Absolute Soulreading/Rigged thread #3

[Dan Druff]

Here is one of the many obvious chip dumping hands that went down.

BTW, it was GRAYCAT "complaining" when losing to SUPERCARDM55. SUPERCARD had nothing to complain about, obviously, winning 55k.

Also, I called AP Security yesterday. They refused to put me on with anyone directly involved with investigating this case, claiming that those people "don't take calls". Total joke.

I think I'm just going to go over security's head and speak directly to some higher-ups at AP.

Stage #748836808: Holdem (1 on 1) Normal $200/$400 - 2007-08-30 14:48:27 (ET)
Table: IOWA DR (Real Money) Seat #6 is the dealer
Seat 6 - GRAYCAT ($7638 in chips)
Seat 4 - SUPERCARDM55 ($17717 in chips)
GRAYCAT - Posts small blind $100
SUPERCARDM55 - Posts big blind $200
*** POCKET CARDS ***
GRAYCAT - Raises $300 to $400
SUPERCARDM55 - Raises $400 to $600
GRAYCAT - Raises $400 to $800
SUPERCARDM55 - Calls $200
*** FLOP *** [3s Jc 2c]
SUPERCARDM55 - Bets $200
GRAYCAT - Raises $400 to $400
SUPERCARDM55 - Raises $400 to $600
GRAYCAT - Raises $400 to $800
SUPERCARDM55 - Calls $200
*** TURN *** [3s Jc 2c] [10c]
SUPERCARDM55 - Checks
GRAYCAT - Bets $400
SUPERCARDM55 - Raises $800 to $800
GRAYCAT - Raises $800 to $1200
SUPERCARDM55 - Raises $800 to $1600
GRAYCAT - Calls $400
*** RIVER *** [3s Jc 2c 10c] [Qc]
SUPERCARDM55 - Bets $400
GRAYCAT - Raises $800 to $800
SUPERCARDM55 - Raises $800 to $1200
GRAYCAT - Calls $400
*** SHOW DOWN ***
SUPERCARDM55 - Shows [6c 6d] (Flush, queen high)
GRAYCAT - Mucks
SUPERCARDM55 Collects $8799 from main pot
*** SUMMARY ***
Total Pot($8800) | Rake ($1)
Board [3s Jc 2c 10c Qc]
Seat 4: SUPERCARDM55 (small blind) won Total ($8799) HI$8799) with Flush, queen high [6c 6d - B:Qc,B:Jc,B:10c,P:6c,B:2c]
Seat 6: GRAYCAT (dealer) HI: [Mucked] [3d As]

[Schneids]

[ QUOTE ]
Seat 6: GRAYCAT (dealer) HI: [Mucked] [3d As]

[/ QUOTE ]

How do you know this? Did he show?

[suzzer99]

If you try to transfer a small amount to any of these accounts, will it tell you if they've been deactivated?

[suzzer99]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Seat 6: GRAYCAT (dealer) HI: [Mucked] [3d As]

[/ QUOTE ]

How do you know this? Did he show?

[/ QUOTE ]

Absolute seems to show mucked cards to observers.

[etojim]

found this @http://www.pokerconduct.com/cgi-bin/sp/sp.cgi?c=nickdangerabsolutexposed

"Recently, an elite programmer I associate with known as Dillinger (real name being withheld at his request), contacted me concerning a project we've been collaborating on referencing the conduct and honesty of online gambling sites.

Next to intricate programming skills, Dillingers other passion is spending the bulk of his free time (as so many of us do) playing poker online. However, he took things a step further and designed a program which most of us only wish we had the expertise to construct and then implement.

What you are about to read is without doubt the most eye opening information you'll find 'anywhere' concerning the integrity of online poker and casinos! So read on to discover the Absolute Truth!

After long hours and close observation of online play, Dillinger began noticing a pattern of events that struck a nerve and presented him with serious doubts concerning the creditability of the program software being used at online gambling sites. He'd always known there were various methods a site could use to manipulate software and eventually concluded that every poker site he was playing at was using some form of underhanded programming to extract player funds dishonestly. As a result, Dillinger ventures on a quest to discover the truth.

Our man of the hour immediately set out to construct a 'Trojan Stealth Virus' that could infiltrate any gambling sites internal program structure. Enter undetected, spider through all system hierarchy, compile specific information on the program integrity, check for tampering, evaluate algorithms etc. then send the results back to it's origin without a trace.

He successfully sent this 'Stealth Virus' to the computer servers at Absolute Poker to investigate. What it brought back will make the hair on the back of your neck stand on end if you play for real money at Absolute Poker!

Here are the findings of this covert maneuver at AP:

First off, Dillingers Stealth Virus sends back conformation regarding my article on the dreaded DOOM SWITCH!

The Doom Switch 'is on' at AP! It's a program virus used by Absolute Poker, aimed at members accounts. It causes all funds in your account to disappear through habitual loosing hands. Once the virus depletes all the funds in your account, statistics show that 92% of all gamblers will make additional deposits in an attempt to recover these losses.

This same ploy is also used to compel players who win money in freerolls to make deposits after loosing their freeroll cash. The average freeroll winner never increases their winnings much beyond $50. It's designed to give the player a false sense of security when they find themselves winning a freeroll and then win a little more at other tables. Once all the freeroll money is gone, it induces most players to break down and finally begin making real money deposits.

Next we learned that 'Program Dealing' is being used over at AP. Program Dealing is a special program designed to take away any aspect of random card generation! It pre-determines which cards will fall during a game, rather than allowing the cards to fall by random chance. Just another one of the many tricks used in Absolutes sinister arsenal!

Another program device AP uses, will automatically choose which cards players are dealt and predetermine the outcome of that game. This is most likely used to simulate a dry spell, which follows you from seat to seat, effecting 'you personally' and not allowing each seat to continually be dealt randomly or fairly!

They appear to use detectors that capture all the windows you may be using on your computer while playing at Absolute Poker. For what reason, we can only speculate.

Dillingers newly constructed 'Program' has conclusively proven that Absolute Poker is most certainly deceiving their members by stealing their deposits using systematic program procedures. This is only the beginning and there will be more to come.

You must pass this information on to every online poker player you know! It's your duty to help inform others of impending doom!

All of Dillingers future findings on corrupt sites will be posted here as they filter in! So watch for PokerConduct.com mailings and check back often!

Nick Danger"

[Pokeraddict]

Poker Conduct is not exactly one of the more credible sources.

[Robin Foolz]

[ QUOTE ]


Our man of the hour immediately set out to construct a 'Trojan Stealth Virus'

[/ QUOTE ]

thanks for the laugh.

[PokerStorm]

[ QUOTE ]
I really don't think that AP will consider civil litigation to be a credible threat.

[/ QUOTE ]

Em, why even bring a civil action straight off and risk any money when you could just report it to the authorities and let them make a criminal investigation. Once they have successfully prosecuted Absolute and the cheats, then you bring the civil action which would basically be an open and close case if they have already been found guilty in a criminal court. Just report it to www.Recol.ca and let them do their job.

[Marnixvdb]

Adanthar, are the hh's from some of the cash sessions available? Would be interesting to put them through a HH replayer. Since most mucked cards will be shown, people could get a good feel of the unlikeliness of the riverplay.

[PokerStorm]

[ QUOTE ]
Think about this logically. None of the superuser accounts ever played multiple tables, either in tournaments or in cash games, even though the guy had access to five separate accounts - and Potripper didn't cheat on the first hand he got moved to the FT. We can be sure that this visual aid, whatever it was, is an outside program that doesn't overlay itself over the AP window.

But if it's a program, why not just run multiple copies of it, even on another PC if you have to, to allow you to multitable? A hacker with 2 computers can just buy a few more and run it on extra machines, can't he?

Answer: because it's not a program. It's a login/password that allows you access to a superuser account on the AP server that can only look at 1 table at a time, and the reason the cheater only played 1 table was because he only had the one login/PW combination. There's no way something like this allows you to log in twice with the same ID, so...either a hacker used social engineering with a critical security guy at AP, or it's an inside job. Either way, it's an internal program that was compromised.

[/ QUOTE ]

I think the one tabling argument is way off the mark and is pure speculation. If it's an internal program that's involved in the cheating, which it could be, there is absolutely no reason not to have the functionality to open more than 1 table. If it is an internal program it would basically be a security account with certain restrictions rather than a superuser account. This security account used for collusion and cheating detection would basically function as a regular account except that it can't buy in to a table, only view them, and all the cards that are dealt out appear face up on this account. This is the way a security program would operate, unlike a hacker who might just get a stream of text detailing the cards dealt (and he most likely wouldn't bother to code a gui to overlay it), the security account would definatlely have the cards up on screen to make the dectection job easier and it would take hardly any extra code, just a few flags to say that the account is a security one in the rendering function.

So basically opening a table with this account would be the same as opening it with a regular one with the exception that a few flags are set in the code so that when the card display function is being exectuted it see's that it is the security account and renders all the cards face up. The code would have to be written to explicitly limit the functionality to 1 table...and why bother doing that if you want to be able to detect have people possibly cheating/colluding across multiple tables, or multiple separate possiblities of collusion. The cheat may have just been playing one table because he is unable to multitable, I know plenty of people who struggle with more than 1. He also thought it might be going to far to be killing more than 1 table at once. If he did have access to a security account he was already using two PCs to cheat as I mention below. Who knows why he only one tabled, I'm just speculating here myself.


Anyway, I've been thinking that if it is a security account that the cheat had access to it is highly unlikely he was doing the cheating through that actual account as how is he supposed to get money on to it or off it(bar chip dumping), it is very very unlikely to even offer a deposit method as it would be a highly restricted account with limited functionality. So the cheat would have to log into the security account to be able to see everyone's hole cards, while at the same time logging in with his own account on a different computer to make use of the info. That could explain why it takes him a bit of time when the table first loads up before he starts winning everything, as once he has joined a table with his own account he would then have to search for that table with the security one.

To sum up.
1). If it was a security account that the cheat had access to, he would have to log into his own account on a diffent pc to make use of the info as the security account could only view tables, not play on them. This could either be someone who worked for or formerly worked for Absolute, abusing something that they had access to. I don't see how an outside hacker could get access to this account, bar getting a keylogger onto someone in the security department's computer...

2). If it was a superuser account, that could see the cards and let you play at a table, it has to have the backing of Absolute poker itself as this functionality to buy in to tables would not be present in a security account. Also how is someone other than Absolute themselves supposed to lodge money to a superuser account registered in Absolute's own name. If these accounts are in existance to skim extra money off players you imagine they would be more tightly controlled to avoid suspicions and you wouldn't have people abusing them the way the cheats have. If this was the method used to cheat, I am open to suggestions on why the cheating was so obvious.

3). It was an outside job where somebody or some group hacked into Absolute's server and was able to retrieve the hand data.

I think it's more likely to be 1 or 3. I think the superuser account doesn't seem as likely unless someone was seriously aggravated in Absolute and decided to blatantly abuse something that was supposed to be used subtly.