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  #11  
Old 11-14-2007, 11:14 PM
JDalla JDalla is offline
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Default Re: Optimally countering deliberate spite calls

It's definately a quandary... the problem with it all is that they are giving up much less to spite call you than you lose when they call you. So the only retaliation that doesn't simply grant them EV is to spite call them back, in which case you still lose EV, but maybe one day you can have a chat with them and agree to both stop. Very prisioner's dilemma esque.
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  #12  
Old 11-14-2007, 11:54 PM
jukofyork jukofyork is offline
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Default Re: Optimally countering deliberate spite calls

[ QUOTE ]
It's definately a quandary... the problem with it all is that they are giving up much less to spite call you than you lose when they call you. So the only retaliation that doesn't simply grant them EV is to spite call them back, in which case you still lose EV, but maybe one day you can have a chat with them and agree to both stop. Very prisioner's dilemma esque.

[/ QUOTE ]
It's certainly got me thinking!

If the NE found by the multiway NE calculator assumes that all players are rationally trying to maximize their own EV then (by definition of NE) there should be no reason for a player to deviate from the computed NE strategy (as any deviation would be -EV).

But as your AK example shows, it's possible for the caller to give up a small amount of their own EV to cost the pusher much more (nearly 10x more in your example), and if your opponent knows that you will "give up $30 to cost him $300" then could the possible profit you will make by forcing him to push less be more than the amount you are giving up?

This seems to fly in the face of what I know about NE though, as there should be no way to deviate profitably?

There must be some flaw in this thinking and/or a flaw in the assumption that each player must rationally try to maximize their own EV only.

Juk [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]
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  #13  
Old 11-15-2007, 12:36 AM
Finnisher Finnisher is offline
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Default Re: Optimally countering deliberate spite calls

The deviations aren't unilateral
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  #14  
Old 11-15-2007, 12:45 AM
jukofyork jukofyork is offline
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Default Re: Optimally countering deliberate spite calls

[ QUOTE ]
The deviations aren't unilateral

[/ QUOTE ]
I've just made a post in the "Poker Theory" forum to see if anybody has an idea about this problem (see here).

Juk [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]
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  #15  
Old 11-15-2007, 08:10 AM
Q.. Q.. is offline
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Default Re: Optimally countering deliberate spite calls

You shouldn't worry about their -ev calls,you should worry about your -ev pushes, guess thats their mind. I don't like idea that just because a regular is sitting on sb all my blinds go to his stack because he knows atc are +ev pushes from sb.

As for the counter - there is just one, tighten your range to make pushes +ev.
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