Look at page 18 of von neumann's thesis, located at this link:
http://www.math.ucla.edu/~tom/papers/poker2.pdf
Can you tell me why it says that the "value of the game" for the first player is negative, and the value of the second player is the negative of this (hence positive)? And quoting the author, "We see that this game is in favor of player 2."
The last game is the only model where he allowed either player to initiate raising.
Even in von neumann's simple model, player 1s optimal strategy doesn't completely hide information from player 2, it just tries to hide as much as it can, and minimize the impact.
I should point out the information advantage is even greater in ring games. Are you really trying to contest that you can profitably play the same range of hands UTG as you do on the button? Or that you are going to be equally profitable in both positions?
I mean i could go into gametheory here, but its commonsense right?