The Parasite Dilemma

[CallMeIshmael]

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Also, while we're at it, in the one shot prisoner's dilemma, is the superrational choice to stay silent?

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The difference here and in the Traveler's Dilemma is that there is more incentive to find a way past the Nash Equilibrium. You can't get past the Nash Equilibrium unless you go past the Nash Equilibrium.

PairTheBoard

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Can you just answer the question?

[Taraz]

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How do you expect my decision to be "Uber Super Rational" to effect the other 99 player's decision on whether or not to be "Super Rational"?

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Im starting to think that he believes all 100 people play the same strategy

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I think he's assuming that if there is a single strategy that is the most rational, everyone will figure it out before they act. So yes, all 100 people will play the same "strategy", even if that means randomizing your choice.

[KipBond]

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Can you just answer the question?

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He took lessons from David Sklansky. If you read a bit of the "Sleeping Beauty" thread, you'll see the strategy there as well. Now, in a minute he'll start asking you questions, and then when you answer them, he'll accuse you of not answering them -- another diversion tactic.

[CallMeIshmael]

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How do you expect my decision to be "Uber Super Rational" to effect the other 99 player's decision on whether or not to be "Super Rational"?

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Im starting to think that he believes all 100 people play the same strategy

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I think he's assuming that if there is a single strategy that is the most rational, everyone will figure it out before they act. So yes, all 100 people will play the same "strategy", even if that means randomizing your choice.

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no, it goes beyond that

he thinks that IF I choose X, then so will everyone else. If I mention that if a group of people are going to contribute, then it seems that it makes sense that one would like to be a parasite to increase their payoff, and of course he retorts with "well, then you lose 200, since everyone plays parasite"

[Taraz]

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How do you expect my decision to be "Uber Super Rational" to effect the other 99 player's decision on whether or not to be "Super Rational"?

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Im starting to think that he believes all 100 people play the same strategy

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I think he's assuming that if there is a single strategy that is the most rational, everyone will figure it out before they act. So yes, all 100 people will play the same "strategy", even if that means randomizing your choice.

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no, it goes beyond that

he thinks that IF I choose X, then so will everyone else. If I mention that if a group of people are going to contribute, then it seems that it makes sense that one would like to be a parasite to increase their payoff, and of course he retorts with "well, then you lose 200, since everyone plays parasite"

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I think he's saying that you can't know what anybody else will choose. So all you can do is sit there and think about it, and then act. You can't "know" that some large part of the group is going to contribute. Imagine that everyone is in an isolated booth and that they can only come out once they make their choice. You have no way of knowing what other people will choose, so you have to think it through alone.

I think the flawed assumption that he is making is that everyone will reason to the same conclusion/choice. He isn't accounting for the possibility that people will arrive at different strategies.

[Siegmund]

In a roomful of smart folk, I reach the conclusion that the game is symmetric for all the players; that each of us will be parasitic with probability p; that the pot size is proportional to (1-3p); that my expected share of the pot is 1/100 regardless of p; and that everyone does better by making p as small as possible. I cooperate, and expect a nice profit.

Now, if this were a real world game against 2+2ers... I am convinced more than 31% of you are greedy jerks. Again, I cooperate, expecting to lose money, but lose less than the rest of you.

Others have already pointed out that the evolutionary version forces a moderate defection rate, with considerable loss of EV.

[Nicholasp27]

he wants to create a better solution than the nash equilibrium; that's his goal

the problem is that it can't just be 'created'...it has to already be there and instead be 'discovered'

nash equilibrium can be discovered by a logical player if they simply take the time to logically think through the problem...that is because it is arrived by looking at the various solutions and removing the dominated solutions and then re-doing it with that solution removed and etc etc until down to the equilibrium of 2,2 (in traveller's example)

he wants a solution that makes more money for everyone, but it can't be arrived at through logical reasoning; only through education and by having all players want to 'help the greater good' by all contributing to maximize GROUP payout rather than INDIVIDUAL payout

so he'd have both go 100,100 in traveller's because the 2 make more money that way, but one cannot, in isolation, using logic, arrive at that conclusion, because 99 dominates 100

[thylacine]

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he wants to create a better solution than the nash equilibrium; that's his goal

the problem is that it can't just be 'created'...it has to already be there and instead be 'discovered'

nash equilibrium can be discovered by a logical player if they simply take the time to logically think through the problem...that is because it is arrived by looking at the various solutions and removing the dominated solutions and then re-doing it with that solution removed and etc etc until down to the equilibrium of 2,2 (in traveller's example)

he wants a solution that makes more money for everyone, but it can't be arrived at through logical reasoning; only through education and by having all players want to 'help the greater good' by all contributing to maximize GROUP payout rather than INDIVIDUAL payout

so he'd have both go 100,100 in traveller's because the 2 make more money that way, but one cannot, in isolation, using logic, arrive at that conclusion, because 99 dominates 100

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On the one hand PTB insists on the problem being as stated, in th OP so that the only thing you can say for sure is the Nash Equilibrium.

On the other hand PTB, demands to get some conclusion other than the Nash Equilibrium, but he refuses to allow any embelishments of the posed problem, despite the fact that thses things have been known for decades.

WTF PTB [img]/images/graemlins/mad.gif[/img]

[CallMeIshmael]

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In a roomful of smart folk, I reach the conclusion that the game is symmetric for all the players; that each of us will be parasitic with probability p; that the pot size is proportional to (1-3p); that my expected share of the pot is 1/100 regardless of p; and that everyone does better by making p as small as possible. I cooperate, and expect a nice profit.

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Why not defect, and make a doubly nice profit?


(I know Im beating a dead horse here, but Im curious to hear responses to this question, and PTB just seems to avoid giving answers)

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Now, if this were a real world game against 2+2ers... I am convinced more than 31% of you are greedy jerks. Again, I cooperate, expecting to lose money, but lose less than the rest of you.

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Exaclty.

I mean, if you want to argue in favour of contributing, talk about the times when a bunch of others play parasite.

[PairTheBoard]

Suppose all 100 of you are able to communicate before making your decisions. Everyone understands that unless an agreement can be reached the best everyone can do is a Nash Randomization where nobody makes any money. But everyone also understands that if everyone will agree to Contribute then everybody can make $100.

However, nobody is willing to agree to this plan unless everyone agrees to it and gives their word they will Write Down "Contribute" on their decision slip. If anyone opts out of the agreement everyone will fall back on the Nash randomization and nobody will make any money. But all 99 do agree to give their word if everyone else, including you, agrees to give their word to contribute.

Now, what do you do? Do you give them your word that you will Contribute? And if so, do you keep your word? You can make all the assumptions you want about not being punished in any way if you agree and then renege.

PairTheBoard