Another AA hand

[Oink]

rzk see my other post.

But

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thirdly, against a perfect opponent b/c is worse than c/c from basic game theory considerations - simply because we are an underdog to his range, we don't need to protect our hand, and we are not making a bluff.

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If I understand you correct you are wrong. Since we are OOP there is other cosnidererations than our eq. I hope I am misunderstanding you

[rzk]

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rzk see my other post.

But

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thirdly, against a perfect opponent b/c is worse than c/c from basic game theory considerations - simply because we are an underdog to his range, we don't need to protect our hand, and we are not making a bluff.

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If I understand you correct you are wrong. Since we are OOP there is other cosnidererations than our eq. I hope I am misunderstanding you

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i just edited my previous post to explain this point a little better:

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thirdly, against a perfect opponent b/c is worse than c/c from basic game theory considerations - simply because we are an underdog to his range, we don't need to protect our hand, and we are not making a bluff. if we bet, the perfect opponent would be able to adjust his bluffing-raising range to make us indifferent to calling down or folding thus losing us (almost) 1BB more compared to the c/c c/c line.

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i have to make a disclaimer that this argument is not 100% rigorous. to be entirely sure of the fact that the perfect opponent would be able to adjust his bluff raising range in a way i described you'd probably have to make a more detailed game theory calculation. but in most situations it's true.

as for your other post (about b/f or b/c c/f possibly better than c/c) the argument i gave also shows that b/f and b/c c/f are just as bad as b/c down, simply because if the opponent adjusts as i described the EV of b/f would be equal to the EV of b/c down.

EDIT: i'm still not claiming that c/c is better than b/c or b/f against _this_ opponent, because of course he's not perfect. but you do have to know _in what way_ he's not perfect. in other words, you have to have a read of some sort. it's possible of course that simply the fact that he plays at that specific limit is already a good enough read for that but that's certainly not obvious.

[Oink]

rzk. You have followed some GT classes?

I think I am misunderstanding you and bare with my poor english. But what I understand you are saying is that c/c > b/c simply because we are a dog?!?!? [img]/images/graemlins/confused.gif[/img] [img]/images/graemlins/confused.gif[/img] [img]/images/graemlins/confused.gif[/img]

(I really hope I am misunderstading you.)

Say for fun that his range is AQ and QQ+.

Also say for fun and instructional purposes that he will raise AQ for free SD, bet or raise QQ and KK for value but check AQ if checked to. (Disregard AA)

We agree that against that range and strategy b/c > c/c c/c right?

I am drunk and prolly misunderstanding you.

I also want to say again that I dont think b/c is best. I just think its better than c/c c/c.

I'd b/f or b/c c/f


EDIT: Oh so you made that whole post afterwards. To be honest I am prolly to drunk to continue.

But I still believe that c/c c/c is one of our worst options.

EDIT EDIT: Also your "if our opponent adjust perfectly" assumtions are also VERY rigid. We cant assume that. It takes a special kind of TAG to raise this turn with JJ and bet river as well as a special kind of TAG to bet both turn and river.


Edit Edit Edit: Without being sure. But if both players on the turn are rational in a game theoretic sense, then I doubt there exist a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. I.e a pefectly adjusting villain will adjust in a way such that there is no "perfect" strategy to choose for Hero. ( I hope I am making sense)

[rzk]

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EDIT: Oh so you made that whole post afterwards. To be honest I am prolly to drunk to continue.

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hehe [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

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EDIT EDIT: Also your "if our opponent adjust perfectly" assumtions are also VERY rigid. We cant assume that. It takes a special kind of TAG to raise this turn with JJ and bet river as well as a special kind of TAG to bet both turn and river.

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i agree. that's why i wasn't insisting that c/c is necessarily better, only that it's clearly better against perfect opposition. however, depending on the specific way our opponent is imperfect c/c is still quite often better.

for example, say this guy never raises our bet and bets the river with a worse hand, but also never bets both turn and river with a worse hand then again c/c is better than b/c c/f, because we can just c/c c/f. this way we lose 1BB when behind and win 1BB when ahead, whereas in the b/c c/f line we lose 2BB when behind and win 2BB when ahead. since we are an underdog the latter option is worse.

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Edit Edit Edit: Without being sure. But if both players on the turn are rational in a game theoretic sense, then I doubt there exist a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. I.e a pefectly adjusting villain will adjust in a way such that there is no "perfect" strategy to choose for Hero. ( I hope I am making sense)

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whaaaaa???? how's that possible that in a two-person game with limited raises that there's no Nash equilibrium???? either you are really drunk or i'm missing something very fundamental. btw, i didn't take classes in GT, just read some stuff on my own so i might certainly be missing something. but i still think you are just too drunk [img]/images/graemlins/laugh.gif[/img]

[Municipal Hare]

Hi again. Old hand of mine. FTP $5/$10. Villain is 30/15/1.3; plays rationally on the big streets. AQo should be discounted a pinch based on the preflop sequence.

While absorbing what Oink has said, I'll put forward one more alternative for sheer juiciness' sake: Check-call turn (to avoid a vomit-inducing raise, collect bets from AQ, and keep weird stuff like JJ interested – albeit with a protection tradeoff) with an eye on bet-folding (blockingbetfolding? Heisenbetting?) a river like this one.

[Oink]

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whaaaaa???? how's that possible that in a two-person game with limited raises that there's no Nash equilibrium???? either you are really drunk or i'm missing something very fundamental. btw, i didn't take classes in GT, just read some stuff on my own so i might certainly be missing something. but i still think you are just too drunk

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Doesnt matter for this post that much.

But in a 2-person game with "limited" (finite) strategy sets there is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium in PURE strategies.

Thres is always at least one in MIXED strategies.

For one to ALWAYS exist in PURE strategies you neeed a compact and convex strategy set for each player and quasiconcave payoff functions for each player.

Since the strategy sets in LHE are not convex that result does not hold and you can have spots where pure Nash equilibria doesnt exist.

[RudeboyOi]

b/f the turn [img]/images/graemlins/laugh.gif[/img]

given the action

we can have KK, QQ just as easily as he can

i dont think AQ is gonna attempt a FSDR here

after the strength we showed on the previous two streets

i believe AK would just b/c this flop

really the only thing we can be hoping for

is to chop with another AA

[Oink]

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really the only thing we can be hoping for

is to chop with another AA

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c/f then?

[RudeboyOi]

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when he raises us really the only thing we can be hoping for

is to chop with another AA

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c/f then?

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better? [img]/images/graemlins/tongue.gif[/img]

[Oink]

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when he raises us really the only thing we can be hoping for

is to chop with another AA

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c/f then?

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better? [img]/images/graemlins/tongue.gif[/img]

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I do agree tho.

He has AQ, QQ, KK, AA. (Maybe 66)

He must put us on the same range. So its a simple game theoretic problem to find the highest EV decision based on assumptions regarding his strategies

(Poker is always that. But here we can actually do it without involving 100 pages of handwritten algebra)