[Jerrod Ankenman]

[ QUOTE ]
OK, I think I have to refine my argument.

(Yes, stubborn enough to continue to be pretty much convinced that being on the button heads-up constitutes an advantage for any stack size... [img]/images/graemlins/wink.gif[/img])

The EV of the SB in a heads-up no-limit game is a function of the stacksize S, and can be written: EV = f(S/BB)*BB.

Now, suppose the SB follows a (definitely non-optimal) strategy of always making a minraise. The BB now faces the situation the SB was facing: he needs to double his stake in the pot in order to stay in the game. The only difference is that the blinds are now twice as high.

[/ QUOTE ]

This is not true. There is a big, big difference between "if i call, the other guy can raise" and "if i call, we see a flop."

[ QUOTE ]
So, the EV for the BB in response to SB's inferior startegy is: EV = 2*BB*f(S/(2*BB)). In this zero-sum game, the corresponding EV for the SB is then: EV = -2*BB*f(S/(2*BB)).

[/ QUOTE ]

So this BB equity is too low, because it assumes that if the dude calls, the other guy can raise. But that's not true.

[ QUOTE ]
<snip> However, one may strengthen this statement a bit: if jam-or-fold is near-optimal for S around S = 6BB, then for S > 12BB jam-or-fold on the SB is strongly suboptimal, as it fares badly against the very poor strategy of always min-raising on the SB.

[/ QUOTE ]

I'm not sure this statement is true either. The optimal strategy doesn't have to fare well against bad strategies necessarily. It sometimes will. But that's not an inherent property. Consider the optimal strategy in Roshambo, which doesn't fare well against the lame strategy of scissors 100%.