[BTirish]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
With Matt R., I too would like to see how you give account of mathematical and theoretical physical concepts in your naturalist methodology. I know how Kant does it, and I'm curious if you propose to do it in the same way.

[/ QUOTE ]

Mathematical meaning is a great example of logical meaning that is distinct from actual meaning. I don't see what's confusing about this.

As I think I said last night, I am not making any definite assertion about the metaphysical status of subjective meaning. Rather I am repudiating your idealism that gives subjective meaning an a priori privileged metaphysical status.

[/ QUOTE ]

Again, I'm not defending any kind of ontological argument here. I'm not suggesting that it is through conceptual analysis alone that any logical concept is demonstrated to exist. So long as you aren't definitively denying, a priori and necessarily, the existence of any entities which are not "actual" in the sense in which you use the term--that is, observable--then I don't think we are actually disagreeing about all that much on this particular point.

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
As I think most analytic philosophers have recognized, it's a lot harder to dismiss 'God' as a name referring to an entity which a person believes to exist.

[/ QUOTE ]

You must still be missing the point, because most ways I read this, it just sounds silly. I AM NOT DENYING THE POSSIBLE ACTUALITY OF NONRATIONAL TRUTH CLAIMS. I am merely saying that you cannot confuse actually meaningless claims with those derived from actual observation.

[/ QUOTE ]

I do think we've been talking slightly past each other for a couple of posts. But I do want to make one clarification for others reading our conversation: by your own admission, you are using the term 'actual' in a manner basically interchangeable with 'observed' or 'resulting from empirical observation.' So all you are really saying, in the end, is that any truth claims concerning God are not "actually meaningful" in that they are not derived (at least directly) from empirical observation. If you mean more than this, then, perhaps ironically, you're the one equivocating with the term 'actual.'

Incidentally, as I've already said, any proof for God's existence must rest upon "observation," but I grant that observation must be understood more broadly than the restrictions of what I assume you mean by methodological naturalism. What I really want to hammer home is that I'm not defending an ontological argument.

Do you find anything objectionable about how I've presented your position here? If not, I'd like to ask you the following question:

Could you offer a defense of methodological naturalism? You seem to have asserted that it is the only reasonable view at the present time--why? Just a brief apologia would be nice.