David Sklansky and the Bible Baby

[madnak]

Right, okay, right. My examples were bad, I get it now. How about the 1% happiness thing? I don't think it's justifiable to choose the baby, because I don't think you can justify drawing the line at any point.

[bunny]

I think the problem stems from assigning probabilities to something that is unmeasurable. I dont think you can meaningfully measure or even assign these sorts of things in the realms where it is interesting, merely in the extremes (where it is less interesting).

In other words I would choose the baby over everybody being .0000001% happier and I would choose increasing everybody's happiness by 2000% over the baby. Any real world example is going to be impossible for me to measure, so I go with a gut feeling, erring on the side of saving the baby as that's the mistake I would hate to make the most.

This is all a bit waffly, I realise - my excuse is I have been away for a month so I'm out of practise.

EDIT: I think this is rational, just that I am severely limited in my ability to gather the necessary information to make the decision.

[madnak]

I have serious doubts that you have a consistent rational standard, but i suppose there's not much more I can say.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
I have serious doubts that you have a consistent rational standard, but i suppose there's not much more I can say.

[/ QUOTE ]

Why don't you think the rational thing to do is the thing that maximises your own satisfaction. I'm a selfish so and so, so I save the baby.

I also suspect the world would be maximally happy if everyone was equally selfish. Can't prove it but can you prove it's not true?

chez

[madnak]

It's a matter of whether the basis for the decision itself is rational. Sometimes it may be rational to make an irrational decision.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
It's a matter of whether the basis for the decision itself is rational. Sometimes it may be rational to make an irrational decision.

[/ QUOTE ]
the basis of all these decision is irrational. They all come down to what we want or value.

chez

[madnak]

To value something isn't irrational. It's not rational either, of course. What's irrational is being inconsistent about your values. I suppose you could just call that a matter of values themselves. You could say that in the car situation, a person values the child who's directly threatened more than the child who happens to be suffering. But there's clearly no consistent framework within which these values are defined.

[Sephus]

[ QUOTE ]
It's not rational either, of course.

[/ QUOTE ]

i could be wrong but i think that's just what he means by "irrational."

[madnak]

See, I'm talking about illogical rather than alogical.

[Sephus]

[ QUOTE ]
See, I'm talking about illogical rather than alogical.

[/ QUOTE ]

i know, and i was guessing about what chez meant. [img]/images/graemlins/confused.gif[/img]