[jukofyork]

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OK, I've thought about this some more and how about if we add the extra constraint that the caller is forced to state his exact strategy before the pusher pushes?

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This doesn't work either. If I'm Caller, I'll say "I'm calling 100% and you know I'm stuck with it." Now Pusher has to fold almost everything since it's just the same problem in reverse. It's the right of first bluff.

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It does mean that the strategies will converge to something stable (not necessarily sensible though) and as you put it "right of first bluff" here is just the caller stating his spite-calling intentions before the hands starts. The really interesting thing I'd love to know is the answer too is this:

If we try all possible calling ranges (where the caller has to state his calling range first) and the pusher then computes his maximally exploitative strategy against each of these calling ranges, then the caller settles on the calling range which is most +EV for him. Will this strategy be more +EV for the caller than the strategy found by each attempting to maximally exploit each other's play (ie: the Nash Equilibrium found by fictitious play)?

If it does turn out so that the "spite-calling equilibrium" is more +EV for the caller and we assume that any attempt to pass on the spite calls will be seen instantly by the pusher and adapted for (hence the extra constraint of stating the caller's strategy before the hands starts to allow for convergence), then it would seem that the "spite-calling equilibrium" is the better strategy for the caller to follow and deviating from it towards the NE would be a bad idea.

If nobody answers this before xmas, then most likely I'll spend a few days getting the code together to try and answer this for SB vs BB situations.

Juk [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]