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Who says I'm harming you?
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If you're altering my property and I don't like it or consent to it, I do, and have a right to reparation.
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maybe a large group of people don't mind a little acid rain, and hell, even if global warming is real, I don't want to spend money on jackets anyway
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Then they don't have to take action. If *I* do, I should be allowed to.
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See above, matter of scale. Murder is obviously a force transaction. Is the example from a thread a week or so ago a transaction (tresspassing)? Where's the line, who draws it, who enforces it.
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Depends on the owner and the representatives of the parties involved. I'd say tresspassing is a forced transaction, but just as there is a matter of degree in the infraction, there is a matter of degree in punishment. Pretty much everyone agrees that the punishment should fit the crime. If I shoot someone because they cut through my property once and didn't harm anything, chances are I'm going to be punished myself.
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Well if your DRO isn't in the business of resolving disputes, what is it doing? What makes you think you're impervious from retaliatory action from the rest of society?
[/ QUOTE ] Exactly my fear. Now I have my group and you have yours, awww crap.
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Here's you're assuming conflict > cooperation when it comes to finding resolutions for the parties involved. Let's take this example from David Freidman's book Machinery of Freedom.
Here's chapter 29, Police, courts, and laws--on the market-
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Inevitably, conflicts would arise between one protective agency and another. How might they be resolved?
I come home one night and find my television set missing. I immediately call my protection agency, Tannahelp Inc., to report the theft. They send an agent. He checks the automatic camera which Tannahelp, as part of their service, installed in my living room and discovers a picture of one Joe Bock lugging the television set out the door. The Tannahelp agent contacts Joe, informs him that Tannahelp has reason to believe he is in possession of my television set, and suggests he return it, along with an extra ten dollars to pay for Tannahelp's time and trouble in locating Joe. Joe replies that he has never seen my television set in his life and tells the Tannahelp agent to go to hell.
The agent points out that until Tannahelp is convinced there has been a mistake, he must proceed on the assumption that the television set is my property. Six Tannahelp employees, all large and energetic, will be at Joe's door next morning to collect the set. Joe, in response, informs the agent that he also has a protection agency, Dawn Defense, and that his contract with them undoubtedly requires them to protect him if six goons try to break into his house and steal his television set.
The stage seems set for a nice little war between Tannahelp and Dawn Defense. It is precisely such a possibility that has led some libertarians who are not anarchists, most notably Ayn Rand, to reject the possibility of competing free-market protection agencies.
But wars are very expensive, and Tannahelp and Dawn Defense are both profit-making corporations, more interested in saving money than face. I think the rest of the story would be less violent than Miss Rand supposed.
The Tannahelp agent calls up his opposite number at Dawn Defense. 'We've got a problem. . . .' After explaining the situation, he points out that if Tannahelp sends six men and Dawn eight, there will be a fight. Someone might even get hurt. Whoever wins, by the time the conflict is over it will be expensive for both sides. They might even have to start paying their employees higher wages to make up for the risk. Then both firms will be forced to raise their rates. If they do, Murbard Ltd., an aggressive new firm which has been trying to get established in the area, will undercut their prices and steal their customers. There must be a better solution.
The man from Tannahelp suggests that the better solution is arbitration. They will take the dispute over my television set to a reputable local arbitration firm. If the arbitrator decides that Joe is innocent, Tannahelp agrees to pay Joe and Dawn Defense an indemnity to make up for their time and trouble. If he is found guilty, Dawn Defense will accept the verdict; since the television set is not Joe's, they have no obligation to protect him when the men from Tannahelp come to seize it.
What I have described is a very makeshift arrangement. In practice, once anarcho-capitalist institutions were well established, protection agencies would anticipate such difficulties and arrange contracts in advance, before specific conflicts occurred, specifying the arbitrator who would settle them.
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Not true
Cody: Hey Shake, your tree is blocking the light onto my yard.
Shake: Oh sorry I'll cut that down.
Cody: Hey Shake, your tree is blocking the light onto my yard.
Shake: Go [censored] Yourself!
Cody: See you in court.
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Or it could go-
Cody: Hey Shake, your tree is blocking the light onto my yard.
Shake: But I like my tree
Cody: What about if I pay you $X to remove the tree?
Shake: How about $Y?
*haggling occurs*
Cody: OK fine, I'll pay $Z.
Shake: agreed, nice doing business for you
Cody: I also think it would be a smart idea to set up some system between us to prevent this from happening in the future.
Shake: Sounds good, let's work something out, or we could subscribe to a common DRO or set of rules or common law.
or
Cody:Hey Shake, your tree is blocking the light onto my yard.
Shake: How about I pay you $X a month for the right to block your sunlight?
Cody: How about $Y? I really like my sunlight.
*haggling occurs*
Shake: Fine I'll pay you $Z/month
Cody: great, nice doing business with you.
or
Cody: Hey shake it's against our HOAs in this neighborhood to have your tree reduce my sunlight. You must cut it down/pay me $X for this obstruction/accept me paying you $X to get rid of it as is the terms of the HOA.
Shake: Sounds great I'll pick [insert option here]
or they could avoid these problems all together without an HOA.
Cody: Hi nieghbor, since we're living next to each other I was thinking that we might want to draw up a contract in advance to solve any externality problems ahead of time.
Shake: Sounds great. We can base it off our own preferences as well as common law.
The solutions are infinite. Read up on
Coase Theorem if you haven't before.
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usually ineffecient
[/ QUOTE ]Sadly yeah, though I put this more on people then the system. Lack of training, need to jusify a needless job, etc.
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The fundamental reason that monopolistic law is always inefficient as compared to it's market counterpart is because they don't need to be. They have no competition. Bureaucrats don't need to be efficient. Individuals who actually have to deal with the consequences on the other hand, have a big incentive to being efficient, and also have the ability to make much more optimal solutions based on their personal preferences rather then settle for the one size fits all solution.
And if you like uniformed central law, you're in luck because common law would provide the basis for law in a land of no territorial monopolies. And of course, if you and others prefer a complete one size fits all legal code, then the market opens up for HOAs and you pick one that has a legal code that fits you. The great thing that makes HOA law > statist law is HOA's are bound to be smaller and more numerous and diverse then their statist counterparts. You may say legal codes are decentralized because they differ by county, but under AC they could differ by street or nieghborhood!