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#1
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So let me distill what I can from the responses and my thoughts regarding the argument so far.
(1) There is some question about the assumption that MTT seating is random (i.e., that it's possible to sit at the same table with yourself at any point in the tournament). There is anecdotal evidence that seating is entirely random at the beginning / with table changes, but nothing hard yet. This, obviously, would have an effect on the validity of the argument (or, rather, drastically alter the frequency that one ends up at one's own table). (2) OP's calculations jumped from 2 accounts to 3 accounts for the later large field argument -- this increases the number of paired combinations from 1 to 3, thus magnifying the effect by three. Justification for this? (3) OP's calculation only considered starting arrangements (by design, it seems). Since better players tend to go deeper than weaker players, and there's an unstated assumption that better players are more likely to adopt such measures (correct?), we expect the likelihood of sitting at a table with yourself to increase as the field decreases. If this is the case, then the effects of (2) and (3) may partially cancel each other, yielding an approximately accurate result for somebody using just two accounts (instead of 3, as calculated). (4) Something that I haven't seen discussed -- is the advantage of sitting with yourself greater early in the tournament, near the bubble, or later in the tournament? i'll with-hold my argument for the relative advantage of each, but the answer to this question may help indicate the degree to which dual-playing would have the most meaningful negative impact on the EV of solo-players. I can elaborate if this is unclear. |
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#2
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Hi David,
I have worked some numbers as my gut says that you are way off. I found the following results given some crude assumptions which I will list later. Anyone interested in exploring this in more depth I will give them my spreadsheets and insights. 2000 player no rebuy structure. 1% chance of being at the same table for avg player 4% chance of being at the same table for advanced player (ROI 2.0) 1000 player no rebuy 2% chance of being at the same table at least once for avg player 9% chance of being at the same table for advanced player (ROI 2.0) I estimate that these numbers are within 30% accurate. some qualitative results are important. Obviously the chance of being at the same table increases tremendously as you go deeper with both accounts. Also the duration of the shared table is likely to go up in the later (more probable) portion of the tournament. The math for 3 accounts is too cumbersome, but should be much more profitable. Here are my assumptions: It's a growth/decay f(x)= T*a^-x ~750 hands for a 2000 player/ ~650 hands for a 1000 player tourney 10 players per table avg player has exactly survival probability of population (exp decay model (a=1.007) adv player has double survival probability (a=1.038) The model does not predict the number of hands that a player will be at the same table with himself The model does not compensate for any advantage while a player is at the same table with himself. |
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#3
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[ QUOTE ]
Hi David, I have worked some numbers as my gut says that you are way off. [/ QUOTE ] I think we're talking about different things. I clearly stated that my numbers were just for the beginning of the tournament, and I believe them to be accurate. You seem to be talking about the chances for being in the same table for the whole tournament, and I agree the cheating rate should increase for sure, I also agree with the factor of 4 you include between an advanced player and the average player, I was using that factor while doing different calculations about the odds of getting both accounts to the final table. I deliberately didn't work these numbers since I knew there was going to be people talking about the big Sunday tournaments in Party and Stars, I challenge them to include all the variables before they say something about the cheating rate in these tourneys. My aim was to provide an example easy to understand and pretty hard to refute. |
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#4
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I have another way to look at it in mathematical terms. The multi-accounters are typically good players.
Let's for arguments sake that I normally play a heads-up, winner-takes-all tournament against another player. He's better than me, so I only win 40% of the time. That means that my EV for a tournament is -0.2 (1 - 0.4 * 2) entry fee. Now my opponent decides to multi-account and he buys two tickets to the tournament. Now I only win 20% of the time and my EV for the tournament has dropped to -0.4 (1 - 0.2 * 3) entry fee. By entering multiple accounts into the tournament, he's decreased my EV by 0.2 entry fee. And of course increased his own EV by the same 0.2 entry fee. I realise that in the big fields any given players EV is only decreased by a miniscule amount when good players multi-account. But it does decrease. And the multi-accounters EV probably increases by a large amount. And that's unfair, IMO. Sirio can probably pick holes in my math if it's incorrect. |
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#5
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[ QUOTE ]
(1 - 0.4 * 2) [/ QUOTE ] this equals +0.2 not -0.2, no? |
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#6
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Given that this appears to be more prevalent than we suspect, build into this model the probability that there are multiple players who are in this tourney with multiple accounts. Now what is the probability that you have at least one cheater at your table?
It appears that an honest player may not be good enough to overcome this -EV. For the record I'm honest. |
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#7
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[ QUOTE ]
The Grandma dilemma: Debunking the myths To the apologists : [/ QUOTE ] All I can say is the apologists make me sicker than the people who actually cheat. [ QUOTE ] The Grandma dilemma: Debunking the myths To the multi-accounting people [/ QUOTE ] I can't wait to see the look on Grandma's face, and the face of all the cheating punks when their funds are long since confiscated and the IRS comes a callin' for their cut. They aren't going to give a flying f*ck that the money got confiscated. All they care is that you won and didn't report and pay tax on your winnings. That will be the screwing you get for the screwing you gave. Christmas is over. The candy store is now closed. The Feds are coming after the online dollar. Since they will have a hard time catching up to the offshore companies, they're going to go after the people they can, which are people playing in America. Who better to make an initial splash with than the known cheats? I hope they are as smart at disappearing as they once were at cheating. |
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