Voting: a game theory look
 

Borodog's thread inspired me, but I decided to create a new thread to discuss it.

Basically, it's possible that no one vote at all. However, if no one votes, a single person has incentive to "cheat" the no-one-vote agreement, since his or her vote would be the only one counted, so whatever he or she says goes. Now, if one person cheats, another then also has incentive to cheat, and the result is a landslide where a whole slew of people go out and vote, since they all are given incentive to vote. It's a very simple game theory problem relating to cartel agreements, quite common in microeconomics.

Re: Voting: a game theory look
 

Such an argument might hold, but in only holds for a most a small number of voters.

Additionally, this argument ignores issues exterior to the game rules, such as whether or not people are not voting because they do not recognize the legitimacy of the process itself. If literally nobody is voting because they don't believe in the legitimacy of the voting system, one person really does not have an incentive to vote and decide everything, because nobody will abide by the results anyway.

Re: Voting: a game theory look
 

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Such an argument might hold, but in only holds for a most a small number of voters.

Additionally, this argument ignores issues exterior to the game rules, such as whether or not people are not voting because they do not recognize the legitimacy of the process itself. If literally nobody is voting because they don't believe in the legitimacy of the voting system, one person really does not have an incentive to vote and decide everything, because nobody will abide by the results anyway.

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Possibly, though every non-voter who lacks faith in the system must be 100% certain that no one will abide by the results. If they perceive there to be even a 1% chance the results hold and the decision of the few voters is enforced, there becomes incentive.

Re: Voting: a game theory look
 

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Such an argument might hold, but in only holds for a most a small number of voters.

Additionally, this argument ignores issues exterior to the game rules, such as whether or not people are not voting because they do not recognize the legitimacy of the process itself. If literally nobody is voting because they don't believe in the legitimacy of the voting system, one person really does not have an incentive to vote and decide everything, because nobody will abide by the results anyway.

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Possibly, though every non-voter who lacks faith in the system must be 100% certain that no one will abide by the results. If they perceive there to be even a 1% chance the results hold and the decision of the few voters is enforced, there becomes incentive.

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All you need is for most people to be fairly certain that most people will not abide by the results. People do communicate, you know.

Re: Voting: a game theory look
 

I don't see how knowing AND TRUSTING (which is another assumption of yours) that most people will not abide erradicates incentive in the event that...

Re: Voting: a game theory look
 

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I don't see how knowing AND TRUSTING (which is another assumption of yours) that most people will not abide erradicates incentive in the event that...

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Your friend Bob elects himself King. Do you genuflect and start paying him taxes?

Re: Voting: a game theory look
 

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I don't see how knowing AND TRUSTING (which is another assumption of yours) that most people will not abide erradicates incentive in the event that...

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Your friend Bob elects himself King. Do you genuflect and start paying him taxes?

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Can you define the current state of this world? I took OP's post to assume we had a couple of candidates, known countrywide, and a complete and sudden disdain/lack of faith in the election process. From this I presume a small, but sizable population actually vote for the candidates. I don't vote for Bob, I vote for one of the candidates. I don't presume I will be the only one to doubt with certainty the committment of the voters to abstain, or the ability of the elected with exsiting infrastracture to force the will, no matter how small, upon the people.

Are you imagining the desert island economics example?

Re: Voting: a game theory look
 

No, I'm imagining the scenario in the OP, i.e. where it is likely that only a single person is voting. Such a scenario does not exist in a vacuum. The only reason I can think of for nobody voting is that nobody believes in voting, or that the results of the vote are legitimate.

Re: Voting: a game theory look
 

What's the original incentive NOT to vote? So that no one votes, as a possibility. I didn't see that.

Re: Voting: a game theory look
 

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What's the original incentive NOT to vote? So that no one votes, as a possibility. I didn't see that.

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The assumption Borodog set forth is that no one person's vote matters, so if everyone beleives this, then no one votes. And so this experiment just begins with the assumption that no one votes because the see no value in it.