Re: Absolute Cheating
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Think about this logically. None of the superuser accounts ever played multiple tables, either in tournaments or in cash games, even though the guy had access to five separate accounts - and Potripper didn't cheat on the first hand he got moved to the FT. We can be sure that this visual aid, whatever it was, is an outside program that doesn't overlay itself over the AP window.
But if it's a program, why not just run multiple copies of it, even on another PC if you have to, to allow you to multitable? A hacker with 2 computers can just buy a few more and run it on extra machines, can't he?
Answer: because it's not a program. It's a login/password that allows you access to a superuser account on the AP server that can only look at 1 table at a time, and the reason the cheater only played 1 table was because he only had the one login/PW combination. There's no way something like this allows you to log in twice with the same ID, so...either a hacker used social engineering with a critical security guy at AP, or it's an inside job. Either way, it's an internal program that was compromised.
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I think the one tabling argument is way off the mark and is pure speculation. If it's an internal program that's involved in the cheating, which it could be, there is absolutely no reason not to have the functionality to open more than 1 table. If it is an internal program it would basically be a security account with certain restrictions rather than a superuser account. This security account used for collusion and cheating detection would basically function as a regular account except that it can't buy in to a table, only view them, and all the cards that are dealt out appear face up on this account. This is the way a security program would operate, unlike a hacker who might just get a stream of text detailing the cards dealt (and he most likely wouldn't bother to code a gui to overlay it), the security account would definatlely have the cards up on screen to make the dectection job easier and it would take hardly any extra code, just a few flags to say that the account is a security one in the rendering function.
So basically opening a table with this account would be the same as opening it with a regular one with the exception that a few flags are set in the code so that when the card display function is being exectuted it see's that it is the security account and renders all the cards face up. The code would have to be written to explicitly limit the functionality to 1 table...and why bother doing that if you want to be able to detect have people possibly cheating/colluding across multiple tables, or multiple separate possiblities of collusion. The cheat may have just been playing one table because he is unable to multitable, I know plenty of people who struggle with more than 1. He also thought it might be going to far to be killing more than 1 table at once. If he did have access to a security account he was already using two PCs to cheat as I mention below. Who knows why he only one tabled, I'm just speculating here myself.
Anyway, I've been thinking that if it is a security account that the cheat had access to it is highly unlikely he was doing the cheating through that actual account as how is he supposed to get money on to it or off it(bar chip dumping), it is very very unlikely to even offer a deposit method as it would be a highly restricted account with limited functionality. So the cheat would have to log into the security account to be able to see everyone's hole cards, while at the same time logging in with his own account on a different computer to make use of the info. That could explain why it takes him a bit of time when the table first loads up before he starts winning everything, as once he has joined a table with his own account he would then have to search for that table with the security one.
To sum up.
1). If it was a security account that the cheat had access to, he would have to log into his own account on a diffent pc to make use of the info as the security account could only view tables, not play on them. This could either be someone who worked for or formerly worked for Absolute, abusing something that they had access to. I don't see how an outside hacker could get access to this account, bar getting a keylogger onto someone in the security department's computer...
2). If it was a superuser account, that could see the cards and let you play at a table, it has to have the backing of Absolute poker itself as this functionality to buy in to tables would not be present in a security account. Also how is someone other than Absolute themselves supposed to lodge money to a superuser account registered in Absolute's own name. If these accounts are in existance to skim extra money off players you imagine they would be more tightly controlled to avoid suspicions and you wouldn't have people abusing them the way the cheats have. If this was the method used to cheat, I am open to suggestions on why the cheating was so obvious.
3). It was an outside job where somebody or some group hacked into Absolute's server and was able to retrieve the hand data.
I think it's more likely to be 1 or 3. I think the superuser account doesn't seem as likely unless someone was seriously aggravated in Absolute and decided to blatantly abuse something that was supposed to be used subtly.
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