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#1
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Re: Philosophical Question about Consciousness
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[ QUOTE ] [ QUOTE ] If your memories aren't making the jump what is? [/ QUOTE ] Your consciousness. [/ QUOTE ] What would individuate your consciousness from other consciousnesses if not memories? [/ QUOTE ] Awareness of self is not reliant on memory. Think of the instants after you wake up. |
#2
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Re: Philosophical Question about Consciousness
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[ QUOTE ] [ QUOTE ] [ QUOTE ] If your memories aren't making the jump what is? [/ QUOTE ] Your consciousness. [/ QUOTE ] What would individuate your consciousness from other consciousnesses if not memories? [/ QUOTE ] Awareness of self is not reliant on memory. Think of the instants after you wake up. [/ QUOTE ] I didn't say awareness of self was dependent on memory. I asked what would individuate one consciousness from another if not for memories. Being self-aware could not serve as a criterion of individuation between one consciousness and another. But it does seem that if consciousness "a" is the the same consciousness as consciousness "b" then "a" would remember the things that "b" did, thought, etc., and so genuine cases of memory could serve as a criterion of individuation for consciousnesses. At least that's the standard sort of view since Locke. I, however, think there is no non-circular way to individuate consciousnesses. (I think that individual consciousnesses are ontologically dependent on the sort of entity that they are consciousnesses of. In other words, there is no such thing as a "pure consciousness".) |
#3
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Re: Philosophical Question about Consciousness
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I didn't say awareness of self was dependent on memory. I asked what would individuate one consciousness from another if not for memories. Being self-aware could not serve as a criterion of individuation between one consciousness and another. [/ QUOTE ] True, there's really no way of judging this in entities that aren't ourselves. We can't confirm that anyone besides our self is actually conscious. But we can confirm our own consciousness (debatable?) and based on that we can speculate on what it would mean for that consciousness to be transfered. |
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