He See's Someones Cards

[pokerponcho]

Even so, it is still collusion. The information is collaborated. Whether he wispers it to his friend or whether he peaks, or whether it''s "magic" is not relevant. Saying that it's sneaking a peak is logical because:

1) The "sucker" is unaware.

2) The cheater knows exactly what the sucker has.

Acting on this tell is not always logical because:

1) It is unethical as violates some of the collaborative ethics of the game.

2) It is unreliable as you do not know what the cheater is thinking.

It's a risky thing to do. One misread, and you get slaughtered. That's why I recommend a tight/aggressive strategy against the cheater. There are several reasons to do it this way:

1) The cheater won't catch on so easily.

2) Re-raising him occasional will put him to the test.

3) This is the way that we play poker. This is the way that we make the most money.

4) Pigs get slaughtered.

[Bad Lobster]

I don’t think you suffer any disadvantage at all. In fact, according to my calculations Player A (the peeker) gains expectation at the expense of Player B (the flasher), you gain expectation at the expense of Players A and B, and Player X (any other player at the table) gains expectation at the expense of both you and Player A.

Counterintuitive? Remember, according to game theory, everyone should be playing their optimum strategy, which is defined as the strategy that gives the maximum expectation when opponents are playing their optimum strategy.

Now, all the Player X’s are playing the same optimum strategy that applies to the no-cheating game. But you and Player A are no longer playing your optimum strategy against Player X (because you’ve both deviated from your optimum ordinary-game strategy to take advantage of Player B). Therefore, Player X’s expectation has to go up--if it did not, then the original strategy could not have been optimum. To put it another way, you and Player A are willingly giving up a tiny bit of expectation vs. all the Player X’s in order to gain a large amount of expectation vs. Player B (and in your case, against Player A). For you and Player A, these are your new optimums.

Any game theorists out there to check my logic?

[pandemonium]

[ QUOTE ]
Any game theorists out there to check my logic?

[/ QUOTE ]

No game theorist here, but there are a few things that might be pointed out. First, in the real world for a normal (non-colluding) game, no player is an optimal player in the game theory sense. No one (currently) knows what an optimal strategy would be... even the best players cannot fathom the entire game tree and therefore their play deviates from optimal.

Second, the colluding game exhibits an entirely different decision search space, such that even if real world players were playing optimally for a regular game, said strategy would most likely be non-optimal for the colluding game. In other words, the only player that can possibly play optimally in the colluding game is the one who is peeking.

The player aware of the peeking can minimize his losses under this situation, but he will never be able to formulate an optimal strategy that will be +EV vis a vis the cheater UNLESS the cheater is playing with non-optimal strategy for the new (collusion) game-- which he may very well be in order to maximize his winnings vis a vis the passive colluder.

Finally it's doubtful that the active colluder is playing optimally since there are over 552 versions of this game, and even in the three player case, there exist two choices-- he is cheating unobserved, or his cheating is observed but he is not certain of that fact.

[pokerponcho]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Any game theorists out there to check my logic?

[/ QUOTE ]

No game theorist here, but there are a few things that might be pointed out. First, in the real world for a normal (non-colluding) game, no player is an optimal player in the game theory sense. No one (currently) knows what an optimal strategy would be... even the best players cannot fathom the entire game tree and therefore their play deviates from optimal.

Second, the colluding game exhibits an entirely different decision search space, such that even if real world players were playing optimally for a regular game, said strategy would most likely be non-optimal for the colluding game. In other words, the only player that can possibly play optimally in the colluding game is the one who is peeking.

The player aware of the peeking can minimize his losses under this situation, but he will never be able to formulate an optimal strategy that will be +EV vis a vis the cheater UNLESS the cheater is playing with non-optimal strategy for the new (collusion) game-- which he may very well be in order to maximize his winnings vis a vis the passive colluder.

Finally it's doubtful that the active colluder is playing optimally since there are over 552 versions of this game, and even in the three player case, there exist two choices-- he is cheating unobserved, or his cheating is observed but he is not certain of that fact.

[/ QUOTE ]

I agree 100%. I also think its sort've crappy that the initial thread purposefully skips over the ethical question. Poker should be treated with more respect than this.

[JaredL]

[ QUOTE ]

Counterintuitive? Remember, according to game theory, everyone should be playing their optimum strategy, which is defined as the strategy that gives the maximum expectation when opponents are playing their optimum strategy.


[/ QUOTE ]

Good so far

[ QUOTE ]

Now, all the Player X’s are playing the same optimum strategy that applies to the no-cheating game. But you and Player A are no longer playing your optimum strategy against Player X (because you’ve both deviated from your optimum ordinary-game strategy to take advantage of Player B). Therefore, Player X’s expectation has to go up--if it did not, then the original strategy could not have been optimum.

[/ QUOTE ]

This part is incorrect.

Consider the following 3-player, zero-sum game. Each player simultaneously chooses one of two options A and B. The payoffs are:
- if all 3 choose the same option, each gets nothing
- if two choose an option, and the last player chooses another, then the odd man out pays each of the other two one dollar. There are two pure-strategy equilibra - all three choosing A and all three choosing B.

Suppose we are in the all choose A equilibrium. If players 1 and 2 both deviate and choose B they will gain at 3's expense.

Basically, equilibrium analysis in games is (pretty much) always restricted so that it doesn't take into account multiple players deviating. Also, I suspect that you understand this bit, but if you have a 3 player poker game and player 1 changes from the equilibrium strategy and 2 and 3 keep playing their equilibrium strategies, then we know 1 will be worse off. Without further information, we can't say whether 2 and 3 will be each better off or not, though they collectively will be. If, however, 2 is made worse by this deviation by 1 then it must make 3 better off and vice-versa. However, if both one and two deviate we don't know how this would affect the third or the first two for that matter.

[rjohson]

i dont think it makes any difference because even tho you know, what the other guy sees another guys cards it doesnt help u in the least bit, because you still dont know if the see er is reacting to his new found information or if hes just playing his hand as usaual

[DiceyPlay]

Let the player exposing his cards be player A
Let the player seeing player A's cards be player B

Suppose player B is on the left of player A and you are on the left of player B. You know player A's starting criteria is weakish and you know player B plays well enough to try and isolate when the opportunity arises.

Since you know player B will make the isolation play, you can re-isolate when you feel you have player B's hand beat given you know player B might be raising light to isolate player A.

This gives you an advantage. Information and patience are the keys to success.

[dreilly]

well i thought about this for a while and i came to the conclusion it would be a disadvantage for you even though you can deduct what hand they both have compared to each other and that is an advantage to you but the expert who has seen two sets of cards has the bigger edge and therefore you are at more of a disadvantage to this player if you end up heads up with him in this pot, if he folds you are at a huge advantage because you can probably count on the fact that they both have matching cards. is this over the full game or just one hand?