Lawyers: legal opinion

[burkoboy]

I had to write a legal opinion for a business law class. I know this is going to come off as a "I need help with my homework post" but, I've already written my opinion because I do need to learn this stuff for the class, as we only have 3 grades in the class and writing this has helped me to learn more about contracts. But I always think its good to get feedback from others, and if you want to help out or give an opinion that would be awesome!

Here is what my professor is grading on
Recognition of Legal Issues

Articulation of Legal Principles (State the rules of law governing the decision.)

Application of the Law
(Do you apply the pertinent law to the facts ?)

Reasoning to the conclusion-
(Do you reach your conclusion in the case by
following the law you cited?)

Grammar, spelling, etc.

Citation of Sources (Be specific.) (Page numbers or outline sections are sufficient.)

Just seeing if you guys pick up on anything I missed, or what you would point out/how you think the case would end up in court.

Chevrolet Excitement v. Harris

For a number of weeks prior to mid-November , 2000, Chevrolet Excitement advertised in a 30 second spot commercial on a weekend television program called “Bowling for Dollars”, that it was giving away a new Chevrolet Cavalier to anyone who bowled a perfect 300 game on the televised program that day. Harris unquestionably was aware of this advertising. In mid-December, Harris entered the week-long tournament which culminated with the finals carried, as usual on the “Bowling for Dollars” television show of December 20, 2000. Harris qualified for the finals, and he threw twelve strikes in a row for a 300 game. Although otherwise rewarded with cash prizes, free Pepsi and the like, Harris wanted a Cavalier. Chevrolet Excitement responded that it had not made advertised the giveaway for over a month. Harris sued.


Thanks for input

[XXXNoahXXX]

"to anyone who bowled a perfect 300 game on the televised program that day"

??

so wasn't the promo over anyways?

[FlyWf]

That's a real case, or very much like a real case. Cobaugh v. Klick-Lewis is the case about that issue in the Dawson contracts casebook but there was a note case(I don't have the book handy) that AFAIK was exactly those facts.

Edit: Halfassed remembering sucks, but because if I didn't look this up I'd have to be working on my ridiculous open memo about essential terms of settlements I decided to do legal research that doesn't help my grade. The case you want is Champagne Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Giles, 388 So. 2d 1343 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980). Fact pattern is lifted almost word for word from the opinion.

"It depends on the exact nature of the advertisements" is the answer, but it'd have to be some incredibly vague wording to let your dude win.

[burkoboy]

I can't find Champagne Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Giles anywhere online. I was able to find Cobaugh v. Klick-Lewis though.

Do you happen to have a link for me?

[burkoboy]

it says "for a number of weeks prior to mid-november" So it makes sense to say that the promo was over, but I'm a little confused because I think you would need to state when the promo ends in your ad, otherwise I think you could argue that it was an ongoing promo. I can counter this though by saying that the ad specifically said "that day" so I agree with Noah saying that there was no definite 'offer' given THAT day so there was no contractual obligations.

Any one else want to comment?

[FlyWf]

Only place I can find it(besides the mention it gets in the Cobaugh opinion, which BTW is kind of a misleading synopsis) is on Westlaw and Lexis, so that won't do you any good.

[JackInDaCrak]

If this isn't due first thing tomorrow morning go to a law library and photocopy the case. Show "388 So. 2d 1343" to a reference librarian, he or she will help you find it.

[En Passant]

Post your opinion so I can evaluate it.

[wstaffor]

Here is the opinion from the case mentioned.

388 So.2d 1343

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
CHAMPAGNE CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH, INC., Appellant,
v.
David GILES, Appellee.
No. 79-1933.
Oct. 14, 1980.

Action was instituted for alleged breach of contract. The Circuit Court, Dade County, Ira L. Dubitsky, J., entered summary judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Daniel S. Pearson, J., held that whether television commercials and printed posters with respect to defendant's offer of a car as a prize for any 300 game bowled on a television program were unilateral offers which expired on their own terms on date of each program or whether plaintiff believed that offer was outstanding as of date on which he bowled a 300 game were questions of fact precluding summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded.

West Headnotes

[1] KeyCite Notes Link to KeyCite Notes

Key Symbol95 Contracts
Key Symbol95I Requisites and Validity
Key Symbol95I(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance
Key Symbol95k20 k. Lapse of Offer. Most Cited Cases

Mimeographed flyer which contained defendant's offer of a car as a prize for any 300 game bowled on a television program, even if flyer remained posted on date of subsequent program when plaintiff bowled a 300 game, expired by its own terms on date of program with respect to which it related and, hence, was not a basis for establishing a breach of contract.

[2] KeyCite Notes Link to KeyCite Notes

Key Symbol228 Judgment
Key Symbol228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
Key Symbol228k181 Grounds for Summary Judgment
Key Symbol228k181(15) Particular Cases
Key Symbol228k181(19) k. Contract Cases in General. Most Cited Cases

Whether television commercials and printed posters with respect to defendant's offer of a car as a prize for any 300 game bowled on a television program were unilateral offers which expired on their own terms on date of each program or whether plaintiff believed that offer was outstanding as of date on which he bowled a 300 game were questions of fact precluding summary judgment.

*1344 Lane, Mitchell & Harris and Byron B. Mathews, Jr., Miami, for appellant.

Charles F. Atwood, III, Miami, for appellee.


Before HUBBART, C. J., and NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.


DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
For a number of weeks prior to mid-January 1978, Champagne Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. advertised, in a thirty-second spot commercial on a Saturday television program called Miami All Star Bowling, that it was giving away a new Plymouth Arrow to anyone who bowled a 300 game on the televised program that day. Giles unquestionably was aware of this advertising. Apparently believing that Champagne's offers could only be withdrawn by a revocation commensurate to the offer itself, Giles, in mid-February 1978, put up his pin money and entered the week-long tournament which culminated with the finals carried, as usual, on the Miami All Star Bowling television show of February 17, 1978. Giles qualified for the finals and, as the reader may have already surmised, threw twelve strikes in a row for a 300 game. Although otherwise rewarded with cash prizes, free Pepsi and the like, Giles called upon Champagne for his just desserts.

Not bowled over by this request, Champagne responded that it had made no offer of an automobile on February 17 and, for that matter, had not been offering such a prize for over a month of Saturdays. Its position, simply stated, was that Giles was aiming at the wrong pocket. Giles sued.

Champagne's defense was that its offer of a prize on and for a particular Saturday television show meant that it made an offer good for that show only. Since no such offer was made on February 17, the day Giles rolled a 300 game, Champagne had no liability. Giles responded that Champagne had placed mimeographed flyers and printed posters containing its offers in nearly every bowling alley, and some of this advertising was still posted as of February 17. The trial court, viewing Champagne's earlier offer unrevoked and outstanding as of February 17, and there being no doubt that Giles rolled a 300 game, entered summary judgment as to liability in favor of Giles.

[1] Link to KeyCite Notes Its bubble thus burst, Champagne appealed. We agree with Champagne that the mimeographed flyer offering a car as a prize for any 300 game bowled on the television*1345 program, even if it remained posted on February 17, 1978, expired by its own terms.[FN1] In the case of a unilateral contract:

FN1. The only flyer contained in the record before us, presumably an exemplar, offered the car for the show of Saturday, December 31, 1977.

“as the obligation is, before acceptance, on one side only, the proposer being bound to comply with his proposal, while the other party is under no obligation, and under no peril until acceptance, the provision of the offer as to time of acceptance is viewed with strictness.” C. W. Kistler v. Hotel Martinique, 44 So.2d 288, 291 (Fla.1950) (emphasis in original).

See also Bullock v. Harwick, 158 Fla. 834, 30 So.2d 539 (1947).

[2] Link to KeyCite Notes The television commercials and printed posters present a different problem. The present state of the record does not reflect whether these were unilateral offers limiting the time of acceptance by their express terms or were offers requiring revocation. While the trial court was correct that there was no genuine issue of material fact that appropriate revocation did not occur, the issue as to whether revocation was required remained. If, in fact, the television commercials were unilateral contracts, it would not have been necessary for Champagne to take any steps to revoke the offers made by it on prior television programs, since these offers would have expired by their own terms on the dates made and would not have been outstanding as of February 17, 1978. Since the record contains no clear and undisputed evidence of the words used on the television commercials, or the words used on the cardboard poster (purportedly still displayed on February 17) and thus does not eliminate the distinct possibility that these were unilateral contracts requiring no revocation, it was error for the trial court to enter summary judgment for Giles. In this respect, as well as in respect to the issue of whether Giles believed that Champagne's offer of a car was outstanding as of February 17, we find that there were genuine issues of material fact still extant at the time of the entry of summary judgment.

Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of Giles and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

Fla.App., 1980.
Champagne Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Giles
388 So.2d 1343

[burkoboy]

Alright here is my final opinion, don't be too harsh, I'm new at this stuff



In this particular case, I feel there is a contract in place. The offer was made with the intent to contract, and it was communicated by the offeror to the offeree in the form of a television ad. There was full acceptance in the fact that it was a unilateral contract, made by performance, in that the offeree bowl a 300 game on the televised program. There is perfect consideration in the mutuality of the obligations in that the offeror give a Chevrolet Cavalier to the offeree if they do in fact bowl a 300 game on the televised program. The question is if Harris has any basis to sue, and what he could possibly sue for. What the question comes down to is whether the television commercials were offers which expired on the date of each program or whether Harris believed that offer was still outstanding on the day when he bowled a 300 game. I feel that the defendant has a strong case saying that they made no offer on December 20th, 2000, and that they hadn’t been running ads for a couple of weeks, meaning there was no offer in place, resulting in no contract. They could also argue that each previous ad, was an ad that was only good for that particular show/day only, and since Chevrolet Excitement had not made an offer that day, they had no liability, constituting in a mistake of judgment. Harris has arguments in that the offers were never revoked, meaning the offer was still effective, resulting in a breach of contract. However, since I feel that the television commercials were unilateral contracts, that would mean that Chevrolet Excitement would not have to revoke their offers that were made on previous television programs, specifically saying “that it was giving away a new Chevrolet Cavalier to anyone who bowled a perfect 300 game on the televised program that day.” Since they mention the words “that day” I feel the ad offers expired on the date that each ad was ran, therefore giving Harris no basis for saying there was a breach of contract. I would rule in favor of Chevrolet Excitement.