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#1
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[quote] Anyway, it seems to me that somewhere out there in logicland, a proof of free will can be constructed from the simple fact that PEOPLE WONDER (AND DISCUSS) WHETHER THEY HAVE FREE WILL.
It seems to me that the premise (in CAPS above) is a bit too strong. Unless one can really get inside another's head, I think we must adopt a more limited starting point: (A) I WONDER WHETHER I HAVE FREE WILL. (B) I HAVE HEARD OTHER PEOPLE SAY THAT THEY WONDER WHETHER THEY HAVE FREE WILL. Perhaps (A) provides a sufficient basis for an argument which I find compelling that I have free will. For the moment, let us take the existence of such an argument as given. How might I extend it to other people? An initially appealing approach is to assume that because other people look, act, smell, etc. so much like me, they experience existence in the same way I do. (B) reinforces the notion that other people are like me. Since I am convinced of my own free will, they must share this quality. Therefore, people have free will. I think that David's original assumption is initially accepted by most people because of an implicit similarity argument. Other people tell us they wonder about the same thing. Because they are so similar to us, they must be capable of wondering about the same thing. It is unlikely that they are all lying. Therefore, other people do wonder about the same thing. What if I want to know if a more differentiated creature has free will? Now things get sticky. Gorillas are in many ways similar to people -- do they have free will? Do all apes and monkeys have free will? All mammals? All animals? Lichen? Aliens land in Washington, D.C. tomorrow -- they have no heads, their bodies contain no carbon, but do contain a large amount of silicon. They look very different from us - might they too have free will? If so, might computers have free will? If so, which computers? I think there is a more fruitful approach to the issue that at least allows simultaneously for free will and determinism, but I have neither the time nor energy to delve into it now. Perhaps in a later post. As a teaser, I think that the conflict between free will and determinism might be largely rectified through careful consideration of frames of reference. |
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#2
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With the exception of a few fringe idea's like Penrose (Shadows of the mind, Emporers new mind) academic consensus in relation to models of the Physical universe suggest a fundamentallly deterministic universe.
Penrose implicitly suggests that large scale quantum cooherence in the human brain allows for quantum uncertainty to act as an interface for free-will to interact with the physical universe. Most scientist would agree that this is pseudo-sceintific speculation at best, and more likely misleading nonsense. None of the widely used physical models of the universe include equations such as E=mc^2+(D) where D is David's next decision. While the models currently used do place limitations on "predictability", they do not suggest anything other than a fundamentally deterministic universe. That free-will exists at the level of experience is clear, the rational implication of accepted scientific models is however that experience of free will is simply a phenomenon. The suggestion is thus that decisions percieved as "free-will" are fundamentally consequential. Any suggestion to the contrary, indicating that decisions of a "mind" external to the physical system can alter the determistic nature of causal physical relationships, would require a rewriting of accepted scientific models of the physical world. Your can browse for such attempts on google (quantum consciousness etc.) I rank them alongside "action flop theory" and "**** poker is rigged". Good luck |
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#3
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I agree with most (perhaps all) of this post. I also think that I have free will. Hmmmm.
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#4
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Welcome to Retardville. Population: you
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