My Basic Thought On Free Will

[Patrick Sileo]

[quote] Anyway, it seems to me that somewhere out there in logicland, a proof of free will can be constructed from the simple fact that PEOPLE WONDER (AND DISCUSS) WHETHER THEY HAVE FREE WILL.

It seems to me that the premise (in CAPS above) is a bit too strong. Unless one can really get inside another's head, I think we must adopt a more limited starting point:

(A) I WONDER WHETHER I HAVE FREE WILL.
(B) I HAVE HEARD OTHER PEOPLE SAY THAT THEY WONDER WHETHER THEY HAVE FREE WILL.

Perhaps (A) provides a sufficient basis for an argument which I find compelling that I have free will. For the moment, let us take the existence of such an argument as given. How might I extend it to other people?

An initially appealing approach is to assume that because other people look, act, smell, etc. so much like me, they experience existence in the same way I do. (B) reinforces the notion that other people are like me. Since I am convinced of my own free will, they must share this quality. Therefore, people have free will.

I think that David's original assumption is initially accepted by most people because of an implicit similarity argument. Other people tell us they wonder about the same thing. Because they are so similar to us, they must be capable of wondering about the same thing. It is unlikely that they are all lying. Therefore, other people do wonder about the same thing.

What if I want to know if a more differentiated creature has free will? Now things get sticky. Gorillas are in many ways similar to people -- do they have free will? Do all apes and monkeys have free will? All mammals? All animals? Lichen? Aliens land in Washington, D.C. tomorrow -- they have no heads, their bodies contain no carbon, but do contain a large amount of silicon. They look very different from us - might they too have free will? If so, might computers have free will? If so, which computers?

I think there is a more fruitful approach to the issue that at least allows simultaneously for free will and determinism, but I have neither the time nor energy to delve into it now. Perhaps in a later post. As a teaser, I think that the conflict between free will and determinism might be largely rectified through careful consideration of frames of reference.