It is logically impossible for an omniscient, omnipotent god to ....

[madnak]

Oh [censored]. I can't believe I didn't cover my ass on that. Okay, I guess you guys win.

[vhawk01]

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Oh [censored]. I can't believe I didn't cover my ass on that. Okay, I guess you guys win.

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[img]/images/graemlins/grin.gif[/img]

Heh, nah, I'm on your(Hume's) side on this, I'm a compatibilist. Just giving you a hard time. You can change your location back, I've enjoyed my glory thoroughly already.

[arahant]

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It's true that it's impossible to see the future and then be able to change it.

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No. Or rather, only in a relatively limited sense. In that sense I'd use terms like "It's impossible to see what the future will necessarily be and influence the future in such a way as to prevent it from becoming what it will necessarily be." Taken to this level, it's tautological.

Every time one of these threads crop up, I explain that determinism and free will aren't mutually exclusive. I also explain that omniscience doesn't preclude influencing the future (even on the part of the omniscient being, and certainly not on the part of other beings).

In some cases I've even linked to or paraphrased demonstrations of the truth of these statements.

Every time one of these threads crops up, somebody comes out and says I'm wrong. They never actually refute my demonstrations (probably wise of them, given that both of my positions have been demonstrated rigorously), and they never actually support their own claims (in fact, such claims have never been logically supported rigorously or otherwise, except in tautological or circular ways).

These people are wrong, and that's critical. The entire OP is based on a fallacious premise. But because, for some reason I can't fathom, the fallacious premise makes intuitive sense to many people, they continue to accept it as fact despite never having considered it in depth. So, hmk, quinn, all you others who think this is obvious: Here's a challenge. If it's so clearly, undeniably true, then it should be very simple to establish such syllogistically. All you have to do is construct such a syllogism, in which neither the definition of your terms nor the statement of your premises assumes the proposition to be proved. Then I'll walk away with my tail between my legs, and I'll change my location to "owned by hmk (or whoever)," and I'll always agree with you whenever you post from here to eternity.

I'm waiting...

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If only I had had the pleasure of your prior explanations [img]/images/graemlins/frown.gif[/img]. I did some googling on compatibilism, but didn't find anything very believable.
Seems to me that any statement of the terms assumes what is to be proven. And I think most people have an intuitive understanding of free will that does conflict with determinism.

Let's say I believe that all our actions are deterministic. If i lift my right arm, it is because the history of every particle and field in my body conspired to make it so. All effects are preceded by classically deterministic causes. Is this not what you define as determinism? And if it is, what would you define as free will?

Maybe I should just ask it thusly...what are your definitions for free will and determinism?

[madnak]

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If only I had had the pleasure of your prior explanations [img]/images/graemlins/frown.gif[/img]. I did some googling on compatibilism, but didn't find anything very believable.
Seems to me that any statement of the terms assumes what is to be proven. And I think most people have an intuitive understanding of free will that does conflict with determinism.

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I agree with you there, though I don't understand it. "Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen." An intuitive impression of something doesn't indicate the validity of that something.

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Let's say I believe that all our actions are deterministic. If i lift my right arm, it is because the history of every particle and field in my body conspired to make it so.

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It's also because you chose to do so.

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All effects are preceded by classically deterministic causes. Is this not what you define as determinism?

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I include probabilistic determinism in my definition. That's more important than it sounds, see below.

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And if it is, what would you define as free will?

Maybe I should just ask it thusly...what are your definitions for free will and determinism?

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Free will is the ability to make meaningful choices that influence future outcomes. Determinism is when every event is either the causal result of other events or is random.

The random part is important, and it's a valid source of disagreement. Pure determinists would say randomness "doesn't count."

Part of the strength of compatibilism among scientists is that if an event has no theoretically identifiable cause, then that event is empirically random. Therefore, if events attributable to free will can't be reconciled with causal factors, an empiricist must approach them as being inherently random.

Of course, in spite of the OP here and his claims, most of the people who support free will as being incompatible with determinism have a moral or spiritual rather than empirical basis for doing so. Hume used some powerful arguments to demonstrate that it is reasonable to believe a person can only be considered responsible for his actions, and that those actions can only be considered meaningful, if they have a causal orientation. Obviously such arguments depend on certain premises, but Hume makes them very intuitive to counter the common-sense views of free will and determinism as being mutually exclusive. That's why his arguments were so wonderful - they work on the "gut" level as well as the rational level.

But of course, it can never be proved that free will and determinism are always compatible according to any given context. If I'm allowed to frame a context, then it's easy to make them compatible with premises that are reasonable (from an empirical standpoint, and with some implicit caveats).

For example: Human choices are the result of brain activity in the prefrontal cortex. Brain activity in the prefrontal cortex exists. Therefore human choices exist. The effects of human choices have a significant and meaningful impact according to many different standards - the path of an individual is determined by his choices, and the choices of many individuals collectively result in changes to the entire biosphere and everything in it. Therefore, since human choice exists and is meaningful, free will is valid. Activity in the prefrontal cortex is the result of chemical and biophysical interactions that function according to deterministic laws. Therefore choices are made deterministically. Therefore free will is deterministic.

The problem is that such simple statements rarely convince anyone. It's similar, IMO, to the problem of convincing fundamentalists of various things. Look at how quick they are to suggest that if humans are "just" collections of atoms, then life must be meaningless. Personally I find that this is the strongest barrier - reductionism doesn't destroy synthetic meaning, it only puts it aside momentarily. A whole can be much more than the sum of its parts - there's no reason to suggest that things like emotion, belief, consciousness, and yes, choice, can arise from basic physical mechanics.

[arahant]

Well, it was a good explanation!
I think we probably have different definitions of free will, which is not to say one is valid. In fact, philosophically yours is probably more sensical. Just for clarity, is the crux of your position that 'random' events (quantum indeterminism, e.g.) that lead one to act in a certain way 'count' toward free will? If the outcome is unknowable, this is what we call 'choice'?

[madnak]

Yes, I think random events that determine conscious action qualify as free will. And of course, I think that supernatural or indeterministic free will, if it were to exist, would have to exist in just such a form.

I don't see many incompatibilist definitions about free will that don't inherently include incompatibilism. That's fine and all if you want to outright define free will as incompatible with determinism (and of course, in that case it only takes one step to verify that you're right given your assumptions). But to me it doesn't seem useful - here you're using definitions of free will and determinism that include mutually exclusivity as a requirement. And then you're saying that free will and determinism aren't compatible. That's tautological, so no meaningful conclusions can be inferred from it.

Given such definitions, then, the idea that the universe is "meaningless" without free will can't be justified. Unless the definition of "meaning" also includes such a stipulation, in which case you're only expanding the tautology!

[arahant]

Yeah, i agree that my definitions make free will and determinism incompatible tautologically. I don't really see a problem with that, though. Theism and Atheism are tautologically incompatible, but they are both words that convey meaning.

At any rate, when people argue that they are incompatible, it's something to bear in mind about where they are coming from, if you don't already. I think the definition these people use would be similar to mine...something along the lines of 'the ability to make choices not dictated by the physical laws of the universe ' (That's not rigorous...just throwing it out there).

[toybux]

Your flawed assumption is a linearly defined God. Free will is not incompatible with a nonlinearly aware God that exists outside the normal flow of time and is in fact equally aware of all moments in time at once.

[FortunaMaximus]

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Your flawed assumption is a linearly defined God. Free will is not incompatible with a nonlinearly aware God that exists outside the normal flow of time and is in fact equally aware of all moments in time at once.

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Yeah, but there is no "normal flow of time." It's merely human perception that it flows forward. It's just an expanding sample size.

That hardly constitutes proof of a God. Gonna have to try much harder than that.

[toybux]

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Yeah, but there is no "normal flow of time." It's merely human perception that it flows forward. It's just an expanding sample size.

That hardly constitutes proof of a God. Gonna have to try much harder than that.

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By "normal" I meant as humans perceive time. The argument assumes for God to know everything he would have to know it "before" the events occurred. I'm just trying to point out that for a all-powerful being completely different than us, such a before and after concept may be meaningless.

I'm not trying to prove there is a God, I just don't think this particular argument is a very good disproof.