Imagine two perfect players playing heads up.

[macgyverlol]

NL Holdem, both start with 200BBs. For the sake of the example, no rake.

You have to stretch your imagination a bit, but imagine a scenario in which a mathematically perfect strategy existed and both of these players never made a mistake against one another. Both know when to make laydowns, etc. and make plays based on the fundamental theorem.

1) Would it then be true that the winner would be determined by whomever is running the hottest of the session?

2) Is this essentially the definition of getting yourself into +EV situations?

3) Is there a level at which world-class players play at now where the skill is essentially taken out and it's down to the luck of the draw?

Well, now that I think about it, I think I answered my own question, kinda. Obviously there's many instances in which two players get it all in preflop and both made theoretically correct plays, even though one of them has to lose.

It's almost obvious, but the "perfectness" of the two players kinda creates a bit more discussion. Finally, is it plausible that a perfect chess like strategy could exist for poker?

[Bantam222]

You answered your own question...

If two players play perfectally, have no room for improvement, and are equal skill level, how can one have an edge? The winner would be whoever is running hotest, (tho the rake would own them both in a real game)

As far as pros go, I believe when any two players play heads up, no matter the skill level, one will have an edge. Even the top pros say they make mistakes in every session and there is always more to learn, to adjust to your opponents play, and to 10th level them lol

[Gonso]

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1) Would it then be true that the winner would be determined by whomever is running the hottest of the session?

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Yes, technically. At 200BB, the HU game you're talking about wouldn't end for a long time though.

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Finally, is it plausible that a perfect chess like strategy could exist for poker?

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I'm from the Sklansky school on this, so I'd say that there probably is, but that such a perfect strategy wouldn't be likely to be an maximal strategy.

[macgyverlol]

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I'm from the Sklansky school on this, so I'd say that there probably is, but that such a perfect strategy wouldn't be likely to be an maximal strategy.

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To clarify, you mean such a strategy wouldnt maximize earnings? If so, I can agree with that.

[Gonso]

Right - unless your opponent were also playing this perfect strategy. Then by NOT altering your strategy, you would maximize earnings staying in equilibrium.

[GiantBuddha]

I'd say that these players have a significant hole in their game: game selection. I'd imagine both players would be very strong on game theory, though.

[runout_mick]

In NL this game would never see the flop until there was a preflop coinflip.

If you were playing "perfectly" in a fundamental theory sense, the best preflop hand would raise to an amount that is mathematically incorrect for the worst hand to call. The worst hand, in order to play perfectly, would never call this bet.

It would come down to a situation where the sb pushes a hand like a small pp, and the bb calls with suited overcards.

[Gonso]

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It would come down to a situation where the sb pushes a hand like a small pp, and the bb calls with suited overcards.

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Forgot about that - that's a good point. I guess JTs vs. 88 or so could even do this even on the very first hand. 88 would be correct to push here, knowing JTs would have to call.

[tsearcher]

It's my understanding that heads up NL HE play, at least in a tournament setting has been solved. So assume there are two egually skilled players that were familiar with unexploitable(UE) HU play, but were not aware of each other players knowledge.

They would both start out playing UE because in a sense that is perfect play. They would keep on playing and observing each other. As long as one player plays UE the other must also continue to do so.

But, what if one player(A) purposely stops playing UE, that is in an exploitable way. He peppers his play with low cost mistakes. I would imagine that would probably be something like folding too much or something else that doesn't cost a lot of chips.

Now the other player(B) see's this and changes his play to exploit the apparent weakness. Now at this point I think player A will have an advantage since he knows B's strategy but B doesn't know A's.

This example may not fit all your criteria. But I think all else being equal, A will be a long term winner. B will have a hard time realizing that his play is being exploited.

Also, my understanding of game theory is obviously very weak. So I'm sure there are a lot of holes in this.

[_D&L_]

No matter how deep the stacks are, one player will eventually go bankrupt even if they are both perfect players. Even if their stacks are infinite compared to the blinds, they will at the very least both go all in on pocket Aces, and one of those pockets will eventually flush.

Well, unless the perfect strategy is not to go in on pocket aces? ...