Fictitious play for multi-player games

[plexiq]

Kind of forgot about this thread, sorry [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

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A perfect example is when there is a big stack bullying the table near the bubble. Nash says the big stack should raise almost every hand and the small stacks should almost always fold. However just being in this situation is -EV for the small stacks. It would be in a small stacks long-term interest to call more liberally and punish the raiser. This will attempt to get the big stack to stop his bullying. But you have to take a -EV move now in order to try and stop being in continually -EV situations in the future.

But that would be way too complicated to figure out with a computer...

Tysen

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I think the example is actually mixing in a different problem.

One part of the problem you describe boils down to flaws of ICM. ICM overestimates midstack-equities at the bubble, and underestimates bigstack equity. If we had access to a better EQ-estimation, midstacks would automatically call wider, because relative equities of folding/busting/doubling up would change.

With ICM we have lots of scenarios where players are expected to win/lose equity during the next orbit. This should never be the case with an accurate EQ model.

As i understand it, thats to be seen "separated" from our original problem: That the NE is usually a bad state for the caller, because he is actually in the position to "force" the pusher into a more favorable state. I think this is a problem with the NE altogether. Maybe i can think of some toy game to better demonstrate my though,...(hopefully i wont forget about the thread, again [img]/images/graemlins/laugh.gif[/img])