Is there truly such a thing as a selfless act?

[vhawk01]

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The semantical argument of "oh well you wouldn't make that choice if it didn't make you happy" is utter BS.

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Not only are there acts that are selfless in the sense that we don't feel happy afterward for having done them, but also anyone who claims that every act that makes one happy is performed because it makes one happy confuses the effect with the cause. Being happy because we did the right thing can simply be an effect of our action, rather than the cause or motivation for performing it.

It is not hard to show that psychological egoism, which claims that every act we perform is motivated by our own rational self-interest, is false.

See Bob Nozick's 'Experience Machine' argument against psychological hedonism, a species of psychological egoism:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Experience_Machine

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Wow, that seems like a terrible refutation. His whole argument basically comes down to the fact that no one trusts or understands the hypothetical. "People want to actually DO things, not just have the experience of doing them" is a silly objection, since the experiment stipulates you cannot tell the difference. Basically, its a failure of imagination. We cannot imagine how this machine could be that convincing, so we think there is some actual difference between experiencing things and having things actually happen.

Underwhelming.

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I'm not necessarily convinced by the argument, but I don't quite get your reaction. There is a difference between actually doing things, and simply having the experience as of having done them. If some people see value in actually doing things, and actually doing them does not result in more pleasure, why wouldn't this support the claim that it's not just pleasure that we seek or value?

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Actually, the problem I see with this thought experiment (which, btw, is more commonly known as The Matrix) is that it's easily refuted by saying that we get more pleasure out of knowing our experiences are real than the hypothetical pleasure we might get being plugged into a machine. It's still pleasure, just a different kind--call it a "meta-pleasure."

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Yeah, thats a succinct way of saying what I was trying to get at.

[samsonite2100]

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Yeah, it's really just down to semantics. As far as that goes, I definitely fall on the "anything you do, you must be getting some pleasure/satisfaction/utility from" side.

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Does this mean that no act can be selfless? I would think that any act not performed from the motivation to further one's own self-interest would qualify as a selfless, or unselfish, act. If that is the case, then even if it were true that "anything you do, you must be getting some pleasure/satisfaction/utility from," that would not mean that the act cannot be selfless.

What would make the claim that we are always motivated by our own rational self-interest false on your view?

I don't see this as a semantical issue.

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Nothing would make it false in my view. And I think it is semantics inasmuch as it depends on one's definition of "self-interest, which your post makes clear.

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It's hard to see what value an empirical claim has if nothing can make it false. Why should I take an empirical claim about what motivates human behavior seriously if nothing can show it to be false?

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Well, okay, the obvious answer is that I would concede my position's falsehood if you could show me one example of someone ever doing something expressly counter to their own self-interest. But then, aren't we back to a definitional disagreement?

Also, getting back to this...

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I would think that any act not performed from the motivation to further one's own self-interest would qualify as a selfless, or unselfish, act. If that is the case, then even if it were true that "anything you do, you must be getting some pleasure/satisfaction/utility from," that would not mean that the act cannot be selfless.

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If the pleasure/satisfaction/utility is the motivation for taking an action, then the action is inherently non-selfless, at least as dictionary defined:

self·less
adj. Having, exhibiting, or motivated by no concern for oneself; unselfish

I don't see how you can have it both ways here.


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ummm no
the post agricultural revolution is a small fraction of human history

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Conceded.

[Philo]

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Ok, so what his argument is saying is, you have two options to choose from:

1) You get to experience X
2) You get to experience X plus some additional, nebulous Y that represents 'something actually happening' or at least 'the idea in your mind that something is actually happening.'

And then he is surprised that people pick 2)? His argument is sort of begging its own question, i.e. that this Y is somehow not a part of the X. But our whole point is that it IS a part of the X. His machine doesn't allow us some key part of happiness, while still claiming it gives us all the happiness we could want. If it was a perfect hedonism machine, it would give us the satisfaction of having actually accomplished something in the real world.

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The two choices are:
(1) Having the experience of actually doing Y
versus
(2) Having the experience as of doing Y, but not actually doing Y.

In both cases you have the idea in your mind that you're actually doing Y, but you're mistaken about this in option (2).

We get from both (1) and (2) the belief that we have actually done Y, and whatever feeling of accomplishment goes with it.

By supposition, you will never know the difference, and your qualitative experiences will be identical in each case, including how much pleasure you gain.

The experiment takes place outside the machine, so to speak. Nozick argues that some people would value option (1) over option (2), despite the fact that the pleasure produced from each option (and from the belief that you have really done Y) is the same.

Here is another question. Would you have a preference between the following two options:

(1) Your life goes on from here normally, with all your friends and family being exactly who you think they are, or
(2) Unbeknownst to you, all your friends and family members are replaced by exact duplicates, and your life goes on from here as if they were all still your real friends and family, and your qualitative/phenomenological experiences are identical in each case.

Do you have any preference for (1) or (2)?

[chezlaw]

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The semantical argument of "oh well you wouldn't make that choice if it didn't make you happy" is utter BS.

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Not only are there acts that are selfless in the sense that we don't feel happy afterward for having done them, but also anyone who claims that every act that makes one happy is performed because it makes one happy confuses the effect with the cause. Being happy because we did the right thing can simply be an effect of our action, rather than the cause or motivation for performing it.

It is not hard to show that psychological egoism, which claims that every act we perform is motivated by our own rational self-interest, is false.

See Bob Nozick's 'Experience Machine' argument against psychological hedonism, a species of psychological egoism:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Experience_Machine

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We did this on SMP ages ago (though didn't know Nozick had done it as well). I like the simple 'many wouldn't volunteer for a lobotomy even if they knew that afterwoods they would be very happy'

but that's not a refutation of no selfless acts. It is (possibly imperfect) refutation of certain forms of utilitarianism (any forms that rely on happiness being a single orderable quantity).

chez

[Philo]

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psychological hedonism, a species of psychological egoism:

Actually, the problem I see with this thought experiment (which, btw, is more commonly known as The Matrix) is that it's easily refuted by saying that we get more pleasure out of knowing our experiences are real than the hypothetical pleasure we might get being plugged into a machine. It's still pleasure, just a different kind--call it a "meta-pleasure."

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That's an interesting objection. I don't think that Nozick's argument is easily refuted by it.

What is the justification for thinking that there will be a difference in the pleasure that we experience between the two options?

Why do you think that what we value about actually doing things versus just having the experience as of doing things should be characterized as a pleasure? Since we have the belief in each case that we have actually done the things that we think we have done, why wouldn't that be enough to account for whatever pleasure we gain from the experience (including thinking that the experience is veridical), so that what is left over is not a pleasure, but simply the fact that we attach value to having actually done things versus not having done them--beyond any pleasure that we gain from the experience?

[Philo]

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The semantical argument of "oh well you wouldn't make that choice if it didn't make you happy" is utter BS.

[/ QUOTE ]

Not only are there acts that are selfless in the sense that we don't feel happy afterward for having done them, but also anyone who claims that every act that makes one happy is performed because it makes one happy confuses the effect with the cause. Being happy because we did the right thing can simply be an effect of our action, rather than the cause or motivation for performing it.

It is not hard to show that psychological egoism, which claims that every act we perform is motivated by our own rational self-interest, is false.

See Bob Nozick's 'Experience Machine' argument against psychological hedonism, a species of psychological egoism:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Experience_Machine

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We did this on SMP ages ago (though didn't know Nozick had done it as well). I like the simple 'many wouldn't volunteer for a lobotomy even if they knew that afterwoods they would be very happy'

but that's not a refutation of no selfless acts. It is (possibly imperfect) refutation of certain forms of utilitarianism (any forms that rely on happiness being a single orderable quantity).

chez

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I was taking happiness to be by supposition what is in our rational self-interest. It can be other things, like pleasure, desire-satisfaction, etc.

So, whatever one takes to be the currency of rational self-interest (pleasure, happiness, desire-satisfaction, etc), the point would be that just because one gains in that currency from an act does not mean that the motivation for performing the act was to gain in that currency.

[chezlaw]

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The semantical argument of "oh well you wouldn't make that choice if it didn't make you happy" is utter BS.

[/ QUOTE ]

Not only are there acts that are selfless in the sense that we don't feel happy afterward for having done them, but also anyone who claims that every act that makes one happy is performed because it makes one happy confuses the effect with the cause. Being happy because we did the right thing can simply be an effect of our action, rather than the cause or motivation for performing it.

It is not hard to show that psychological egoism, which claims that every act we perform is motivated by our own rational self-interest, is false.

See Bob Nozick's 'Experience Machine' argument against psychological hedonism, a species of psychological egoism:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Experience_Machine

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We did this on SMP ages ago (though didn't know Nozick had done it as well). I like the simple 'many wouldn't volunteer for a lobotomy even if they knew that afterwoods they would be very happy'

but that's not a refutation of no selfless acts. It is (possibly imperfect) refutation of certain forms of utilitarianism (any forms that rely on happiness being a single orderable quantity).

chez

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I was taking happiness to be by supposition what is in our rational self-interest. It can be other things, like pleasure, desire-satisfaction, etc.

So, whatever one takes to be the currency of rational self-interest (pleasure, happiness, desire-satisfaction, etc), the point would be that just because one gains in that currency from an act does not mean that the motivation for performing the act was to gain in that currency.

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as long as it's not a single orderable currency then it doesn't matter, however the motivation for all acts comes from our self although it may be about others.

chez

[Philo]

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Yeah, it's really just down to semantics. As far as that goes, I definitely fall on the "anything you do, you must be getting some pleasure/satisfaction/utility from" side.

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Does this mean that no act can be selfless? I would think that any act not performed from the motivation to further one's own self-interest would qualify as a selfless, or unselfish, act. If that is the case, then even if it were true that "anything you do, you must be getting some pleasure/satisfaction/utility from," that would not mean that the act cannot be selfless.

What would make the claim that we are always motivated by our own rational self-interest false on your view?

I don't see this as a semantical issue.

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Nothing would make it false in my view. And I think it is semantics inasmuch as it depends on one's definition of "self-interest, which your post makes clear.

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It's hard to see what value an empirical claim has if nothing can make it false. Why should I take an empirical claim about what motivates human behavior seriously if nothing can show it to be false?

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Well, okay, the obvious answer is that I would concede my position's falsehood if you could show me one example of someone ever doing something expressly counter to their own self-interest. But then, aren't we back to a definitional disagreement?

Also, getting back to this...

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I would think that any act not performed from the motivation to further one's own self-interest would qualify as a selfless, or unselfish, act. If that is the case, then even if it were true that "anything you do, you must be getting some pleasure/satisfaction/utility from," that would not mean that the act cannot be selfless.

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If the pleasure/satisfaction/utility is the motivation for taking an action, then the action is inherently non-selfless...



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Right. And what I'm saying is that showing that one gains pleasure/satisfaction/utility from an act does not show that the motivation for the act is to gain pleasure/satisfaction/utility.

The psychological egoist must show not only that all acts result in a gain in pleasure/satisfaction/utility (a claim which I think is false, anyway), but then must also show that the motivation for every act is to gain in pleasure/satisfaction/utility. These are two distinct steps in the argument, each of which requires justification. So what do you think the justification is for step 2?

[chezlaw]

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The psychological egoist must show not only that all acts result in a gain in pleasure/satisfaction/utility (a claim which I think is false, anyway), but then must also show that the motivation for every act is to gain in pleasure/satisfaction/utility.

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I don't know if you're using some precise definition of psychological egoism but with regards to the op:

Firstly there's no reason why you have to actualy gain from the act, even if perfectly rational its only an expected gain given the current information.

The second point is correct as long as there's no ordering so its not a simple maximisation function. The Nozick/labotomy examples only work when the maximisation function exists.

chez

[thylacine]

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Is there truly such a thing as a selfless act?

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Yes. Selfish genes create sometimes-altruistic people, who sometimes commit altruistic selfless acts. This is very standard evolutionary theory.

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So if he had worded his sentence as "Is there such a thing as a truly selfless act" as opposed to "Is there truly such a thing as a selfless act" would your answer have been the same?

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<font color="red"><u>Yes! Selfish genes create sometimes-altruistic people, who sometimes commit altruistic selfless acts! This is very standard evolutionary theory!</u> </font>