Pascal's wager justifies terrorism?

[soon2bepro]

chez: Pascal's wager isn't entirely wrong.

It proves that when presented with choices X and Y, if you have reason to believe that X has a higher probability to result in infinite gain than Y; or if Y has a higher probability to result in infinite loss than X; you take X.

However, it's true that often we have more than just 2 choices, in the case of believing in fairytales, there's virtually an infinite number to choose from, not to mention making one up.

When there's more than 2 choices, the same principles apply, but now it's much harder to make any valuable estimation. When the number is infinite, it's probably impossible. Hence why Pascal's wager is not applicable in this case.

[chezlaw]

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"The main problem with the Wager is that belief for the sake of personal gain is not true belief. In order to reap the infinite rewards, you must not believe solely for the sake of those rewards, but for the sake of believing itself. Believing for personal gain is morally reprehensible, un-Christian and is deserving of eternal damnation."

From http://ek15.blogspot.com/2006/10/vol...als-wager.html

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The true belief issue can normally be dealt with and is not the fundemental flaw. Pascal's wager boils down to the idea that a decision with a finite cost in this life could gain infinite reward in the next life and hence is a good bet. The flaw is that the decision being made in the hope of infinite reward in the next life could also result in the loss of infinite reward in the next life.

So whatever decision you make the downside is loss of infinite reward. For the reason you give its not only not a good bet but probably a bad bet.

chez

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chez,

In keeping with my earlier post about assumptions, your positing that the Wager is illogical/invalid is based on the following assumptions, which Pascal didn't make:

1) There is a chance Christianity is false;

2) If # 1 is true then another religion that might be true will also infinitely punish a believer of another religion.


Islam meets both those criteria, but again they weren't stated or implied by Pascal. He in fact started with an implicit assumption that they weren't so. Even in the case where #2 is true but it isn't known which religion is the true one, then that only implies a risk in making a wager with the wrong religion, and the risk from making none at all still dooms one.

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Sure if christianity is necessarily true, if god exists but that's the fallacy that Pascal commited.

Deny the fallacy and you can make the argument work but that's true of all arguments. It doesn't make the wager a good bet and as previously pointed out there's good reason for atheists to believe its a very bad bet.

edit; incidently here's the wager; [ QUOTE ]
God is, or He is not. But to which side shall we incline? Reason can decide nothing here. There is an infinite chaos which separated us. A game is being played at the extremity of this infinite distance where heads or tails will turn up...Which will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see which interests you least. You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun, error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than the other, since you must of necessity choose. This is one point settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is.

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Its not reaally christianity but the idea that somehow you can make a finite choice that might give infinite gain. therein lies the fallacy because the choice might cost you infinite gain.

chez

[guesswest]

I agree that this fallacy shows up as applied to a Christian god. But I disagree that this is a more significant problem than the issue of true belief - that's the dealbreaker with Pascal's wager because it applies in all possible worlds.

We don't get to choose what we believe to be true, not consciously anyway. If you announce that you believe in god because believing in god would be a +EV proposition - it just doesn't make it so, you don't actually 'believe' in any sense of the word. It's no different from announcing that you're a missionary when you're in fact a crack dealer.

[chezlaw]

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I agree that this fallacy shows up as applied to a Christian god. But I disagree that this is a more significant problem than the issue of true belief - that's the dealbreaker with Pascal's wager because it applies in all possible worlds.

We don't get to choose what we believe to be true, not consciously anyway. If you announce that you believe in god because believing in god would be a +EV proposition - it just doesn't make it so, you don't actually 'believe' in any sense of the word. It's no different from announcing that you're a missionary when you're in fact a crack dealer.

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Its interesting but true belief isn't a complete deal breaker. Suppose Pascal's wager is true if you have true belief. Then anything finite you can do that increases the chances of true belief is a good bet.

For a non-practising atheist its seems reasonable to argue that exposure to christian practice increases the chances of them becoming a true believer (especially if god exists). This can't be proved but it must be worth a try? [img]/images/graemlins/wink.gif[/img]

I'd liken it to trying to catch a cold. No guarantees but standing in the wet and cold is a good bet. But it then also follows that if youve been a practising christian for a long time and haven'tbecome a true believer then its a good bet to try something else. Maybe embracing there true atheistic belief will lead them to true belief in god, must be worth try [img]/images/graemlins/wink.gif[/img]

chez

[guesswest]

You possibly have a point in so far as you can up your chances of believing in something by increasing your exposure to arguments in favour of that thing. Although by the same token, if you have a rational mind, by doing so you must be aware of the greater likelihood of your resulting beliefs being false (thus not really beliefs).

And it's worth mentioning that this is not what Pascal meant. He seems to suggest we just 'decide' to believe something. Also, since there's obviously no way of quantifying the likelihood of catching the cold from standing in the rain, there's no way of knowing if the wager actually is +EV. I know he said 'if you lose, you lose nothing' - but that's clearly not true even based only on what he says himself earlier in the same paragraph.

[chezlaw]

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You possibly have a point in so far as you can up your chances of believing in something by increasing your exposure to arguments in favour of that thing. Although by the same token, if you have a rational mind, by doing so you must be aware of the greater likelihood of your resulting beliefs being false (thus not really beliefs).

And it's worth mentioning that this is not what Pascal meant. He seems to suggest we just 'decide' to believe something. Also, since there's obviously no way of quantifying the likelihood of catching the cold from standing in the rain, there's no way of knowing if the wager actually is +EV. I know he said 'if you lose, you lose nothing' - but that's clearly not true even based only on what he says himself earlier in the same paragraph.

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We've addressed this many times (even if DS has only just noticed) but it seems historically true that Pascal was aware that we couldn't chose to believe but could chose to behave as a christian making belief more likely to follow.

Pascal aside, it doesn't matter how much it costs if true belief in god is the only path to infinite reward. That's the power of the wager. The fallacy is that accepting the wager may have an infinte cost.

chez

[FortunaMaximus]

How much does an outward statement of belief and an inward statement of disbelief, to oneself, really sway the relative valuation of those factors?

To suggest otherwise is to condemn free will as fallacious, no?

[guesswest]

Yes, but as you've pointed out, the infinite thing only applies in the event that god exists. The strength of the legitimate belief objection is that it can be applied to Pascal-type wagers that don't reference infinite rewards/losses too. I suppose in the case of infinite rewards/losses you're right that you need both - since even the slimmest attempts to acquire belief would then be +EV.

And I've never noticed this discussion on here before either...

[guesswest]

I don't understand what you're saying? Free will doesn't require freedom from your own mind. As it relates to Pascal's wager the idea is that god, if he exists, will be judging you by direct reference to your beliefs - it's not a tribunal.

[chezlaw]

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Yes, but as you've pointed out, the infinite thing only applies in the event that god exists. The strength of the legitimate belief objection is that it can be applied to Pascal-type wagers that don't reference infinite rewards/losses too. I suppose in the case of infinite rewards/losses you're right that you need both - since even the slimmest attempts to acquire belief would then be +EV.

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I think that must be right, unless you can prove that there's no chance of god existing then all finite objections are crushed. If belief in god could be surgically implanted in manner that kills us 5 minutes later it would still be +ev.

chez