Thinking is part of reality

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
Perry stops the search because if the shopper performing the search is the shopper with the torn sack, then continuing with the search is resulting in even more spilled sugar. Moreover, Perry's goal is to identify the shopper with the torn sack, which can only be done by examining that shopper's cart. Therefore, the logical behavior is to check the cart of the shopper performing the search.

This doesn't go anywhere. Look, there are already computer programs that can successfully perform this task, so there is no way that a first-person is needed to do so. Solving the problem of the torn sack doesn't require anything but simple actions taken based on programmed dynamics. This is, at best, a poor example.

[/ QUOTE ]

Again, Perry only has reason to check his own sack if he thinks that he is the one who is conducting the search. The content of the belief that "the shopper performing the search is the shopper with the torn sack" does not give him reason to check his own sack.

The fact that computer programs can perform tasks like this is completely irrelevant, since we don't explain the behavior of computers by reference to their propositional attitudes. Perry would have to be an idiot if his argument depended on the claim that we must attribute first-person beliefs to anything that can perform such tasks.

[madnak]

[ QUOTE ]
Again, Perry only has reason to check his own sack if he thinks that he is the one who is conducting the search. The content of the belief that "the shopper performing the search is the shopper with the torn sack" does not give him reason to check his own sack.

[/ QUOTE ]

It does if he is the shopper with the torn sack. "His own sack" and "the sack of the shopper performing the search" are the same sack. He gains nothing by checking "his own sack" that he doesn't gain by checking "the sack of the shopper performing the search."

[ QUOTE ]
The fact that computer programs can perform tasks like this is completely irrelevant, since we don't explain the behavior of computers by reference to their propositional attitudes.

[/ QUOTE ]

We don't explain the behavior of humans that way, either. And we certainly don't have to explain the behavior of humans that way. If we did, the field of psychology would be in an even sorrier state than it is, but even the field of neurology clearly indicates that much of human action is automatic and programmed, and not based on beliefs or attitudes. Some action is obviously influenced by beliefs and attitudes, but to exactly what extent nobody knows. And it's possible to conceive of a human being who works completely like a computer. In fact, it's likely that all beliefs and attitudes are the result of collective action by neurons, and thus are composed of parts smaller than themselves.

[ QUOTE ]
Perry would have to be an idiot if his argument depended on the claim that we must attribute first-person beliefs to anything that can perform such tasks.

[/ QUOTE ]

No, he would just have to be ignorant or arrogant (or both)...

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]


We don't explain the behavior of humans that way, either.

[/ QUOTE ]

Yes, we do. All day, every day. Apparently you think persons are automatons. We could have saved a lot of time discussing the role that first-person beliefs play in the explanation of an intentional agent's behavior if you would have just said from the outset that you think there are no such things as persons or intentional agents.

[madnak]

It's not that I don't believe in those things, I just believe those things have no observable effects. Our conceptions of such things as agency are therefore unnecessary. I believe that our actions are the results of physical processes - in terms of our actions, I'm a (probabilistic) determinist. Agency itself I view as a quale (or category of qualia) - something passively experienced, despite the illusion of being an active phenomenon.