The self is not physical, but symbolic

[coberst]

The self is not physical, but symbolic

What are symbols and why are symbols meaningful to me? One answer might be “the self is not physical, it is symbolic”—Becker.

Mathematics is, I think, a useful means to start an effort for comprehending the nature of symbols.

Mathematical concepts are referred to by symbols, both written and audible. Eighty-five or quatre-vingt-cinq references the same concept as does 85. Common mathematical symbols such as 0, 1, i, pi and e are meaningful because we have become familiar with the concepts that they symbolize when we have studied mathematics in school. Our schools and colleges are interested primarily in helping us use these symbols as an algorithmic means for solving mathematical problems.

I am a retired engineer and I worked constantly for four years in college learning how to do math. Doing math is very important to engineers, understanding math is of little consequence to an engineer’s job performance. I suspect most engineers would be somewhat dumbfounded if they were to be asked ‘do your understand mathematics’.

The degree of meaning that these symbols hold for each of us is dependent upon the relationship we have with the concept. Almost all of us will find that the symbols 1, 2, 3, and 4 are meaningful even before we go to school. Those who have studied math in grade school and high school will find that the other symbols mentioned have a meaning of some dimension.

L&N, Lakoff and Nunez, co-authors of “Where Mathematics Comes From”, tell us that “to comprehend a mathematical symbol is to associate it with a concept—something meaningful in human cognition that is ultimately grounded in experience and created via neural mechanisms.”

At birth an infant has a minimal innate arithmetic ability. This ability to add and subtract small numbers is called subitizing. (I am speaking of a cardinal number—a number that specifies how many objects there are in a collection, don’t confuse this with numeral—a symbol). Many animals display this subitizing ability.

In addition to subitizing the child, while playing with objects, develops other cognitive capacities such as grouping, ordering, pairing, memory, exhaustion-detection, cardinal-number assignment, and independent order.

When a child goes to school the teacher depends upon all of these past experiences as prerequisites for a child to readily comprehend arithmetic.

It is our experience in the world that eventually gives symbols significance. As we get older we travel far from these original experiences that give our world of symbols their meaning. We are constantly adding new worldly experiences to augment this meaning we attach to symbols. I suspect that if we could examine closely one of our concepts of a particular symbol we would find that concept to be as complex and convoluted as is our DNA. If we could trace the historical sequences of the structuring of a particular concept it might be as instructive as is a similar examination of our DNA.

Concepts, i.e. symbols, i.e. abstract ideas, are like a gigantic chemical molecule that continues to grow in size and in complexity as we pass through life. The symbol gains grounding from our experiences but the concept also has a great deal that result from our imagination. I think we might say that a symbol is an abstract idea created by experience and imagination, which becomes a significant meaning in our life.

If such is the case can you comprehend why some people might ‘go bananas’ when the flag is burned?

[MidGe]

[ QUOTE ]
The self is not physical, but symbolic

What are symbols and why are symbols meaningful to me? One answer might be “the self is not physical, it is symbolic”—Becker.

Mathematics is, I think, a useful means to start an effort for comprehending the nature of symbols.

[/ QUOTE ]

Yes the self is symbolically represented by the empty set!

The way you identify with fads or what you read is amusing, coberst! [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

[Alex-db]

I find it a poor and tough-to-read writing style, the concepts are developed so slowly I lose interest by the 8th line.

Perhaps adding a clean, elegant, concise version would help get more replies to these?

[coberst]

[ QUOTE ]
I find it a poor and tough-to-read writing style, the concepts are developed so slowly I lose interest by the 8th line.

Perhaps adding a clean, elegant, concise version would help get more replies to these?

[/ QUOTE ]

You might be correct. Could you show me how I could have written it better?

[tame_deuces]

Well, I think it is a bit of both. A car is a material object, but in our mind physical effects create the things we name thoughts, ideas, symbols. As such the idea/thought/notion of a car is different than the inanimate object. And to stretch it even further, this 'idea' may stretch beyond the physical use/abilities of a car (a thing of beauty, a status symbol, a piece of machinery, a toy etc.)

Kant's expression 'das ding an sich' reflects upon this 'translation' of something animate into the 'mind'.

An easy analogy is that a painting of a train is not a train, but it still symbolizes it.

I don't think you have to go overboard with it, because our brains also follow the properties of the physics in our universe, etc.

[coberst]

[ QUOTE ]

Well, I think it is a bit of both. A car is a material object, but in our mind physical effects create the things we name thoughts, ideas, symbols. As such the idea/thought/notion of a car is different than the inanimate object. And to stretch it even further, this 'idea' may stretch beyond the physical use/abilities of a car (a thing of beauty, a status symbol, a piece of machinery, a toy etc.)

Kant's expression 'das ding an sich' reflects upon this 'translation' of something animate into the 'mind'.

An easy analogy is that a painting of a train is not a train, but it still symbolizes it.

I don't think you have to go overboard with it, because our brains also follow the properties of the physics in our universe, etc.

[/ QUOTE ]

How can one encompass the pysical and the abstract idea into one unity? I do not think that the concept we call the self includes our arms and legs, i.e. our physical body.

[Borodog]

[ QUOTE ]
I do not think that the concept we call the self includes our arms and legs, i.e. our physical body.

[/ QUOTE ]

There is no sense in which this can possibly be meaningful. Your physical body is different from all other matter in the universe in that you directly control it simply by will, and the will is clearly a facet of self. You just will your arm and your leg and they obey; they are clearly integrated into the self.

[Bork]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I do not think that the concept we call the self includes our arms and legs, i.e. our physical body.

[/ QUOTE ]

There is no sense in which this can possibly be meaningful. Your physical body is different from all other matter in the universe in that you directly control it simply by will, and the will is clearly a facet of self. You just will your arm and your leg and they obey; they are clearly integrated into the self.

[/ QUOTE ]

Going to disagree with this. There are lots of parts of your body you can't control by will. Also, you are going to run into big issues when you talk of directly controling your limbs. If you define what's going on in your body as 'direct' control you are likely to also be forced to define driving your car as direct control.

Further, saying that what he says can 'in no sense possibly be meaningful' is biting off way way more than you can chew. It is very hard to argue for such a claim, and in fact what he says has a clear meaning. Maybe you think it's false (I would agree), but it's certainly meaningful. There is a big difference between false and meaningless. (also a big difference between meaningless and 'in no possible sense having meaning' for that matter) The fact that you gave your psuedo argument involving direct control and will demonstrates that you think his claim is meaningful. If it had no meaning you wouldn't know what to argue against, right?

I think the self includes part of your body but not all of it. Definitely not your arms and legs.

Personal identity is an extremely deep and difficult problem in philosophy, and it sounds like you aren't open-minded about it.

[coberst]

I think that Bork has certainly spoken the truth when s/he said "Personal identity is an extremely deep and difficult problem in philosophy". I would add psychology to that statement. I am tryin to comprehend Otto Rank which has led me to make a post on this very difficult subject.

[Hoi Polloi]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I do not think that the concept we call the self includes our arms and legs, i.e. our physical body.

[/ QUOTE ]

There is no sense in which this can possibly be meaningful. Your physical body is different from all other matter in the universe in that you directly control it simply by will, and the will is clearly a facet of self. You just will your arm and your leg and they obey; they are clearly integrated into the self.

[/ QUOTE ]

Another way of saying this is that one's sense of self would certainly change if one lost one's arms and legs. The "self" is the reification of a socio-linguistic convenience.