[vhawk01]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]

This proposal has several crippling game theoretic problems. Generally, I think any voting system that incentivizes dishonest voting is a poor solution. Just about all voting systems create some incentive for dishonest voting in certain situations, but this one takes it to the extreme.

[/ QUOTE ]

Can you go into detail?

[/ QUOTE ]

It's hard to go into detail because your example is a little unclear. For instance, how many times are people allowed to revise their ballot? Because, depending on certain variables, I'm not sure you would ever get any sort of equilibrium.

Is the voting secret? If so, it looks to me like you've basically reconstructed the prisoner's dilemma.

[/ QUOTE ]

Except when everyone defects the program is cut. So "always defect" is a poor choice. It is 'iterated' in a fashion since he stipulated that people would get their bill and then be able to revise, so your decision to free-ride increases the cost for everyone which increases their likelihood to freeride and so on. So any freeriding feeds back and shuts down programs. Which sounds awesome.