Terminology, Free Will, and 'Act as if'

[Cerril]

From a prior post, Madnak replied to my comment.
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I'm assuming a free will because I feel like I have one. All signs point to 'no' on that matter, but it isn't going to change how I act, so I find the discussion itself to have little significance on my actions (not to say that I don't enjoy the discussion). I assume you see what I'm getting at.[ QUOTE ]



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If all signs point to "no," it's difficult to discuss human actions in the context of free will. I don't think free will is a useful way to classify human action, regardless of whether it exists.

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The question I have then, is if we can establish that free will does not exist or likely does not exist, and that we live in a deterministic universe, what sort of terminology should we use to describe the appearance of choices, suggestions, imperatives, and other situations that must allow for some freedom to choose between alternatives?

I tend to use the terminology of free will in daily life because I feel as if I have the freedom to make choices, whether or not I actually do. I also cannot justify failing to condemn people for their actions

{slight pause for commentary, I have in the past mentioned a disciplinary/justice system that treated all actions as necessary on the part of the agent, and as such is focused more on preventative and restraining measures than punishment or deterrence. Obviously in such a system the major important factors are keeping a crime from being committed and preventing the individual from committing any further crimes.}

The term I used for this (and have mentioned this in the past) is 'act as if.' That is, a philosophical argument/dilemma/problem is an 'act as if' situation if we are incapable of acting in a way that corresponds with the likely 'truth.' Examples include:

- It is impossible to have certain or even strongly probable knowledge of anything.

- We are not justified in predicting the future based on the past (we have no reason to believe, strictly speaking, that the future will resemble the past)

- We do not have free will, our actions are either determined or random.

- There is no reason to believe that the language I am speaking has any meaning to you remotely like the meaning it holds to me.

- I cannot demonstrably prove or have it proven to me that the world, other people, or anything that I sense exists outside my own mind.

Now, there are a number of pro and con arguments and while they're interesting, they all fall (to me) into the category of 'act as if.' No matter what I may find to be true, I am going to be speaking with the assumption that there are other people, and that they do hear and understand me, and that their replies will have meaning to me. I will also assume that my own feelings and apparent choices have force, and that I am responsible for my actions and could choose to act or not act in a given way. I take everything from probabilities to the reality of the ground and air, to the laws of physics to be true and act accordingly (i.e. some things I believe to be safe, and some dangerous, and I can differentiate between them. If I want a given outcome, there are ways to make that more likely through my actions).

All of these things, to me, are philosophical trivialities. They have spurred very in depth and heated discussions, but in the end everyone on both sides of the fence acts as if there were a given outcome (depending on the question) and not necessarily the one they were arguing for.

So one question here is: provided we are all acting in the manner I described, is there a better terminology to conduct these debates in? Would the truth of them going against our beliefs have any positive impact on our actions despite our perception to the contrary?

Anything else along this vein, anything I'm missing the point on completely?

[madnak]

I don't see why the current terminology doesn't apply to a deterministic world. "Free will" and "will" are two very different things. I have will, I make choices, etc. There is nothing in determinism that precludes this. The only implication is that when I make a choice, I do so for a reason (or based on randomness).

I don't understand where "act as if" is relevant to the original point. If certainty is impossible, then all actions are based on unverifiable assumptions, therefore in any action we take we must "act as if" those assumptions are true. How is this relevant to determinism?

It is, in any case, impossible to "act as if" I have free will, as free will by definition indicates action without cause. In a deterministic universe, there is a reason for all my actions, and it's meaningless to say "act as if there's no reason for your actions." I suppose if I'm trying to look insane I might act in random or erratic ways, but that doesn't correspond to "free will" either. I suppose that since free will represents apparent randomness, you could say that to "act as if" I have free will is to act randomly, because that will result in action with the same indicators that action based on free will would have. But that's also meaningless, because the apparent randomness of free will is by definition not actual randomness, and therefore acting randomly isn't the same as "acting as if" I have free will.

[Andrew Karpinski]

There is no possible way for free will to exist.

Hope I cleared this up for you.

[HedonismBot]

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There is no possible way for free will to exist.

Hope I cleared this up for you.

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Go on

[Metric]

Possibility: "Free will" is just the statement that my large-scale actions hinge on some extremely subtle (and very often non-predictable due to complexity -- though fundamentally deterministic) chemical processing of info (thoughts) in my brain.

Maybe trivial or maybe wrong, but this is philosophy -- who can tell?

[madnak]

That's not free will.

[Lestat]

I still say free will exists... From everything I've read, since the last discussion on here about Free Will Vs. Determinism, it's mostly agreed that randomness does in fact exist at the quantum level.

[Lestat]

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There is no possible way for free will to exist.

Hope I cleared this up for you.

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Why not? What if randomness exists? Why would free will be impossible?

[chezlaw]

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I still say free will exists... From everything I've read, since the last discussion on here about Free Will Vs. Determinism, it's mostly agreed that randomness does in fact exist at the quantum level.

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but its also been shown that such randomness is equivalent to a deterministic system and so can't be significant.

Also, doing stuff at random is not free will.

chez

[Lestat]

The only argument that came close to convincing me of a deterministic world was the fact that there is no such thing as randomness. That is, the big bang occured and started a causal chain in where everything that occurs is based on an antededent event. Of course, this makes sense. You break a rack of billiard balls and it appears to be chaotic, yet the final outcome can be no other way.

However, the presence of randomness (to me at least), means a non-deterministic universe. This is because there is more than one possible outcome for any given event. At least this appears to be the case on a molecular level. If my day tomorrow has more than one possible outcome then my actions also have a chance to affect those outcomes.