1k - take me to valuetown

[BluffTHIS!]

I'm not going to explain this anymore to you because you aren't really paying attention to all the considerations and goals of the play I have given. But as an exercise, ask yourself what you should do if villain made a post oak bet (the very minimum bet) with a hand that could improve to beat hero's hand, as well as ones that couldn't, and how you should react to that bet and how your reaction would affect the river play. And then increase that bet amount in increments upto and past the pot size and ask yourself the same questions for each bet size. And you have to factor in villain's level of trickiness.

[invisibleleadsoup]

ok i'll think some more about it

[donkey]

didn't BluffTHIS used to be good at poker? it seems like either he's on drugs now or got really old

[Cali4niaRaisin]

Great post BluffTHIS, perfect

[xorbie]

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if our hand was actually that defined and he actually bluffed w/ the correct frequency it wouldnt matter how often we called.

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fv,

You have just shown yourself to be a total imbecile with that statement.

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actually you are incorrect, depending on what you mean by "optimal bluffing frequency". a nash equilibrium here would mean precisely that folding 100% and folding 0% of the time (or anything in between) is of equal EV.

[aflaba]

The value of raising with AJ and 72 is approx. the same. The only difference is that we have outs with AJ if he calls.

Calling is way more profitable with AJ than with 72.

Hence if calling is profitable with AJ we would rather call with that hand and raise when we hold 72. That maximizes our Shania.

At least that is my take on the matter.

[BluffTHIS!]

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if our hand was actually that defined and he actually bluffed w/ the correct frequency it wouldnt matter how often we called.

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fv,

You have just shown yourself to be a total imbecile with that statement.

[/ QUOTE ]

actually you are incorrect, depending on what you mean by "optimal bluffing frequency". a nash equilibrium here would mean precisely that folding 100% and folding 0% of the time (or anything in between) is of equal EV.

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xorbie,

In a game like this of imperfect information, where a probable range held by an opponent can be narrowed to a much more probable range, then an equilibrium point based on that previous less certain probability has now become unstable because villain now has a better mixed strategy (he can bluff with a greater frequency than if against a greater range for hero). Complicating this problem though is that unless villain were to push on the river, then hero has an option other than only calling or folding, which is raising.

And the point of all this in practical terms is that it is always a mistake to play in a manner so that one's opponent can precisely and narrowly define your hand, because he then knows how to better play against it.

[donkey]

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if our hand was actually that defined and he actually bluffed w/ the correct frequency it wouldnt matter how often we called.

[/ QUOTE ]

fv,

You have just shown yourself to be a total imbecile with that statement.

[/ QUOTE ]

actually you are incorrect, depending on what you mean by "optimal bluffing frequency". a nash equilibrium here would mean precisely that folding 100% and folding 0% of the time (or anything in between) is of equal EV.

[/ QUOTE ]


xorbie,

In a game like this of imperfect information, where a probable range held by an opponent can be narrowed to a much more probable range, then an equilibrium point based on that previous less certain probability has now become unstable because villain now has a better mixed strategy (he can bluff with a greater frequency than if against a greater range for hero). Complicating this problem though is that unless villain were to push on the river, then hero has an option other than only calling or folding, which is raising.

And the point of all this in practical terms is that it is always a mistake to play in a manner so that one's opponent can precisely and narrowly define your hand, because he then knows how to better play against it.

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what gave you the idea that our opponent can precisely and narrowly define our hand? in this spot, most decent players can have like 923923 different hands. you're really bad at poker if smoothcalling the turn bet makes your opponent narrow your hand to AJ

[BluffTHIS!]

donk,

It's not smootcalling a bet per se, but smoothcalling such a small one, which means you have only a one pair hand that isn't willing to play a bigger pot. While this might seem to just be smart in exercising pot control, it is villain who is making the bet, controlling the pot and who gets the most accurate read. For hero to call that smaller bet with a set or an overpair (assuming he thought the possiblilty of an overpair not being good was small) and such a smoothcall to be right, would have to be based more on the possibilities that villain would always fold a worse hand to a raise and also be more likely to make or call a bigger bet on the river. Otherwise you are letting villain not only get a more accurate read on your hand, but also limit its value as to how much it can extract from an opponent who would in fact play a bigger pot even if not to the point of going to the felt.

[donkey]

why can villain narrow our range to 1pair hands as opposed to one of the 9 billion draws that we couldve picked up on the turn?