blitzing on third and long and the problem with poker forum advice

[grizy]

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So the times you don't have the straight, the correct strategy is majority check, minority bet, even though "check" has 0 e.v. and "bet" has negative e.v. Is there a mistake here?

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I have a more than cursory familiarity with game theory.

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= does not compute.

Against an maximally exploitive opponent in a clairvoyant situation like the one you describe, bluffing does not have -EV. It has 0EV because his calling frequency makes you indifferent to bluffing.

It gets no more basic than this.

If your opponent is not maximally exploitive, and will be either folding or calling too often, you would not want to use a mixed strategy. You would either always bluff (because bluffing is +EV) or never bluff (because bluffing is -EV.)


What part of this do you not understand?

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You are wrong, in pete's example of bluffing into a DRY sidepot, a bluff with pure air (a bet) is always negative EV.

[Subfallen]

grizy -

You are making the exact point I am. The EV of bluffing against an optimal opponent in the clairvoyance game is 0.

Interestingly, 0 is also the EV of checking.

That Pete would suggest this situation as an example where an optimal mixed strategy contains different EV branches suggests that he is not only clueless, but mildly retarded.

[Subfallen]

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So the times you don't have the straight, the correct strategy is majority check, minority bet, even though "check" has 0 e.v. and "bet" has negative e.v. Is there a mistake here?

[/ QUOTE ]
+
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I have a more than cursory familiarity with game theory.

[/ QUOTE ]
= does not compute.

Against an maximally exploitive opponent in a clairvoyant situation like the one you describe, bluffing does not have -EV. It has 0EV because his calling frequency makes you indifferent to bluffing.

It gets no more basic than this.

If your opponent is not maximally exploitive, and will be either folding or calling too often, you would not want to use a mixed strategy. You would either always bluff (because bluffing is +EV) or never bluff (because bluffing is -EV.)


What part of this do you not understand?

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You are wrong, in pete's example of bluffing into a DRY sidepot, a bluff with pure air (a bet) is always negative EV.

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WTF? not bluffing loses the main pot. We are talking about a poker-like game with antes, right?

[grizy]

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grizy -

You are making the exact point I am. The EV of bluffing against an optimal opponent in the clairvoyance game is 0.

Interestingly, 0 is also the EV of checking.

That Pete would suggest this situation as an example where an optimal mixed strategy contains different EV branches suggests that he is not only clueless, but mildly retarded.

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Wtf, so you're playing a game where your opponent's actions are never dependent on yours?

1. such a game is not poker.
2. if you're truly clairvoyant, you should be playing the loterry.

I just wated 10 minutes of my life.

[grizy]

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So the times you don't have the straight, the correct strategy is majority check, minority bet, even though "check" has 0 e.v. and "bet" has negative e.v. Is there a mistake here?

[/ QUOTE ]
+
[ QUOTE ]

I have a more than cursory familiarity with game theory.

[/ QUOTE ]
= does not compute.

Against an maximally exploitive opponent in a clairvoyant situation like the one you describe, bluffing does not have -EV. It has 0EV because his calling frequency makes you indifferent to bluffing.

It gets no more basic than this.

If your opponent is not maximally exploitive, and will be either folding or calling too often, you would not want to use a mixed strategy. You would either always bluff (because bluffing is +EV) or never bluff (because bluffing is -EV.)


What part of this do you not understand?

[/ QUOTE ]

You are wrong, in pete's example of bluffing into a DRY sidepot, a bluff with pure air (a bet) is always negative EV.

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WTF? not bluffing loses the main pot. We are talking about a poker-like game with antes, right?

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My sir, think about your last statement. let's say you and villain both call someone who's all in on the flop. there is a massive main pot but nothing in the sidepot. There is your totally 100% dry sidepot.

[Subfallen]

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grizy -

You are making the exact point I am. The EV of bluffing against an optimal opponent in the clairvoyance game is 0.

Interestingly, 0 is also the EV of checking.

That Pete would suggest this situation as an example where an optimal mixed strategy contains different EV branches suggests that he is not only clueless, but mildly retarded.

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Wtf, so you're playing a game where your opponent's actions are never dependent on yours?

1. such a game is not poker.
2. if you're truly clairvoyant, you should be playing the loterry.

I just wated 10 minutes of my life.

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Pete assumed clairvoyance when he said we know our opponent has top pair.

[grizy]

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grizy -

You are making the exact point I am. The EV of bluffing against an optimal opponent in the clairvoyance game is 0.

Interestingly, 0 is also the EV of checking.

That Pete would suggest this situation as an example where an optimal mixed strategy contains different EV branches suggests that he is not only clueless, but mildly retarded.

[/ QUOTE ]

Wtf, so you're playing a game where your opponent's actions are never dependent on yours?

1. such a game is not poker.
2. if you're truly clairvoyant, you should be playing the loterry.

I just wated 10 minutes of my life.

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Pete assumed clairvoyance when he said we know our opponent has top pair.

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He did not assume to know what our opponent's strategy is... and unless you violate that assumption, z's dependence on x in my example dictates a mixed strategy is best.... and that betting a totally dry side pot is always negative EV.

Look, Pete explained the game in words to you already... and I put it into matrix form. If you still can't figure it out, you really need to take game theory 101 or whatever they call it nowadays.

[Subfallen]

I don't know why you're all thinking in terms of individual outcomes instead of overall strategic EV. W/e. Enjoy, gl at the tables.

[grizy]

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Here you are also categorically wrong. The very definition of an optimal mixed strategy in game theory requires that the mixed strategy yield equal EV across all actions vs. a maximally exploitive opponent.


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this sir... is wrong. Even John Nash could only prove it to be the case with assigned probabilities, would you care to outdo one of the greatest geniuses of the 20th century?

Furthermore, even if an unique nash equilibrium solution is possible here, you are assuming your opponent is also playing a perfect mixed strategy game in opposition to yours.

THis is not possible in a real world poker game, which in all probability has infinite number of nash equilibriums possible, noen of which (probably) is stable.

[Jerrod Ankenman]

Two things:

Zero-sum two-player games are a lot different than multiplayer games. Many of the terms and concepts that we define/explain in our book apply ONLY to ZSTPG, and not to other situations, such as multiplayer, in a technical sense, although they are still useful for understanding various situations.

So this bluffing into a dry side pot thing isn't really a very good example, because it's not an example of an "optimal" or "equilibrium" solution - it's an example of perturbing the (three-player Nash) equilibrium solution by threatening to transfer equity from one guy to the other in order to make the threatened guy pay you. This is obvious because you would prefer the guy to know that you bluff into dry side pots (with negative EV) because then he will call you and not otherwise. But the essential feature is the third player to whom you can transfer the first guy's equity.

Secondly, in a ZSTPG, it's obvious on reflection that IF strategy X is optimal (that is, is part of an optimal strategy-pair), and strategy X contains at least one mixed strategy where the number of non-zero strategic option weights is 2 or more, then each of those strategic options must have equal value against the other member of the strategy-pair. If this weren't true then the player playing X could improve his equity unilaterally by changing his mixed strategy to be pure in the higher-valued strategic option, which violates the condition that X is part of an optimal strategy-pair.