressions. Surely we can, at the very least, tell the determinists to keep quiet until they can offer their determinations—including, of course, their advance determinations of each of our reactions to their determining theory.

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[West]

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I tend to agree with Rothbard about free will, at least to this extent:


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After several centuries of arrogant proclamations, no determinist has come up with anything like a theory determining all of men's actions. Surely the burden of proof must rest on the one advancing a theory, particularly when the theory contradicts man's primary impressions. Surely we can, at the very least, tell the determinists to keep quiet until they can offer their determinations—including, of course, their advance determinations of each of our reactions to their determining theory.


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I knew you were going to say that

[drzen]

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David,

your 'proof' sounds very much like the logically flawed ontological God proof to me


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That's all that needs to be said about it, and were Russell alive, he wouldn't find it necessary to say any more than to say that he can conceive of unicorns.

[drzen]

[ QUOTE ]
My point is that there is something that prevents us from doing or thinking just anything. And it's not just because we chose not to. Unless there's something "wrong" with you, you will never be able to do these things.

And this "type" of free will differs from another which has to do with whether on not things are prederermined.

[/ QUOTE ]

Could you do them if you were a cannibal?
Could you do them if there were no law?
Could you do them if you were raised by wolves?
Could you do them if God told you to?

[Splendour]

I am not very knowledgable about free will, but as I think about it I remember something interesting from the novel "The Maltese Falcon" by Dashiell Hammett...In that novel the character being sought by the hero tells a story about how he abandoned his family and whole life after a beam falls off a building and almost kills him...The weird thing was that after having this consciousness altering experience he remarried a woman similar to his first wife and took up a career and life similar to the one he originally had...in other words he jumped tracks then ended up in a very similar groove to the one he started from...makes you think...do we run from one thing to run back to what we just came from...how does free will fit into that? Personally I get bored with the same routine so I doubt if I ever jumped tracks I would end up back in the same place, but you gotta wonder...

[athought]

How enlightening this conversation is.

I've always been exposed to theological free will as the freedom for a person to choose between doing something their god does or doesn't want them to do. (i.e. or maybe more directly stated as the freedom to disobey one's god). The problem with this notion is of course that direct coercion involved in the very definition.

Now, the argument of pure free will - or whether one can exercise control over his/her own actions seemingly also hinges on the semantics of the definition - and this definition also seemingly prevents us from any sort of proof if I understand correctly.

That is, if determinism implies that the outcome of a "seemingly" random event (a dice roll) is pre-determined? If so that event was not truly random. Something forced a predetermined outcome. But since we lack the tools or understanding of the laws that caused the outcome - it to us is random.

So I guess I'm asking - does this mean that ignorance is a prerequisite of free will. Or rather - As long as one does not have the means or capacity to measures all the forces of the universe at work, free will exist on a relative basis for that person.

Or am I way off?

It feels like some corollary of HUP applies in this discussion.