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Old 05-16-2007, 05:52 PM
chezlaw chezlaw is offline
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Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: corridor of uncertainty
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Default Re: Modern Pascal\'s Wager adaptation: For real.

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The argument falls down because the person I will become in 10000 years time is not me. I gain nothing though I probably would thank the person I used to be.

The god version fails for other reasons but otherwise would work because of the soul which would be some sort of eternal me.

chez

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Wait...what? Of course it would still be you. All it requires is a continuity of memory, and I see no reason that is ruled out.

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If we go with memories then all we need to do is find a way to transfer memories to someone else, should be much easier then keeping some body alive in perpituity.

but lets assume that its some continuity of memory that matters (like all personal identity solutions it has serious problems but lets ignore them), then I'm the same person as before to the extent that memories have continued. However a lot of my memories of 30 years ago have been lost and some of the memories I think I have of 30 years ago are incorrect. Rather than saying I'm the same person as 30 years ago it makes more sense to say I'm the same person to some extent and I'm more the same person that I was 10 years ago than I was 30 years ago.

We therefore have a diminshing interest in our future self although you could argue we have some duty to who we will become. It would reach zero fairly quickly (on a scale of immortality) or at least fairly quickly reach the point where my future self has no more 'sameness' than you and I.

chez
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