Do Rights Exist?

[nietzreznor]

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I don't understand how this principle could be foundational; ownership is a means not an end. Why this instead of human well-being, or flourishing, or happiness?

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There are different types of means--instrumental and constitutive. Virtuous behavior (and hence the respecting of people's rights) is a constitutive means toward happiness and human flourishing.

[nietzreznor]

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So "rights" are are an immutable unchanging set of universal laws (absolute morality).

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The right of self-ownership is immutable and unchanging, I beleive--we all have this right whether or not we realize it, whether or not it is respected, etc.

But one should not mistake this for "absolute morality"--this would only be the case if questions concerning rights comprised the entire domain of morality. But this isn't the case. Issues concerning rights are just part of the virtue of justice, and justice is only one virtue among many. I don't think the answer to many (perhaps even most) moral questions can be given with an absolute. And while I think rights themselves are absolute, how we ought to act in accordance with rights isn't (i.e., there may be cases when one ought to violate someone's rights).

[lehighguy]

So some "rights" are absolute truths.

And any rights that can be deduced from these roots are then also absolute, no?

Where did these "rights" come from, how do you know they are truly correct?

[nietzreznor]

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So some "rights" are absolute truths.

And any rights that can be deduced from these roots are then also absolute, no?

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I'm not sure what you mean by the first part, but I agree with the second part, as written.

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Where did these "rights" come from, how do you know they are truly correct?

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Rights don't "come" from anywhere--at least it sounds weird to say that. I think a better way to think about rights is as a legitimate method of enforcing moral obligations. I think there are many instances where someone ought to act in one way or another (e.g., I ought to be nice to my neighbor), but rights pick out the select subset of these instances in which one could legitimately use force to see that the obligation is met (e.g., I ought to be nice to my neighbor, and I ought not steal from him. Only with respect to the latter can my neighbor use force to see that I act appropriately).

It seems to me that asking where such legitimacy "comes from" is the same as asking why these are "truly correct". As far as how I know they're correct--well, I'm a fallible human being, so I could be wrong. But I suspect I'm right (obviously). Frankly, I feel like the idea of self-ownership is intuitive to most people, and doesn't require an argument under most circumstances. That doesn't mean that no argument can be provided (I think one can), but the problem is that, on my understanding, grasping the content of one virtue (in this case, justice) reuqires grasping the content of all other virtues. So I think the question is more complicated than first meets the eye.

But since this response isn't long-winded enough yet, here is Roderick Long's (anarcho-libertarian and philosophy prof) paraphrased argument:

"Since reason is the most essential human trait, we are obligated to live as rational a life as possible. A life that exemplifies reason only in its choice of means is not as rational as one that also exemplifies reason in its choice of ends. Hence a life in which one deals with others through reason and persuasion is more human than a life in which one deals with others through force. So we are obligated not to initiate force against others. (When others initiate force against us, dealing with them through reason alone is no longer an available option, so the prohibition on force applies to initiatory force only.)"

[timotheeeee]

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But since this response isn't long-winded enough yet, here is Roderick Long's (anarcho-libertarian and philosophy prof) paraphrased argument:

"Since reason is the most essential human trait, we are obligated to live as rational a life as possible. A life that exemplifies reason only in its choice of means is not as rational as one that also exemplifies reason in its choice of ends. Hence a life in which one deals with others through reason and persuasion is more human than a life in which one deals with others through force. So we are obligated not to initiate force against others. (When others initiate force against us, dealing with them through reason alone is no longer an available option, so the prohibition on force applies to initiatory force only.)"

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I didn't want to get involved in a debate about rights, because it always ends up in a banging-head-against-wall stalemate for everyone involved, but here goes.

The first sentence of this quote is a bright and shining non-sequitur and pseudo-philosophical gibberish. Why does an essential trait inherently impose obligations to utilize that trait to the fullest possible extent? "Obligations" is serious talk, and it is in no way intuitive or deducible that an ought derives from essentiality. Can I use force to make someone use reason to the proper breadth (as deemed by? me? the guy not using enough reason?)

Why is the amount fixed at "as much as possible?" Assuming it could be proven that an ought can somehow be ramified from a trait, why isn't the obligtion something simpler like 'one ought to use reason most of the time' or 'one ought to use rationality to determine the times reason should or shouldn't be used' or 'one ought to use reason at least once?'

Does essentiality only bind humans? How about monkeys? Cacti? Twix bars? If not, why do they get off the hook? Or does the obligation only come into play when talking about reason? If so, why?

Also, he assumes reason to be the most essential trait, and this is also in no way intuitive or deducible. What if I think having a soul is the essential trait? How about if all of this 'essential trait' craziness is irrelevant because everything is determined ahead of time? What if I don't care about what the essential trait of humans is, and I think my essential trait is being a kickass Super Mario Kart player?

Listen, I'll all for self-ownership and non-coercion; but I don't think there's a string of logic that will prove these to be 'oughts.'

[Propertarian]

This presupposes that self-ownership is foundational; it does not show why it is. If self-ownership is not foundational then respecting it will not neccesarily lead towards happiness and human flourishing as it will not be what constitutes virtuous behavior.

[Propertarian]

Furthermore, what if some other values (justice, equality, security, happiness, well-being, flourishing etc.) justify the use of force? Lack of the use of force is one human value amongst many.

[DVaut1]

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But since this response isn't long-winded enough yet, here is Roderick Long's (anarcho-libertarian and philosophy prof) paraphrased argument:

"Since reason is the most essential human trait, we are obligated to live as rational a life as possible. A life that exemplifies reason only in its choice of means is not as rational as one that also exemplifies reason in its choice of ends. Hence a life in which one deals with others through reason and persuasion is more human than a life in which one deals with others through force. So we are obligated not to initiate force against others. (When others initiate force against us, dealing with them through reason alone is no longer an available option, so the prohibition on force applies to initiatory force only.)"

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I didn't want to get involved in a debate about rights, because it always ends up in a banging-head-against-wall stalemate for everyone involved, but here goes.

The first sentence of this quote is a bright and shining non-sequitur and pseudo-philosophical gibberish. Why does an essential trait inherently impose obligations to utilize that trait to the fullest possible extent? "Obligations" is serious talk, and it is in no way intuitive or deducible that an ought derives from essentiality. Can I use force to make someone use reason to the proper breadth (as deemed by? me? the guy not using enough reason?)

Why is the amount fixed at "as much as possible?" Assuming it could be proven that an ought can somehow be ramified from a trait, why isn't the obligtion something simpler like 'one ought to use reason most of the time' or 'one ought to use rationality to determine the times reason should or shouldn't be used' or 'one ought to use reason at least once?'

Does essentiality only bind humans? How about monkeys? Cacti? Twix bars? If not, why do they get off the hook? Or does the obligation only come into play when talking about reason? If so, why?

Also, he assumes reason to be the most essential trait, and this is also in no way intuitive or deducible. What if I think having a soul is the essential trait? How about if all of this 'essential trait' craziness is irrelevant because everything is determined ahead of time? What if I don't care about what the essential trait of humans is, and I think my essential trait is being a kickass Super Mario Kart player?

Listen, I'll all for self-ownership and non-coercion; but I don't think there's a string of logic that will prove these to be 'oughts.'

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Meta ethics makes my brain hurt. Send me to Hume's Guillotine please, before this goes any further.

Or perhaps just put me here:

[nietzreznor]

DVault,

Best. Game. Ever.

[nietzreznor]

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The first sentence of this quote is a bright and shining non-sequitur and pseudo-philosophical gibberish. Why does an essential trait inherently impose obligations to utilize that trait to the fullest possible extent? "Obligations" is serious talk, and it is in no way intuitive or deducible that an ought derives from essentiality.

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I don't think this is a fair reading of what Long is saying, but that is probably in large part because this is not a full, fleshed-out argument but rather a summary of an argument. Long, like myself, is an Aristotelian, so living a good, ethical life (where a good life must be an ethical one, since being a virtuous person is constitutive of living a good life) is deeply connected with living a fully human life (which is vague, admittedly).
The comments you make concerning obligation, though, are misguided I think--you seem to be adopting a Kantian view of "obligation" when I think Long (and Aristotle) mean something different.

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Can I use force to make someone use reason to the proper breadth (as deemed by? me? the guy not using enough reason?

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Only if their lack of use of reason constitutes aggression against you. The question of what constitutes such aggression (who determines what counts?) is a separate and most unrelated question involving the determinate content of self-ownership and law.

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Why is the amount fixed at "as much as possible?" Assuming it could be proven that an ought can somehow be ramified from a trait, why isn't the obligtion something simpler like 'one ought to use reason most of the time' or 'one ought to use rationality to determine the times reason should or shouldn't be used' or 'one ought to use reason at least once?'

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Well, like most things in virtue ethics, there are no really clear answers--and as I stated earlier in this thread, I don't think it is necessarily the case that a virtuous person ought always act in accordance with natural rights. This doesn't lessen another's moral claim to such rights, only the idea that (as you point out) one must use reason 100% of the time irregardless of circumstance.

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Does essentiality only bind humans? How about monkeys? Cacti? Twix bars? If not, why do they get off the hook? Or does the obligation only come into play when talking about reason? If so, why?

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The idea of "having an obligation" can only apply to moral agents. As far as I know, humans are the only being that fall into this category, though we may be visited by aliens at some point that are moral agents. (It is also an interesting question whether or not really intelligent nonhuman animals like dolphins and chimpanzees might qualify...)

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Also, he assumes reason to be the most essential trait, and this is also in no way intuitive or deducible. What if I think having a soul is the essential trait? How about if all of this 'essential trait' craziness is irrelevant because everything is determined ahead of time? What if I don't care about what the essential trait of humans is, and I think my essential trait is being a kickass Super Mario Kart player?

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Well, the Aristotelian tradition could be wrong about rationality--this is always a possibility. But whether or not you (or anyone else)thinks/cares/etc what is most essential is irrelevant. Such an attitude, I think, leads to some kind of moral relativism. I obviously haven't provided an argument why I think such a position is wrong, but to clarify my view, all I can say is that there are many objective facets of living a good life--living the good life (being happy) is not synonomous with thinking that one is doing so. So if you think you being a good SNES mario kart player means you're living well (since the SNES version is BY FAR the best [img]/images/graemlins/grin.gif[/img]), you might just be wrong.

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Listen, I'll all for self-ownership and non-coercion

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Glad to hear it, and I must say that I agree [img]/images/graemlins/laugh.gif[/img]

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but I don't think there's a string of logic that will prove these to be 'oughts.'

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Here I'm an inclined to disagree, but I welcome further debate. You raise interesting points and make cogent arguments.