FLORIDA ALLOWING POKER GAME STAKES TO BE RAISED IN JULY!

[Truthiness24]

They seem to be at the impression at HR that people are going to come to East Tampa to do something besides gamble. Maybe if there's enough $ in the joint, as when you raise the stakes, it can fly.

[Atomic]

I don't think the expansion plans at the HR Tampa had anything to do with poker limits increasing. It probably has to do with the expected move to Class III slots if Gamblin' Charlie makes good on the compact negotiations with the Seminole and Miccosukee tribes.

Speaking of making good. The Florida Baptists are calling out Gov. Crist to make good on his campaign promise to oppose the expansion of gaming in Florida.

http://www.floridabaptistwitness.com/7325.article

The article is pretty straight forward but the fun part is the comment section at the St Petersburg Times Political Blog about the Baptist article.

http://blogs.tampabay.com/buzz/2007/...ng_on_cri.html

Mixing debate on politics, religion and gambling - good stuff.

[Russ M.]

Hooray for the Bible Belt! While we're at it, get rid of the intranets and that dern TV box! Excuse me while I get back to churning butter.

[NY60]

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I think that intent isn't going to be relevant. A court is going to have to make a ruling based upon the plain meaning of the statute. "Intent" only becomes relevant if the plain meaning is unambiguous. It isn't.


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I'm not sure I understand what you mean here.

If the plain meaning is "unambiguous" then there is no doubt as to the plain meaning.

It seems that you are saying it isn't - i.e., that the plain meaning is ambiguous (unless this is just a typo).

Besides, "intent" is always always always the core issue when dealing with statutory construction.


[/ QUOTE ]

Intent only becomes an issue when the "plain meaning" is unclear or ambiguous. I don't think that it is. "Maximum required buy-in" is exactly what it says.

I don't have a monopoly on that which is right, FWIW. I invite someone (or many people) to put on the black hat of the moral crusaders of religious right and big-daddy government (the bad guys in our scenario) and make an argument from within the four corners of SB 752 that the "plain meaning" of the statute WRT "maximum required buy-in" is somehow unclear or ambiguous and that we need to look at intent.

And THEN, can you show what exactly the intent was otherwise?

[/ QUOTE ]

I'm sorry pal, I know you mean well but you still have not answered how you can expect to limit the "LIMIT" players to $80 per hand but allow the "NL" players to sit down plop $8000 on a table and then bet the whole thing on the first hand? Its a perversion of the statutory intent. Plain and simple.

Its the last time I am going to say this, legislative intent is always always the question. It is never never ignored.

You are just plain wrong when you say that a Judge can simply ignore the legislative intent until an ambiguous term arises.

I'm sorry don't get mad at me I don't make the laws I just practice them.

[Rabid_Hippo]

NY60 - I can't disagree with you more when it comes to statutory interpretation. The rules of construction are clear that the plain language of a statute controls. Only when the language of a statute is ambiguous is legislative history considered. Trust me ... as a young pup fresh out of law school I spent my first two years of practice as a federal law clerk dealing with this issue all of the time. The courts don't care what the legislature "intented" if the law they passed is clear in its language.

I agree that it's pretty obvious that there's a drafting "error" in the statute ... but the language is what it is.

[Truthiness24]

[ QUOTE ]
I agree that it's pretty obvious that there's a drafting "error" in the statute ... but the language is what it is.


[/ QUOTE ]

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Its the last time I am going to say this, legislative intent is always always the question. It is never never ignored.

You are just plain wrong when you say that a Judge can simply ignore the legislative intent until an ambiguous term arises.

[/ QUOTE ]

Can either of you -- NY60 in particular -- cite case law? The question is: should a court will look to legislative intent when a statute is unambiguous?

I'm pretty sure I'm right WRT the state of the law on this, but I wouldn't mind learning something new.

[Rabid_Hippo]

Geez ... I usually only like to do this when someone is paying [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

The following is taken from FlaJur - which can have dubious conclusions at times - but I really don't want to do any independent research on this:

The legislative intent, which is the primary factor of importance in construing statutes, must be determined primarily from the language of the statute. S.R.G. Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 365 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1978); Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693 (1918); State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969 (1908); State v. Dalby, 361 So. 2d 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1978).

The legislative intent must be determined if possible from what is said in the statute. Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co., 118 So. 2d 664 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1960).

Whenever possible, the meaning of a statute must be gleaned from its plain language. Levine v. Levine, 734 So. 2d 1191, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1568 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1999).

Thus, if the intent of the legislature is clear and unmistakable from the language used, it is the court's duty to give effect to that intent. Englewood Water Dist. v. Tate, 334 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1976).

A statute is to be taken, construed, and applied in the form enacted. Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976); Blount v. State, 102 Fla. 1100, 138 So. 2, 80 A.L.R. 830 (1931); State v. Dalby, 361 So. 2d 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1978).

This is so because the legislature must be assumed to know the meaning of words and to have expressed its intent by the use of the words found in the statute. S.R.G. Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 365 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1978); Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976); Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693 (1918); State v. Dalby, 361 So. 2d 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1978).

Though the courts' role in the lawmaking process is recognized, and they have a limited power to adjust statutory provisions to fit changing concepts, the courts cannot use the machinery of construction to amend, modify, or repeal valid statutes. In addition, it is well settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom of an enactment. Sheffield-Briggs Steel Products, Inc. v. Ace Concrete Service Co., 63 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 1953). Their function is only to ascertain the will of the legislature. They must construe the law as given by the legislature and may not substitute judicial cerebration for the law or require the enforcement of what they think the law should be.

Under Florida law, the plain meaning of the statutory language is the first consideration of statutory construction. Edwards v. Safeguard Ins. Co., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (M.D. Fla. 2004). Basic canon of statutory interpretation requires District Court of Appeal to presume that legislature says in statute what it means, and means in statute what it says there. Haskins v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 898 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2005).

The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires court to presume that the legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. Broz v. Rodriguez, 891 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2005), review denied, 907 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2005).
A court's function is to interpret statutes as they are written and give effect to each word in the statute. Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Florida Mun. Power Agency, 789 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 2001).

Courts must apply a statute as they find it, leaving to the legislature the correction of assorted inconsistencies and inequalities in its operation. Guilder v. State, 899 So. 2d 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2005).

Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resort to the rules of statutory interpretation, since to do otherwise would constitute an abrogation of legislative power. The plain and obvious provisions must control.

Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659 So. 2d 1064, 20 Fla. L. Weekly S447 (Fla. 1995); In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 20 Fla. L. Weekly S376, 20 Fla. L. Weekly S427 (Fla. 1995); Zuckerman v. Hofrichter & Quiat, P.A., 646 So. 2d 187, 19 Fla. L. Weekly S634 (Fla. 1994), on remand to, 672 So. 2d 888, 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1034 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1996), appeal after remand, 710 So. 2d 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1998), reh'g denied, (June 10, 1998) and review denied, 728 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1998); Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984); Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Bryant, 170 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1964); State v. Stuler, 122 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1960); Marshall Lodge No. 39, A. F. & A. M., v. Woodson, 139 Fla. 579, 190 So. 749 (1939); A.R. Douglass, Inc., v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157 (1931); Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693 (1918); Leigh v. State ex rel. Kirkpatrick, 298 So. 2d 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1974); White v. Campbell, 215 So. 2d 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1968); Douglas v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 191 So. 2d 483 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1966); Biddle v. State Beverage Dept., 187 So. 2d 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1966), cert. dismissed, 194 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1966); Alligood v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 156 So. 2d 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1963).

Where the legislative intent is plain, the courts may not apply their own construction or rearrange the words, or add punctuation marks that would result in a departure from the natural meaning of the language used. Wagner v. Botts, 88 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1956).

Where legislative intent as evidenced by statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no necessity for any construction or interpretation of the statute, and courts need only give effect to plain meaning of its terms. State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).

Where the language of a statute is clear and unequivocal, the legislative intent may be gleaned from words used without applying incidental rules of construction. Reino v. State, 352 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1977) (abrogation recognized on other grounds by, Mercer v. State, 654 So. 2d 1221, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1995)).
Nicoll v. Baker, 668 So. 2d 989, 21 Fla. L. Weekly S96 (Fla. 1996); Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984).

Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984); Phil's Yellow Taxi Co. of Miami Springs v. Carter, 134 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1961); State ex rel. Beth v. Burnett, 141 Fla. 870, 194 So. 277 (1940); In re Ratliff's Estate, 137 Fla. 229, 188 So. 128 (1939); Smith v. Fechheimer, 124 Fla. 757, 169 So. 395 (1936); Brooks v. Anastasia Mosquito Control Dist., 148 So. 2d 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1963); Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co., 118 So. 2d 664 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1960).

The court is bound by the unambiguous terms of a statute. Cassady v. Consolidated Naval Stores Co., 119 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1960).

In ascertaining the legislative intent, the courts are bound by the plain and definite language of the statute and are not authorized to engage in semantic niceties or speculations. If the language of the statute is clear and unequivocal, the legislative intent must be derived from the words used without involving incidental rules of construction or engaging in speculation as to what the judges might think the legislature intended or should have intended. Tropical Coach Line, Inc. v. Carter, 121 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1960).

If the terms and provisions of a statute are plain, there is no room for judicial or administrative interpretation. Southeastern Utilities Service Co. v. Redding, 131 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1961).


Thus, the court is without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications.

American Bankers Life Assur. Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1968).

Now, if ambiguous, we get to the rules of statutory construction and an inquiry into legislative history.

When a statute does not define a term, the Supreme Court must resort to canons of statutory construction to derive the proper meaning. Nehme v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc., 863 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2003).

Under Florida law, the purpose of construing a statute is to give effect to legislative intent. Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (M.D. Fla. 2004).

The primary guide to statutory interpretation is to determine the purpose of the legislature. Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc., 898 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004).

Legislative intent must be determined primarily from the language of the statute; however, the primary and overriding consideration in statutory interpretation is that a statute should be construed and applied so as to give effect to the evident intent of the legislature regardless of whether such construction varies from the statute's literal meaning. Miele v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 656 So. 2d 470, 20 Fla. L. Weekly S260 (Fla. 1995), answer to certified question conformed to, 62 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 1995); Deason v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 705 So. 2d 1374, 23 Fla. L. Weekly S35 (Fla. 1998). In other words, this intent must be given effect even though it may appear to contradict the strict letter of the statute and well-settled canons of construction. Vildibill v. Johnson, 492 So. 2d 1047, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 275 (Fla. 1986), answer to certified question conformed to, 802 F.2d 1347 (11th Cir. 1986); State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1981); Wakulla County v. Davis, 395 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1981) (abrogation recognized on other grounds by, Marion County v. Johnson, 586 So. 2d 1163, 16 Fla. L. Weekly D2346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1991)); State, Dept. of Revenue v. Kemper Investors Life Ins. Co., 660 So. 2d 1124, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D2072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1995).

[Cactus Jack]

This is why lawyers make so much and why I didn't go to law school.

[Truthiness24]

Nice work. You put just enough time into it to justify itself.

Rebuttal?

[Truthiness24]

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This is why lawyers make so much and why I didn't go to law school.


[/ QUOTE ]

It's also why you have time to play poker more than me.