Saving bunny and RJT

[David Sklansky]

I've been pondering this subject quite a bit and I believe that I can demonstrate fairly persuasively, though not prove rigorously, that a certain type of "assuming" is essentially identical to a certain type of "having faith".

Before going further let me make clear that the arguments I will present apply to any subject that may or may not be true, not just religion. It just so happens that if my thought processes are not flawed it means that bunny and RJT will definitely NOT burn in hell. But please don't let that influence you in evaluating my points.

First, it is important to understand that there are two types of faith and two types of assuming. (They are not mutually exclusive.) There is faith in something largely because of the evidence (I have faith OJ killed Nicole) and faith in something where you acknowledge that an objective observer is reasonable if he claims that the evidence isn't sufficient to back up your claims of "certainty" (I have complete faith that my husband was true to me during his month long tip to Amsterdam). It is this second type of faith I will be discussing here.

As for assuming, one type involves assigning a high enough probability so that the action you take is the same as if you were certain. (I assume he wouldn't make such a large raise without aces or kings so I'm folding my queens.) The other type of assuming occurs in situations where it is not necessarily true that what you assume is also what you think has the highest probability. Rather you make the assumption because no other assumption will do you any good anyway. (I assume that the player on my right has the queen of hearts because if he doesn't they will make five clubs no matter what I do. I bought stock duing the Cuban missile crisis under the assumption that the depressed prices would bounce back if there was no nuclear war because if there was, I'd be dead anyway.) This second type of assuming is the one I am disussing here.

The thing is to an outside observer the second type of faith and the second type of assuming look the same. Both people pick actions consistent with being sure of something. Actions that in many cases look wrong to others. Furthermore both people if asked if it seems odd that others would pick a different action would admit that it doesn't. (Notice that txaq doesn't fit into this category nor do many rabbis. Because their contention is that a purely intellectual understanding of their religion is enough to persuade someone of its truth. Basically faith of the first kind.)

Put another way suppose the Lakers are playing the Knicks and the Knicks are six point favorites. But for some reason you have to bet straight up, no points. And you are no expert handicapper.

If this were to happen there are only two reasons you could possibly bet on the Lakers. Either you have some otherwordly "feeling" that the Lakers will win. Or your life would be so worthless if the Lakers lost that the money would be irrelevant. Meanwhile you BOTH fully acknowledge that others will, and from their standpoint should, bet the other way.

In the above example say the second guy, the assumer, will be miserable soley because he loves the Lakers so much. The first guy, the one with faith, is only OK with them. Wouldn't it be reasonable to assume that the Lakers would want to win more for the second guy than for the first guy? And that they would also want to win for that guy than expert handicapper who bet on them because it made sense to. Unless that handicapper also loved them as much. In other words shouldn't love trump belief? Even if the lover is only assuming. But I am straying a bit.

My basic contention is that the person who proclaims faith in something when the evidence is admittedly not there, is almost exactly equivalent, logically, to the person who assumes something that he objectively knows is not certain because he wants desperately for it to be true. In other words he would love it to be true. And that the reason that the equivalence is not admitted is mainly because it is the first guy who is scared to admit that he is for all intents and purposes the second guy. RJT and bunny are the braver ones.

[John21]

How would your scenario play out when it wasn't evidence pointing against a certain outcome, but lack of evidence indicating a contrary conclusion?

As a very crude example: say I believe the Broncos will win the Superbowl in 2010. Wouldn't this be simply an issue of faith since there is no foundation to assume it will happen?

[cambraceres]

I think there is a difference in these two types of believers. If we make a scale, and label the horizontal axis "Belief"and the vertical Axis as "Faith", my point can soon be illustrated. Consider a line on this graph that is perfectly horizontal, and at some arbitrary vertical position.
In this example, I consider faith to be the overall assuredness of a certain event's inevitability. I consider belief to be the rational portion, the objective determination of what the outcome of some system or situation will be.

Consider the aforementioned line, it, being horizontal, indicates a steady level of faith from one side to the other of the rational belief scale(the horizontal axis). This means, in analysis of this fictitious graph, that on one side of the scale, we have those who believe something on rational grounds, and have no need for non rational belief. On the other side, are those who have no rational component to their belief in something, it just is they would say. This is the home of blind faith, or belief without objective justification. Now so far they seem equivalent, but the difference lies in the way they believe what they do. People are not so black and white, and they would fall somewhere in the middle of this scale probably, but we will deal with superlatives for now so as to maintain a simplistic feel to this concept.

What I mean by the difference being in the way these believers think, I mean that the non rational believer needs to rationalize his belief, where as the objective believer has no need, as his conclusion follows in a neat and tidy way form the laws of existence and logic.

I happen to believe that the way you think about an existent changes it, the same with a situation. In other words, there is a natural law of complementarity. You cannot define an existent except in terms of the apprehending rationality. If you and I both see one thing immediately in front of us, say a cathedral, it is a totally different building that I see, it may look the same though.

Because of this complementarity, rationalization changes the mind of the apprehending individual, which then causes actual change in the state of the subject existent.

Cam

[David Sklansky]

Its the same thing. Evidence for, evidence against, no evidence at all. They combine to form a probability that objective observers will tend to agree on. In the Broncos case its about 3%.

[John21]

[ QUOTE ]
Its the same thing. Evidence for, evidence against, no evidence at all . They combine to form a probability that objective observers will tend to agree on. In the Broncos case its about 3%.

[/ QUOTE ]

I'm failing to see how any level of probability can be reached in an information void.

i.e. what is the probability that your answer to the following question will be correct: 2+y=?

[David Sklansky]

If there is no information the probability is equally distributed among the various competing answers.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
My basic contention is that the person who proclaims faith in something when the evidence is admittedly not there, is almost exactly equivalent, logically, to the person who assumes something that he objectively knows is not certain because he wants desperately for it to be true. In other words he would love it to be true. And that the reason that the equivalence is not admitted is mainly because it is the first guy who is scared to admit that he is for all intents and purposes the second guy. RJT and bunny are the braver ones.

[/ QUOTE ]
Good stuff but its not bravery its politics. You can't tell someone they must behave in the way you want because you deperately want there to be a god who says they must behave that way.

It can be evolved politics, non-political religons aren't so fit. Often its just nasty infliction of will upon others.

chez

[FortunaMaximus]

[ QUOTE ]
If there is no information the probability is equally distributed among the various competing answers.

[/ QUOTE ]

An infinite set of answers divided equally. Seems weak somehow. But, yeah, ok. So the summation of probability can be either odd or even. Sigh.

[madnak]

[ QUOTE ]
If there is no information the probability is equally distributed among the various competing answers.

[/ QUOTE ]

That means that if there is an infinite range of answers, the probability of any given answer is 0. You realize this, right David?

[IronUnkind]

[ QUOTE ]
If this were to happen there are only two reasons you could possibly bet on the Lakers. Either you have some otherwordly "feeling" that the Lakers will win. Or your life would be so worthless if the Lakers lost that the money would be irrelevant. Meanwhile you BOTH fully acknowledge that others will, and from their standpoint should, bet the other way.

[/ QUOTE ]

Relating this to Christianity: A believer holds that this "otherworldly feeling" is accessible to everyone. He calls it The Holy Spirit, and he says that before an individual is saved, this Spirit convicts the unbeliever.

But there are people who will swear that they've never felt this pull, and a Christian might argue the following:

1. Yes you have. You've hardened your heart against it.
2. You already had a hard heart, and therefore, it didn't penetrate your consciousness.

There might be other arguments, but these are the main ones I think, and the second of which may be used by either a free will advocate or a Calvinist.

At this point, the believer and the unbeliever are at a standstill. The pervasive influence of The Holy Spirit is purely an article of faith for the believer, since he can't know the heart of the unbeliever. But the unbeliever is unmoved by this reasoning because it sounds hokey, mystical, and convoluted. But mostly because he has no response for those who say that he ought to have felt something which he, in all honesty, did not feel. What can he do but shrug his shoulders? Moreover, he will point out, quite rightly, that this doesn't meet the standard of falsifiability, and unbelievers f'n love Popper, so this a biggy.

The believer must realize that the unbeliever's rejection of god is wholly reasonable if he truly did not feel this impulse. And the unbeliever must realize that once the believer trusts this instinct, then he is proceeding upon a logical, if unparcimonious, course of action by believing.

[ QUOTE ]
In the above example say the second guy, the assumer, will be miserable soley because he loves the Lakers so much. The first guy, the one with faith, is only OK with them. Wouldn't it be reasonable to assume that the Lakers would want to win more for the second guy than for the first guy? And that they would also want to win for that guy than expert handicapper who bet on them because it made sense to. Unless that handicapper also loved them as much. In other words shouldn't love trump belief? Even if the lover is only assuming. But I am straying a bit.

[/ QUOTE ]

I think you make a very good point here, but as you well know, the personalities of these two bettors usually overlap when we apply it to the question of religion. The believer is deeply convinced of God's presence, and he also feels genuine love for the Being to whom he ascribes this conviction. Basically, he believes it to be true, and he needs it to be true.

The first guy IS the second guy, but there is no shame in this. I've always said to those who claim religion is a crutch that this is a good thing; Crutches prop up fragile limbs. I think fragility is inherent to mankind.

If there is a god, why should it seem strange that there would be a psychological need for him? The presence of this psychological need is probably a poor argument for his existence, but there is no need for the believer to lie about feeling this way; it's also a poor argument against his existence.