Poker question from alphatmw

[Shandrax]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I assume the question was about a Hold'em scenario, since people usually mean "Hold'em" when they talk about Poker. If it was about Hold'em though, it is not clear (to me) how much game theory you can apply to a game with community cards. Most of the conclusions from Draw or Stud simply don't apply to Hold'em, especially since the last card comes face up.

I have always wondered if it is correct in Hold'em to bluff (or call) on every street with the game theory frequency even if it doesn't appear to make sense, or if you should just pick your spots and only bluff when scarecards hit or draws appear on the board.

That's part statement, part question.

[/ QUOTE ]

From the *optimal* game theory perspective, the game makes no difference. I could write a program that takes either (or any) type of game as input, and outputs an unbeatable solution. The only hitch is I'd die long before the program finished.

[/ QUOTE ]

I wouldn't be so sure on that [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~gilpin/papers/texas.aaai06.pdf

[kdotsky]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I assume the question was about a Hold'em scenario, since people usually mean "Hold'em" when they talk about Poker. If it was about Hold'em though, it is not clear (to me) how much game theory you can apply to a game with community cards. Most of the conclusions from Draw or Stud simply don't apply to Hold'em, especially since the last card comes face up.

I have always wondered if it is correct in Hold'em to bluff (or call) on every street with the game theory frequency even if it doesn't appear to make sense, or if you should just pick your spots and only bluff when scarecards hit or draws appear on the board.

That's part statement, part question.

[/ QUOTE ]

From the *optimal* game theory perspective, the game makes no difference. I could write a program that takes either (or any) type of game as input, and outputs an unbeatable solution. The only hitch is I'd die long before the program finished.

[/ QUOTE ]

I wouldn't be so sure on that [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~gilpin/papers/texas.aaai06.pdf

[/ QUOTE ]

It's not optimal, because it's an approximation. It could be very good though, but I don't know, I only scanned the abstract.

[bigpooch]

Well, IF the world's greatest mathematician was able to
approximate with reasonable accuracy optimal heads up play,
then it's VERY CLEAR who will have the edge: the math and
game theory expert and it will not be that close. And
depending on the game, it may not be a very pretty sight.

Of course, a lot depends also on the particular game, and
the edge may not show up for a very long time; however,for
those games where a bot-like approach is going to work well
even in the toughest games, the edge will show up much more
quickly and will be obvious to the experts in the game.

To give a very simple example, suppose you are playing heads
up limit draw (which is a very simple form of poker). There
is almost NO VALUE to the behavioral psychologist at all and
if anything, the psychologist might make erroneous
conclusions based on his opponent and make a nonoptimal
adjustment that is simply due to "how the cards fell".

Also, the math expert CAN and will take advantage of these
by adjusting (ever so slightly) if he feels there may be a
need to put the psychology expert on tilt IF and ONLY IF
the players sometimes steam. For example, suppose in this
encounter, the math expert is up by over 200 big bets, and
notices that the psychology expert is making an incorrect
adjustment based on the history of the hands; well, it does
not take a rocket scientist to know what sort of situation
that is likely to put the psychology expert really over the
edge. Of course, if nobody steams, then it's not even
relevant (it is possible that both of these players NEVER
steam).

[Butso]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
"the world's greatest mathematician and game theory expert goes heads up against the world's greatest behavioral psychologist / people reader. both have average skills in the other person's expertise, and both have a good understanding of poker. who has the edge, and how much is it?"

If you use perfect game theory and have no physical tells, no one can have an edge on you head up.

[/ QUOTE ]

Wrong

This is a game of imperfect information in which the game theory guy does not know the type of his opponent. By type I simply mean the way any 'realisation of' the psychologist plays the game. In any optimal strategy chosen by the game theory wiz there will (almost certainly) be realisations of his opponent's type against which he is an underdog-It is possible that the psychologist can have an edge against Mr. game theory.

[/ QUOTE ]

Way Way Wrong. The optimal game theory strategy is the same against any opponent, regardless of how he is playing, and it is already proven to be unbeatable.

The term game theory is thrown around loosely in poker. You don't understand what it really means to play by optimal game theory.

But again, keep in mind the mathematician cannot play this optimal strategy because it takes too long to compute.

[/ QUOTE ]

Heres a simple example of what I'm talking about

Opponent type A: Bets 100% of the time he has nothing, Checks 100% of the time he has hit.

Opponent type B: Checks 100% of the time he has nothing,
Bets 100% of the time he has hit.

Do you still contend that there is a unique optimal strategy for Mr. Game Theory against these two types of his opponent, given that Mr Game theory does not know which type he is up against?

[Butso]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
"the world's greatest mathematician and game theory expert goes heads up against the world's greatest behavioral psychologist / people reader. both have average skills in the other person's expertise, and both have a good understanding of poker. who has the edge, and how much is it?"

If you use perfect game theory and have no physical tells, no one can have an edge on you head up.

[/ QUOTE ]

Wrong

This is a game of imperfect information in which the game theory guy does not know the type of his opponent. By type I simply mean the way any 'realisation of' the psychologist plays the game. In any optimal strategy chosen by the game theory wiz there will (almost certainly) be realisations of his opponent's type against which he is an underdog-It is possible that the psychologist can have an edge against Mr. game theory.

[/ QUOTE ]

Read the thread plz

[/ QUOTE ]

I have read the thread. What do you mean?

[jogsxyz]

An expert game theorist would not use optimal strategy against an unknown opponent thruout the match. He would be able to adjust quickly and use best exploitive strategy.
Optimal strategy is only used when one has no clue what the other player to doing.

[jogsxyz]

[ QUOTE ]

You don't completely understand what the game theoretic optimal strategy is. It has absolutely nothing to do with psychology or tells. It is the same strategy regardless of your opponent, regardless of how that opponent is playing or feeling at the time, and regardless of whether he has obvious tells. And it is unbeatable.



[/ QUOTE ]

Optimal strategy is not unbeatable. Ever hear of a bad beat or beginner's luck?
Optimal strategy is unexploitable. It guarantees some minimum EV. This EV need not be positive.
Optimal strategy should be used against an opponent of unknown style.
In other words, when you don't know what to do, use optimal strategy. When you know what to do, just do the right thing.

[Xhad]

[ QUOTE ]
Heres a simple example of what I'm talking about

Opponent type A: Bets 100% of the time he has nothing, Checks 100% of the time he has hit.

Opponent type B: Checks 100% of the time he has nothing,
Bets 100% of the time he has hit.

Do you still contend that there is a unique optimal strategy for Mr. Game Theory against these two types of his opponent, given that Mr Game theory does not know which type he is up against?

[/ QUOTE ]

You are under the mistaken impression that a game theory perfect strategy is optimal against everyone. It isn't. A game theory strategy is unbeatable against everyone, but it won't exploit an opponent's weaknesses because it won't necessarily pay attention to them.

Going back to my rock paper scissors example from earlier, the strategy of randomly choosing every time is impossible to beat over a long period of time. However, against someone who simply plays rock every time, choosing paper every time is better than choosing randomly. But choosing randomly still doesn't lose.

[Eagles]

[ QUOTE ]
sklansky,

are you capable of determining perfect game theory vs any opponents with dynamic stack sizes?

[/ QUOTE ]
IMO this question needs to be answered.

[Eagles]

Also I think this question would be very interesting if you replaced texas hold em with battleship.
edit: The game theorist would have to have a huge edge there.