Game Theory Problem Of The Week
 

For this week's game theory problem we will take a look at another situation .

There are two players who pick numbers from 1-100 without replacement . Each player posts a $1 ante but player one must always check even though he's first to act . Player two has the option of betting the pot or checking behind . Given this knowledge , what strategy must player two employ to maximize his EV ?

We may make the assumption that player one and two are playing optimally aside from the stipulation placed on player one .

Re: Game Theory Problem Of The Week
 

Player one can only check and call or check and fold . There is no raising in this game .

Re: Game Theory Problem Of The Week
 

lemee guess, ur taking a math class and trying to get us to do ur homework for u? joking obv.

good stuff, keep it comin.

Re: Game Theory Problem Of The Week
 

lol, thx

Re: Game Theory Problem Of The Week
 

Gave up on the previous question so quick?

Re: Game Theory Problem Of The Week
 

I'm using this problem as a stepping stone into tackling the more daunting task .

We will get there in due time .

Be patient [img]/images/graemlins/smile.gif[/img]

Re: Game Theory Problem Of The Week
 

Player B should be betting [0-.5]*(1/1+p)(bluffs) so if the pot is 1 he should be betting for value the top 50% of his hands times 1\2 of of his value hands so that he is betting a total of 75% of his hands. This is a guess btw.

Re: Game Theory Problem Of The Week
 

Ok I got it .

I think .

Re: Game Theory Problem Of The Week
 

P2
[1,11] Bet
[12,78] Check
[79,100] Bet

P1
[1,11] Fold
[12,100] Call

Gives P1 an EV of -1/9

Re: Game Theory Problem Of The Week
 

Ok so far I have something like P2 bets with 67-100 and checks behind everything else . Player 1 calls with 79-100 and folds everything else .