The Brain Transplant Argument

[mbillie1]

[ QUOTE ]
(1) It is not absolutely impossible that our brains should be transplanted into new receptacles while retaining their intrinsic functions. (The intrinsic functions are the processes that characteristically occur in the brain, and which are assumed to sustain a mentally endowed subject.)

(2) Amongst the brain’s intrinsic functions is that of sustaining a subject with thoughts, apparent memories, beliefs, (etc.), and so such a rehoused and functioning brain will sustain a subject of experience who has psychological links to the donor subject.

(3) The total system, of which the rehoused brain is a functioning part, is not the self-same animal which donated it.

(4) The resulting subject sustained by (or realized by) this system would be the same subject (or person) which that brain previously sustained.

Do you think that BTA shows that animalism is false?

[/ QUOTE ]

the bolded part in "2" is a pretty bold claim. the brain receives signals from the entire body. sensory stimuli, nutrition, etc all have a significant impact on making up our conscious experience / "who we are" ... it's a pretty bold claim to say that the rehoused brain brings the same subject experience from the original body/brain. i'm not convinced whatsoever that "2" is acceptable as a premise.

i'm also not convinced whatsoever that the subject/experience/self in the new body would be the same if the old brain could be transplanted into it. also, unfortunately, there's no way to demonstrate that since we have no ability to experience other subjects directly, even if we could do this dramatic brain transplant process (although obviously we could have some idea or another based on interacting with the new body/brain combination)

[Kaj]

[ QUOTE ]
That the new body wouldn't be the same person because they are in a new body? ... That's a tough argument to make.

[/ QUOTE ]

If you put your old car engine in a new car, is it the same "car"?

How is this a tough argument to make? Read again what I quoted. How can a brain in a new body be the "same person". For one, ITS A WHOLE NEW BODY with a whole new set of physical characteristics. But if you want to confine "person" to just brain activity (which is absolutely arbitrary), just a little tweak in your hormone levels alone can have drastic changes on your personality. And these are produced outside the brain.

Nobody is really making an argument saying that certain traits won't still be present, only pointing out that what you are defining as a "person" is a completely arbitrary definition which includes some parts and excludes other parts.

[StayHungry]

If anytime in the future this is attempted, rest assured there'll be weirder things going on

[madnak]

Identity is just a conceptual convention we use. It's all labels. There is no such thing as identity "really."

Again - I can hardly prove this. But, again - I think these views of identity are unsupportable and nonsensical, based on arbitrary premises that nobody in their right mind actually accepts.

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
Identity is just a conceptual convention we use. It's all labels. There is no such thing as identity "really."

Again - I can hardly prove this. But, again - I think these views of identity are unsupportable and nonsensical, based on arbitrary premises that nobody in their right mind actually accepts.

[/ QUOTE ]

Do you think that objects do not really persist because identity seems incompatible with change? If so, do you reject four-dimensionalism as well?

[mbillie1]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Identity is just a conceptual convention we use. It's all labels. There is no such thing as identity "really."

Again - I can hardly prove this. But, again - I think these views of identity are unsupportable and nonsensical, based on arbitrary premises that nobody in their right mind actually accepts.

[/ QUOTE ]

Do you think that objects do not really persist because identity seems incompatible with change? If so, do you reject four-dimensionalism as well?

[/ QUOTE ]

Objects are not self-identical through time, they're always changing, so in the Platonic/idealistic sense, no they do not persist.

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
(1) It is not absolutely impossible that our brains should be transplanted into new receptacles while retaining their intrinsic functions. (The intrinsic functions are the processes that characteristically occur in the brain, and which are assumed to sustain a mentally endowed subject.)

(2) Amongst the brain’s intrinsic functions is that of sustaining a subject with thoughts, apparent memories, beliefs, (etc.), and so such a rehoused and functioning brain will sustain a subject of experience who has psychological links to the donor subject.

(3) The total system, of which the rehoused brain is a functioning part, is not the self-same animal which donated it.

(4) The resulting subject sustained by (or realized by) this system would be the same subject (or person) which that brain previously sustained.

Do you think that BTA shows that animalism is false?

[/ QUOTE ]

the bolded part in "2" is a pretty bold claim. the brain receives signals from the entire body. sensory stimuli, nutrition, etc all have a significant impact on making up our conscious experience / "who we are" ... it's a pretty bold claim to say that the rehoused brain brings the same subject experience from the original body/brain. i'm not convinced whatsoever that "2" is acceptable as a premise.

i'm also not convinced whatsoever that the subject/experience/self in the new body would be the same if the old brain could be transplanted into it. also, unfortunately, there's no way to demonstrate that since we have no ability to experience other subjects directly, even if we could do this dramatic brain transplant process (although obviously we could have some idea or another based on interacting with the new body/brain combination)

[/ QUOTE ]

I like the tack of challenging premise 2 as well. What I would like to do is provide an account of what it is to be a subject of experience that implicates the rest of the body in some way as integral. I know the spinal cord and the central nervous system are crucial to many psychological processes, for example.

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Identity is just a conceptual convention we use. It's all labels. There is no such thing as identity "really."

Again - I can hardly prove this. But, again - I think these views of identity are unsupportable and nonsensical, based on arbitrary premises that nobody in their right mind actually accepts.

[/ QUOTE ]

Do you think that objects do not really persist because identity seems incompatible with change? If so, do you reject four-dimensionalism as well?

[/ QUOTE ]

Objects are not self-identical through time, they're always changing, so in the Platonic/idealistic sense, no they do not persist.

[/ QUOTE ]

There are accounts of persistence that are compatible with change.

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
If anytime in the future this is attempted, rest assured there'll be weirder things going on

[/ QUOTE ]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EdJGlYOL0r4
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/1263758.stm
http://www.mymultiplesclerosis.co.uk...ransplant.html

[madnak]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Identity is just a conceptual convention we use. It's all labels. There is no such thing as identity "really."

Again - I can hardly prove this. But, again - I think these views of identity are unsupportable and nonsensical, based on arbitrary premises that nobody in their right mind actually accepts.

[/ QUOTE ]

Do you think that objects do not really persist because identity seems incompatible with change? If so, do you reject four-dimensionalism as well?

[/ QUOTE ]

I think identity is epistemological - no, not even that, linguistic - rather than metaphysical.