AC -- why would anyone ever have to accept the judgement of the court?

[Sifmole]

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What entity would enforce the judgements?

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An enforcing entity...

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I'm guessing this is a wry joke

[SheetWise]

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Why would anyone ever have to accept the judgement of the court?

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I don't know if it surprises you or not -- but in our current system many people don't. They simply leave oustanding warrants. And as long as they don't ever come in contact with the law again, they can ignore the court forever. An amazing number of people ignore court orders, and simply stay out of that courts jurisdiction. Unless it's a crime where they are willing to extradite -- it's a fine solution. In other cases, they have to avoid contact with all law enforcement.

[Borodog]

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So why would they? What entity would enforce the judgements?

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Since I just did it (for the second time in a few days), I may as well do it again in this thread. Here is how private security and justice might work in the free market. Since free market solutions are organic and evolutionary, this scenario might not be complete, but it shows that reasonable free market solutions can work.

Aggression against an individual, or having their contractual agreements violated, or being defrauded, are inherently unpredictable risks. In other words, we cannot in general predict when we will be robbed, otherwise we would arrange not to be in that palce at that time. We cannot in general predict who will break their contracts with us, else we would not contract with them. We cannot in general predict who is defrauding us, else would would not deal with them.

These risks are insurable risks because they are unpredictable. The frequency of some risks can be affected by our decisions, such as choosing to live in a better neighborhood versus a crime ridden neighborhood, but we cannot predict anything about individual events. People who fall into the same risk pool pool their money in the form of insurance premiums to insure themselves against unpredictable losses.

There are also uninsurable risks. You cannot insure yourself against the risk of suicide. You can easily influence and predict such events. An insurer that provided such a policy would attract suicidal individuals who wanted to leave money to their family and the insurer would rapidly go broke. Similarly you cannot insure yourself against robbing someone else.

Since aggression, breaking of contracts, and fraud against individuals are insurable risks, the natural model for resolving such matters is an insurance model. Insurance companies are numerous and large. They indemnify tens of billions if not hundreds of billions of dollars in assets. They do this by investing premium dollars in diversified appreciating hard assets like real estate, which are also the source of their profits. In a security insurance model, individuals purchase polices that indemnify themselves and their property from loss due to aggression, broken contracts, and fraud. Their premium is determined by their risk pool. Competition amongst insurers insures that insurance customers are subdivided into smaller and smaller groups of indistinguishable levels of risk, and ensures the lowest possible premiums. For example if Company A placed desk jockeys in the same risk pool as pro football players for getting injured, the premiums of the desk jockeys would clearly subsidize systematic payments to the football players, whose risk of injury are far higher. Another company that subdivided the groups could offer much lower premiums to the desk jockeys, and they would leave Company A, forcing them to either go broke or raise the premiums for the football players to the natural level that represents their actual risk.

When I am aggressed against, I file a claim to recover my losses. Say you steal my car. I file a claim. The company first investigates to make sure I am not defrauding them and discover who actually stole the car. They have an incentive to find out who did it, because regardless, they have to pay for my new car. They want to recover these costs from the actual aggressor.

Once they identify you and gather sufficient evidence, they take the case to a reputable arbitrator. They will not simply go to an arbitrator who will always find in their favor, for the judgements of such an arbitrator would simply be ignored. There is no financial incentive for an arbitrator to simply hand out judgements to the highest bidder. Such an arbitrator would quickly gain a reputation for worthless judgements, his judgements would be ignored in the market, and hence there is no incentive to pay for his judgements in the first place. He will rapidly go out of business. This is why Underwriter's Laboratory doesn't just hand out it's seal to any product whose manufacturer pays a fee; if they did the seal would be worthless and they would go out of business post haste.

Now, you can report the action against you to your insurance provider, they can perform their own investigation, and they (or you) can take your side of the case to an arbitrator of your choice as well. But again, there is no incentive for him to simply rule in your favor because you pay him. Again a disreputable arbitrator is an out of work arbitrator.

In the majority of cases the facts are clear, the investigations will agree, and so will the rulings. Your insurer does not have any incentive to tilt their investigation in your favor, because you haven't insured yourself, indeed you can't, from committing auto theft. It's no skin off their nose if you lose the case.

When the judgement comes out against you, you have a couple of choices. You can simply pay up, and be done with it. I would highly advise this cource of action. Because if you don't pay up, my insurer will send a security firm to show up and extract compensation for their loss (they already paid me, remember). They will seize funds or property, or whatever assets are required to fullfil the judgement.

Meanwhile, your insurance company won't lift a finger to stop them, because doing so would be extremely costly, and because you can't insure yourself against you committing autotheft. If you try to resist yourself, or by hiring personal security forces, it will be extremely costly and probably get you killed. I guarantee the resources of my insurance company with its hundreds of billions of dollars in holdings will exceed the resources you have at your disposal to resist.

Note that my insurer is not initiating force against you. They are simply closing the force transaction that you initiated against me when you stole my car.

In the few cases where the facts are not clear enough to produce identical judgements, the two insurers will simply come to a negotiated settlement between themselves, since having security forces "battle it out" to settle the dispute would be incredibly costly.

Hence we have a simple insurance based model of criminal justice that incorporates competition amongst insurers, arbitrators, and security firms that does not require a territorial monopoly for any of them. There are clear market mechanisms that result in compliance with reputable arbitration.

There are a number of benefits from such a system. For example, since your premium depends on your level of risk, personal responsibility is incentivised. Those who have alarm systems and guns and take other security measures will have lower insurance premiums, and communities are incentivized to expel criminal elements because those elements raise their premiums, just to name a couple.

[hmkpoker]

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What entity would enforce the judgements?

[/ QUOTE ]

Me.

[Borodog]

As an extension, there are other supplementary models that can be invoked. For example, if you don't comply with reputable judgements, your credit rating will be damaged. People will be less likely to do business with you because you have demonstrated that you are untrustworthy. You will have to pay a premium to get people to deal with you, for example in interest rates. Hence you have an incentive to just comply with reputable judgements.

[Sifmole]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
So why would they? What entity would enforce the judgements?

[/ QUOTE ]

Since I just did it (for the second time in a few days), I may as well do it again in this thread. Here is how private security and justice might work in the free market. Since free market solutions are organic and evolutionary, this scenario might not be complete, but it shows that reasonable free market solutions can work.

Aggression against an individual, or having their contractual agreements violated, or being defrauded, are inherently unpredictable risks. In other words, we cannot in general predict when we will be robbed, otherwise we would arrange not to be in that palce at that time. We cannot in general predict who will break their contracts with us, else we would not contract with them. We cannot in general predict who is defrauding us, else would would not deal with them.

These risks are insurable risks because they are unpredictable. The frequency of some risks can be affected by our decisions, such as choosing to live in a better neighborhood versus a crime ridden neighborhood, but we cannot predict anything about individual events. People who fall into the same risk pool pool their money in the form of insurance premiums to insure themselves against unpredictable losses.

There are also uninsurable risks. You cannot insure yourself against the risk of suicide. You can easily influence and predict such events. An insurer that provided such a policy would attract suicidal individuals who wanted to leave money to their family and the insurer would rapidly go broke. Similarly you cannot insure yourself against robbing someone else.

Since aggression, breaking of contracts, and fraud against individuals are insurable risks, the natural model for resolving such matters is an insurance model. Insurance companies are numerous and large. They indemnify tens of billions if not hundreds of billions of dollars in assets. They do this by investing premium dollars in diversified appreciating hard assets like real estate, which are also the source of their profits. In a security insurance model, individuals purchase polices that indemnify themselves and their property from loss due to aggression, broken contracts, and fraud. Their premium is determined by their risk pool. Competition amongst insurers insures that insurance customers are subdivided into smaller and smaller groups of indistinguishable levels of risk, and ensures the lowest possible premiums. For example if Company A placed desk jockeys in the same risk pool as pro football players for getting injured, the premiums of the desk jockeys would clearly subsidize systematic payments to the football players, whose risk of injury are far higher. Another company that subdivided the groups could offer much lower premiums to the desk jockeys, and they would leave Company A, forcing them to either go broke or raise the premiums for the football players to the natural level that represents their actual risk.

When I am aggressed against, I file a claim to recover my losses. Say you steal my car. I file a claim. The company first investigates to make sure I am not defrauding them and discover who actually stole the car. They have an incentive to find out who did it, because regardless, they have to pay for my new car. They want to recover these costs from the actual aggressor.

Once they identify you and gather sufficient evidence, they take the case to a reputable arbitrator. They will not simply go to an arbitrator who will always find in their favor, for the judgements of such an arbitrator would simply be ignored. There is no financial incentive for an arbitrator to simply hand out judgements to the highest bidder. Such an arbitrator would quickly gain a reputation for worthless judgements, his judgements would be ignored in the market, and hence there is no incentive to pay for his judgements in the first place. He will rapidly go out of business. This is why Underwriter's Laboratory doesn't just hand out it's seal to any product whose manufacturer pays a fee; if they did the seal would be worthless and they would go out of business post haste.

Now, you can report the action against you to your insurance provider, they can perform their own investigation, and they (or you) can take your side of the case to an arbitrator of your choice as well. But again, there is no incentive for him to simply rule in your favor because you pay him. Again a disreputable arbitrator is an out of work arbitrator.

In the majority of cases the facts are clear, the investigations will agree, and so will the rulings. Your insurer does not have any incentive to tilt their investigation in your favor, because you haven't insured yourself, indeed you can't, from committing auto theft. It's no skin off their nose if you lose the case.

When the judgement comes out against you, you have a couple of choices. You can simply pay up, and be done with it. I would highly advise this cource of action. Because if you don't pay up, my insurer will send a security firm to show up and extract compensation for their loss (they already paid me, remember). They will seize funds or property, or whatever assets are required to fullfil the judgement.

Meanwhile, your insurance company won't lift a finger to stop them, because doing so would be extremely costly, and because you can't insure yourself against you committing autotheft. If you try to resist yourself, or by hiring personal security forces, it will be extremely costly and probably get you killed. I guarantee the resources of my insurance company with its hundreds of billions of dollars in holdings will exceed the resources you have at your disposal to resist.

Note that my insurer is not initiating force against you. They are simply closing the force transaction that you initiated against me when you stole my car.

In the few cases where the facts are not clear enough to produce identical judgements, the two insurers will simply come to a negotiated settlement between themselves, since having security forces "battle it out" to settle the dispute would be incredibly costly.

Hence we have a simple insurance based model of criminal justice that incorporates competition amongst insurers, arbitrators, and security firms that does not require a territorial monopoly for any of them. There are clear market mechanisms that result in compliance with reputable arbitration.

There are a number of benefits from such a system. For example, since your premium depends on your level of risk, personal responsibility is incentivised. Those who have alarm systems and guns and take other security measures will have lower insurance premiums, and communities are incentivized to expel criminal elements because those elements raise their premiums, just to name a couple.

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Borodog -- a well thought out explanation. However, I ask you: doesn't the final section sound kind of scary to you? It does to me -- I see companies that specialize in jackbooted collection thugs. You final piece implies, but yet doesn't explicitly accept, the likeliehood of violent means.

Another point I take issue with is your repetition of "a disreputable arbitrator is an out of work arbitrator" -- are you aware of the current state of arbitrator abuse in the marketplace? Many people sign contracts currently, specifically with Credit card companies, that force them comply with arbitration rather than able to bring a lawsuit; there is a reasonable history of these arbitrations being very tilted toward the company paying the arbitrator ( no I don't have specific references but I will see what I can do ).

I guess my main problem is I don't have much faith in the wonderful rational cooperation of all firms -- mankind has time and again proven itself irrational.

[hmkpoker]

[ QUOTE ]
Borodog -- a well thought out explanation. However, I ask you: doesn't the final section sound kind of scary to you? It does to me -- I see companies that specialize in jackbooted collection thugs. You final piece implies, but yet doesn't explicitly accept, the likeliehood of violent means.

[/ QUOTE ]

And this is exactly why anarchocapitalism doesn't appeal to most people.

It's not based on a fantasy utopia. It's a logical deduction based on observable and proven principles. Persons are intuitive: sometimes a good listening friend is more effective in therapy than a well-read psychologist. People, however, are counter-intuitive. Our intuitive understanding of human beings is limited to individuals, and it's easy to see why. We are individuals, so we already have an edge in understanding others just by our inherent proximity.

However, no one can similiarly relate to a nation or an economy. Widescale human interaction is less intuitive than individual behavior. We need to approach this the same way we approach everything that we can't understand: with logic, reasoning and science.

Letting someone with the best intentions of the people, but no scientific understanding of how "people" work, is like letting an aesthete who can envision the most beautiful home, but who has no architectural knowledge, try to build a house.

So all those "but it doesn't seem like" arguments are nonsense. If the ACer is explaining the logic behind the development of his idea, that's what you have to disprove.

[Sifmole]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Borodog -- a well thought out explanation. However, I ask you: doesn't the final section sound kind of scary to you? It does to me -- I see companies that specialize in jackbooted collection thugs. You final piece implies, but yet doesn't explicitly accept, the likeliehood of violent means.

[/ QUOTE ]

And this is exactly why anarchocapitalism doesn't appeal to most people.

It's not based on a fantasy utopia. It's a logical deduction based on observable and proven principles. Persons are intuitive: sometimes a good listening friend is more effective in therapy than a well-read psychologist. People, however, are counter-intuitive. Our intuitive understanding of human beings is limited to individuals, and it's easy to see why. We are individuals, so we already have an edge in understanding others just by our inherent proximity.

However, no one can similiarly relate to a nation or an economy. Widescale human interaction is less intuitive than individual behavior. We need to approach this the same way we approach everything that we can't understand: with logic, reasoning and science.

Letting someone with the best intentions of the people, but no scientific understanding of how "people" work, is like letting an aesthete who can envision the most beautiful home, but who has no architectural knowledge, try to build a house.

So all those "but it doesn't seem like" arguments are nonsense. If the ACer is explaining the logic behind the development of his idea, that's what you have to disprove.

[/ QUOTE ]

My last posting had no intention of disproving anything. It was an honest statement of exactly where I am at right now as to why I just can't buy AC. Boro does a fine job of expressing himself -- and I honestly don't have the time just now to analyze and present an attempt at refutation.

[hmkpoker]

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It was an honest statement of exactly where I am at right now as to why I just can't buy AC.

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Christians "just can't buy" evolution.

[SheetWise]

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Christians "just can't buy" evolution.

[/ QUOTE ]
I'm not a Christian -- but that's BS.

It's like saying the Nation of Islam "just can't buy" peace. First of all, it's not true -- and second, it's a sure way to end any discourse.