Programmers, help fight the UIGEA from the bottom up.

[Tuff_Fish]

The software CAN be protected.

The individual poker game servers will be worthy of trust.

No dishonest site operator will be able to mess with the code without immediate detection and notification of the other players at the site.

There can be a whole universe of poker sites out there ranging from one table sites to many table sites..... depending.

The method does not violate any patents.

My co-worker may well be a millionaire someday.

Tuff

[jukofyork]

[ QUOTE ]
The software CAN be protected.

[/ QUOTE ]
I'm sorry, but is just wrong. No piece of software can be protected from snooping as the very definition of "software" means that it has to be executed on a machine and if the machine can understand it then so can a human.

You can make it very hard, but their will always be somebody with the dedication and know-how to get round whatever you try.

Juk [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

[jukofyork]

[ QUOTE ]
Tuff,

The software does have to be open source. Unless you're going to pay them out of your non existent poker winnings, the only way this thing will ever get built, improved and maintained is with community collaboration.

Great find on the secure shuffling algorithm. However, there was a list of patents that this code may violate:

[ QUOTE ]
Here we list known patents which are related to used techniques or provided
functionalities of this software. We stress that in some countries the usage
of LibTMCG may violate the claims of these patents and thus is prohibited
by law. However, I am not a lawyer ...

* EP0384475 (1990-08-29, SCHNORR CLAUS PETER)
Method for subscriber identification and for the generation and verification
of electronic signatures in a data exchange system

* US4995082 (1991-02-19, SCHNORR CLAUS P)
Method for subscriber identification and for the generation and verification
of electronic signatures in a data exchange system

* JP3001629 (1991-01-08, KURAUSU PEETAA SHIYUNORU)
METHOD FOR GENERATING AND CONFIRMING MUTUAL IDENTIFICATION AND SIGNATURE
OF SUBSCRIBER IN DATA EXCHANGE SYSTEM

* US6077161 (2000-06-20, WISLER JAMES M)
Multiplayer card games having card plays to foundations

* WO0173694 (2001-10-04, NEFF C ANDREW, VOTEHERE INC)
VERIFIABLE, SECRET SHUFFLES OF ENCRYPTED DATA, SUCH AS ELGAMAL ENCRYPTED
DATA FOR SECURE MULTI-AUTHORITY ELECTIONS

* US2002007457 (2002-01-17, NEFF C ANDREW)
Verifiable, secret shuffles of encrypted data, such as elgamal encrypted
data for secure multi-authority elections

* WO02056230 (2002-07-18, NEFF C ANDREW et al., VOTEHERE INC)
ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM

* US2002078358 (2002-06-20, NEFF C ANDREW et al.)
Electronic voting system

* US2002103029 (2002-08-01, FINLAYSON SCOTT; MULCAHY STEPHEN; LOW MICHAEL)
Multiplayer gaming

* EP1259024 (2002-11-20, FURUKAWA JUN, NIPPON ELECTRIC CO)
Certified shuffle-decrypting system, certified shuffle-decrypting method
and certified shuffle-decryption verifying method

* JP2002344445 (2002-11-29, FURUKAWA JUN, NIPPON ELECTRIC CO)
SHUFFLE-DECODING SYSTEM WITH CERTIFICATION AND METHOD THEREFOR, AND
SHUFFLE DECODING VERIFICATION METHOD

* US2002181702 (2002-12-05, FURUKAWA JUN, NIPPON ELECTRIC CO)
Certified shuffle-decrypting system, certified shuffle-decrypting method
and certified shuffle-decryption verifying method

* BE1014397 (2003-10-07, LAUREYSSENS DIRK)
Online card game, played using physical or virtual cards via e.g.
computer, hand held device or television

* US2005028009 (2005-02-03, NEFF C ANDREW, VOTEHERE INC)
Verifiable secret shuffles and their application to electronic voting

* WO2005093671 (2005-10-06, SALOMONSEN GORM, GROTH JENS, CRYPTOMATHIC AS)
ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS

? Electronic Card Games in general:
http://v3.espacenet.com/results?sf=a&...p;=&=&=

? Secret Electronic Voting in general:
http://v3.espacenet.com/results?sf=a&...p;=&=&=

Finally, I want to say I am disappointed but I have not lost either hope.

[/ QUOTE ]

[/ QUOTE ]
That sucks and so does the whole idea of allowing software patents IMO... [img]/images/graemlins/frown.gif[/img]

Is their no country without IP laws anymore? Indonesia used to have no IP laws until fairly recently, but I think they do now.

Juk [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

[Tuff_Fish]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
The software CAN be protected.

[/ QUOTE ]
I'm sorry, but is just wrong. No piece of software can be protected from snooping as the very definition of "software" means that it has to be executed on a machine and if the machine can understand it then so can a human.

You can make it very hard, but their will always be somebody with the dedication and know-how to get round whatever you try.

Juk [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

[/ QUOTE ]

You are attacking the wrong problem. [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

But keep up the good work all. All along here, folks are defining and refining the solutions to the problem.

The security problem is solved unless somebody shows a problem we haven't mitigated. Keep thinking, objections are good.

Payments and who and how are another problem, but not necessarily a software one. We will never be able to "slip one by" the DOJ, but we may be able to do things in such a manner that they can't do anything about it.

Tuff

[Phil153]

[ QUOTE ]
That sucks and so does the whole idea of allowing software patents IMO...

[/ QUOTE ]
I'm generally in favor of patents when the topic is sufficiently complex and innovative.

But patenting an algorithm that a math graduate can figure out in several hours is so unbelievable wrong, especially when that algorithm may be the only possible solution to a given problem.

[jukofyork]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
The software CAN be protected.

[/ QUOTE ]
I'm sorry, but is just wrong. No piece of software can be protected from snooping as the very definition of "software" means that it has to be executed on a machine and if the machine can understand it then so can a human.

You can make it very hard, but their will always be somebody with the dedication and know-how to get round whatever you try.

Juk [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

[/ QUOTE ]

You are attacking the wrong problem. [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

But keep up the good work all. All along here, folks are defining and refining the solutions to the problem.

The security problem is solved unless somebody shows a problem we haven't mitigated. Keep thinking, objections are good.

[/ QUOTE ]
If your security stands on the belief that some software can be made "unsnoopable" then I'm afraid it's just not going to work and as soon as money is involved all the smartest crackers in the world will be working round the clock to find a method to circumvent whatever you have tried. The only really secure method is to use some decentralized cryptographic algorithm as outlined in the other post.

I think this whole idea is an interesting one, but is fundamentally flawed. Assuming that a P2P poker client was created and a bank (or other trusted institution) agreed to hold player's money in such a way as to allow other players to confirm each other's balances (so as not to allow balance "faking"), then I have to ask myself would I play on such a system myself?

Sadly, I don't think I would other than for heads up matches. I think for HU matches then a system like this could be trusted 100%, but as soon as you add multiple people into the equation then how can you be sure they are not colluding against you?

One option would be to have hand histories that revealed all of the mucked cards after each hand was over. This would change the fundamental way poker is played, but at least (in theory) then each player could see if they were being colluded against. I'm sad to say again that I still wouldn't play even with this addition, as I'm quite sure that somebody smart enough could collude in a very clever way that would make detection almost impossible.

So in conclusion: I think this makes for a very interesting academic idea and could possibly work in practice for heads up play, but I don't think you can ever secure it properly against collusion for multi-player games.

Juk [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

[Phil153]

I think you'd be far better working out the details of the payment system first, and getting back to us once you've solved that. Not "just make it work", but the actual details of HOW it will work, what the costs will be, what the deposit options will be, how it'll interact with the p2p software to guarantee payment, how you'll identify players to process payment, etc. I think if you do that, you'll see why your idea is a non starter - or at the very least, not superior to a fixed, centrally managed server.

As an engineer I'm sure you realize that most radical ideas look fine on paper but fall down in the details.

[Nortonesque]

The algorithm also is very susceptible to someone dropping out, so it may be somewhat academic.

[ QUOTE ]
I think this whole idea is an interesting one, but is fundamentally flawed. Assuming that a P2P poker client was created and a bank (or other trusted institution) agreed to hold player's money in such a way as to allow other players to confirm each other's balances (so as not to allow balance "faking"), then I have to ask myself would I play on such a system myself?

[/ QUOTE ]
Another problem would be for the bank to confirm the game's actual outcome.

[ QUOTE ]
Sadly, I don't think I would other than for heads up matches. I think for HU matches then a system like this could be trusted 100%, but as soon as you add multiple people into the equation then how can you be sure they are not colluding against you?

[/ QUOTE ]
Not overly dissimilar from the current situation though.

The system I'm envisioning would allow anyone to run a table and select a card provider (which could be themselves, or some trusted third party, or something else a la mental poker). So you could imagine:

A high trust environment -- like PS or FTP, where a money holder sets up the table, and only allows customers to play, and has total access to the results.

A low trust environment -- where it's play money and it runs off one of the player's machines.

Somewhere in between -- like a homegame, or something else. This would be the really intriguing place to watch, and see what interesting payment systems pop up.

[jukofyork]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Sadly, I don't think I would other than for heads up matches. I think for HU matches then a system like this could be trusted 100%, but as soon as you add multiple people into the equation then how can you be sure they are not colluding against you?

[/ QUOTE ]
Not overly dissimilar from the current situation though.

[/ QUOTE ]
I think that having a 3rd-party take care of the collusion detection (and bot detection) using their own unpublished methods is probably more likely to put off colluders (and botters). Perhaps, I'm wrong for thinking like this though.

Juk [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

[Nortonesque]

OK -- picture the high trust environment above but with a program that the money holder requires its customers to run, which checks for botting software, collusion, etc. We should be able to replicate the status quo (if the status quo is indeed high trust).

I guess basically what I'm envisioning is leveling the playing field for poker software and having people compete on trust environments (payment systems, deal fairness, game fairness). And if that competition never materializes, well, we've got a spiffy p2p system for free money games I guess. [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]