malmuth on bluffing

[ohio]

i've been reading a review of malmuth's poker essays 3 and one point especially troubled me. in his essay "a note on bluffing", malmuth makes several serious errors when he writes about expected value.

for example, what should you do when you encounter a player who never bluffs? malmuth wrote:

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Since he never bluffs, you should never call. Your expectation on the end is also zero because you never give up a bet that you shouldn't.

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that seems bizzare. just because your opponent bets, it doesnt mean he has a better hand than yours. if i hold the nuts then i'm certainly not going to throw my hand away. instead i'm going to raise back.

has malmuth ever tried to explain his thinking on this particular essay? thanks.

[DrVanNostrin]

[ QUOTE ]
i've been reading a review of malmuth's poker essays 3 and one point especially troubled me. in his essay "a note on bluffing", malmuth makes several serious errors when he writes about expected value.

for example, what should you do when you encounter a player who never bluffs? malmuth wrote:

[ QUOTE ]
Since he never bluffs, you should never call. Your expectation on the end is also zero because you never give up a bet that you shouldn't.

[/ QUOTE ]

that seems bizzare. just because your opponent bets, it doesnt mean he has a better hand than yours. if i hold the nuts then i'm certainly not going to throw my hand away. instead i'm going to raise back.

has malmuth ever tried to explain his thinking on this particular essay? thanks.

[/ QUOTE ]
He's referring to an equilibrium solution. If he doesn't bluff he can only value bet. His strategy will be to bet the top X% of his hands. Since he's betting for value the worst hand he bets must have 50% equity vs. your calling range.

Let's assume:
-the pot contains one unit and will have the option to bet one unit or check after that you may call or fold.
-both your range and his range follow a continuous distribution on the interval [0,1]

Let's say he starts by betting the top 50% of his hands for value. Your strategy should be to call with the top 33.3% of your hands (all these hands have enough equity vs. his range). He'll adjust to you by betting 16.6% of his hands. You'll adjust by calling with only the top 11.1% of your hands. These adjustments continue. And I think you can see where it's headed. Eventually, he'll only be able to bet when he has the nuts and you can only call when you have the nuts (in the case of a continuous distribution this will be never).

The idea is that value bets must be balanced with bluffs (and vice versa).

[ohio]

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He's referring to an equilibrium solution.

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no, i'm afraid he's not referring to an equilibrium solution. elsewhere in the essay, malmuth wrote:

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Suppose there are two players, lets call them A and B. They play exactly the same, except that on the end Player A will bluff 50 percent of the time and Player B will never bluff. Who do you think plays worse?

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malmuth's conclusion: "both A and B play equally bad".

a very bad conclusion that demonstrates a great misunderstanding of expected value. malmuth made a big mistake and i'm curious whether he ever explained how that happened (or even acknowledged it was an error).

[Jimbo]

I know you are just dying to be correct but you aren't. Bluffing 50% of the time and never bluffing are pretty much equally bad, no question at all.

Jimbo

[DrVanNostrin]

I'm not sure how that last part contradicts the idea of an equilibrium solution. And I tend to think he is talking about an equilibrium solution because if he was it would make perfect sense. I also doubt that a statistician/poker player does not understand expected value. But I haven't read the essay so I don't know. Maybe you could post more about it.

[ohio]

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I'm not sure how that last part contradicts the idea of an equilibrium solution.

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the last part discusses two static situations--not some dynamic equilibrium process.

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I also doubt that a statistician/poker player does not understand expected value. But I haven't read the essay so I don't know. Maybe you could post more about it.

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here is a whole thread devoted to the essay. have a look and see if you still think malmuth is talking about an equilibrium situation. it's obvious he isnt.

[ohio]

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I know you are just dying to be correct but you aren't. Bluffing 50% of the time and never bluffing are pretty much equally bad, no question at all.

[/ QUOTE ]

you're missing the point. even if they are exactly equally bad, the logic behind malmuth's thinking is very seriously flawed. have a look at the thread.

[Jimbo]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I know you are just dying to be correct but you aren't. Bluffing 50% of the time and never bluffing are pretty much equally bad, no question at all.

[/ QUOTE ]

you're missing the point. even if they are exactly equally bad, the logic behind malmuth's thinking is very seriously flawed. have a look at the thread.

[/ QUOTE ]

LMAO, I suppose you are too young to know QuadNines or ramashiva either. One loves to quote Mason out of context and the other is just an escapee from an asylum. My bet is you 1) either never read the essay yourself or 2) are one of the two donks I named above. Too funny!

Jimbo

[ohio]

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LMAO, I suppose you are too young to know QuadNines or ramashiva either. One loves to quote Mason out of context and the other is just an escapee from an asylum.


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i dont care who those people are. are you saying the direct quotes are wrong? if so then please correct them. if they are taken out of context then place them in context. i'm more inclined to believe people who back up their claims with evidence more than people who just fling unsupported accusations. nevertheless, thanks for your limited input.

[DrVanNostrin]

[ QUOTE ]
Suppose there are two players, lets call them A and B. They play exactly the same, except that on the end Player A will bluff 50 percent of the time and Player B will never bluff. Who do you think plays worse?

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I do agree that his answer to who's worse A or B is wrong. (I'm assuming A bets his entire range as Mason stated.) Even if your opponent bets their entire range you can still fold the worst of your hands. A's strategy is slightly worse than B's.