#791
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Re: Cheating at AP, updated cliff notes
[ QUOTE ]
I'm not trying to stir anything up- and they are likely a very legit company- but don't we suspect at various times this started happening after a recent update? [/ QUOTE ] No, it definitely started before that. |
#792
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Re: Cheating at AP, updated cliff notes
A little background on AP's outsourcing of security and technology services:
2004: Interactive Gaming Security Network provided "managed security solutions" to Absolute. Press Release 2006: Arizona Bay (IGSN's parent company) is retained to provide "a rapid development and deployment of technology and human infrastructure to support Absolute Poker’s rapid growth objectives." Press Release As of last year, Arizona Bay's, Senior Consultant, Curtis Olson was acting as Absolute's Vice President of Technology. |
#793
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Re: Cheating at AP, updated cliff notes
[ QUOTE ]
A little background on AP's outsourcing of security and technology services: 2004: Interactive Gaming Security Network provided "managed security solutions" to Absolute. Press Release 2006: Arizona Bay (IGSN's parent company) is retained to provide "a rapid development and deployment of technology and human infrastructure to support Absolute Poker’s rapid growth objectives." Press Release As of last year, Arizona Bay's, Senior Consultant, Curtis Olson was acting as Absolute's Vice President of Technology. [/ QUOTE ] mm, good coffee! The title of the 2nd press release is "Arizona Bay Guides Hypergrowth of Absolute Poker.com" L O L |
#794
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Re: Cheating at AP, updated cliff notes
Okay- even if it started before that I guess the point I was making is that their explicit stated expertise is in tying together accounts and activities like this.
So while not attempting to sound nefarious- someone somewhere should have all this info tied up in a nice little package if they are actually asked. |
#795
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Re: Cheating at AP, updated cliff notes
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ] 1) the team at Absolute that created the hand-dealing algorithm would approve their software having this feature. I would hope no single person would be allowed to design such a critical part of the program without oversight from others and they would stop such an egregious programming flaw from being implemented. However, after reading these threads it seems all bets are off concerning rigorousness from AP. Maybe the person went in and modified the program later without anyone noticing, I guess you can't put anything past AP. [/ QUOTE ] If this part of the program was put in at the highest levels, it's certainly possible. Just a theory, mind you. If I was writing the software I wouldn't write anything to the database to have anything to query until the hand was complete, so the only thing that would know what the state of the current hand was would be the server application's current memory. Another possibility combines the two ideas; an account that causes all hands to be sent instead of just the user's hand. Or maybe the code that sends all the cards requires the player to be an observer because that's done with a different part of the code? And is the location of the leak? [ QUOTE ] 2) If this information was being sent out to all players I would think that somebody with much more computer savvy than me would have noticed that "extra" information was being sent from the Absolute servers and, even if they didn't know what is was or how to handle the encryption, they would have made it public before now. I suppose, though, that if someone did somehow crack the encryption he would probably keep it to himself and utilize it for profit. Maybe someone did that, told his buddies and now there is a legion of cheats out there, who knows? Does this make sense? [/ QUOTE ] How many people do you honestly think analyze network data to look for holes like that? Absolute Poker has about 2400 cash players on it at most at any given time. Lets say that it has 20000 total cash players (probably a very high estimate I would guess). How many of those do you think are software savvy enough to either 1) hack the encryption (without knowing what algorithm it is), or 2) decompile the program and look through the assembly to figure out the packet format after it's stored? These, while not impossible, are not trivial programming tasks and things I would expect only from very experienced hackers. [/ QUOTE ] Like I said I'm not a computer expert. But I don't think the hacker pool is limited to poker players. For instance, many of the bot programmers supposedly aren't really poker guys, they're game theory computer nerds instead. Maybe the hacker wouldn't have to break the encryption itself, maybe he could hack a different AB server and steal the encryption key. Or maybe he could buy off someone in AP and have it leaked to him. I don't know. |
#796
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Re: Cheating at AP, updated cliff notes
Right- that's what I was getting at.
And they very clearly state they have a fraud consultant relationship with Absolute Poker as of the last year or so. And since their stated products/solutions are seemingly the ones in use when you hear about all the shutdowns at UB because of activites or non-activites of players at Absolute (plenty of threads on this around) I'm wondering what would happen if someone asked them what tie ins they know about on the accounts that are the known cheating accounts at this point. Edit: to be clear- I'm not saying they would respond to us. But this seems like a clear spot where Absolute could actually get useful info if they wanted without the show of an audit. (which they should still open themselves to) And one more time to make sure... they are also nine.com's consultant. |
#797
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Re: Cheating at AP, updated cliff notes
[ QUOTE ]
Like I said I'm not a computer expert. But I don't think the hacker pool is limited to poker players. For instance, many of the bot programmers supposedly aren't really poker guys, they're game theory computer nerds instead. Maybe the hacker wouldn't have to break the encryption itself, maybe he could hack a different AB server and steal the encryption key. Or maybe he could buy off someone in AP and have it leaked to him. I don't know. [/ QUOTE ] Like I said in the conversation posting, I was undecided whether I should even post my thoughts it because it was all idle speculation anyway. What I DO feel is relevant is that before anyone consider playing at Absolute again, they should explain exactly how the system was penetrated and exactly what they did to prevent it from happening in the future. |
#798
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Re: Cheating at AP, updated cliff notes
Is the video of the tournament on youtube?
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#799
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Re: Cheating at AP, updated cliff notes
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ] Like I said I'm not a computer expert. But I don't think the hacker pool is limited to poker players. For instance, many of the bot programmers supposedly aren't really poker guys, they're game theory computer nerds instead. Maybe the hacker wouldn't have to break the encryption itself, maybe he could hack a different AB server and steal the encryption key. Or maybe he could buy off someone in AP and have it leaked to him. I don't know. [/ QUOTE ] Like I said in the conversation posting, I was undecided whether I should even post my thoughts it because it was all idle speculation anyway. What I DO feel is relevant is that before anyone consider playing at Absolute again, they should explain exactly how the system was penetrated and exactly what they did to prevent it from happening in the future. [/ QUOTE ] It's actually metaphysically impossible for the system to have been penetrated. But also, you are wrong. Absolute needs to burn in flames and there is no alternative whatsoever. [ QUOTE ] Is the video of the tournament on youtube? [/ QUOTE ] This guy must be from P5's. Look at the OP dude. |
#800
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Re: Cheating at AP, updated cliff notes
[ QUOTE ]
Absolute needs to burn in flames and there is no alternative whatsoever. [/ QUOTE ] No kidding. Why did Mason lock the t-shirt thread. Bringing attention to the situation is good. |
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