[Guyute]

There are ethical issues at two levels of abstraction here.

At one level are questions of normative ethics - what is right and what is wrong. I have made no claims about normative ethics, and no claims that I know what is right and what is wrong.

One level up, however, are questions of meta-ethics - is there right and is there wrong. It is here that I am making my claim that there is in fact a right answer when it comes to moral questions. I make these claims not based on the belief or hope that my moral beliefs are absolutely true, but rather because it seems to me that the arguments are much stronger for a non-relativistic morality. It is only a non-relativistic morality that captures much of what it seems needs to be captured by a meta-ethical theory: tolerance of some communities, no tolerance of others, the capacity for genuine moral disagreement, the capacity for moral progress.

It seems to me that the only position other than absolutism about morality is the one chezlaw seems to be advocating, one of no moral truths at all, sometimes called emotivism. I personally find this theory untenable, but there are decent arguments supporting it that are quite difficult to respond to. However, if it turns out that the arguments are stronger for emotivism, I would be forced to change my views.