What was the biggest mistake made during WWII?

[Zeno]

Excellent thread and discussion. The focus, rightly, has been to the west but still I find it interesting that the word China has not even entered the discussion. Although as far as mistakes are concerned, perhaps the biggest were made in the aftermath of WW11 and none more so than issues with China. But that would be a completely different thread perhaps. For a tease on this idea see here: Anti-Japanese War

The full text is below:

59th Anniversary of Anti-Japanese War's End Marked

Fifty-nine years ago Sunday, the Japanese emperor announced his nation's surrender. For China, eight years of war against the invading forces ended.

In Beijing, more than 50 historians commemorated the 59th anniversary of the end of the Anti-Japanese War by holding a special meeting in the Anti-Japanese War Memorial Hall.

They called for a just attitude towards the war by the Japanese government and the establishment of friendly ties between China and Japan.

In Nanjing, visiting Japanese groups, historians, survivors of the Nanjing Massacre, and young people gathered to mark the day. All the groups vowed they would remember the historical lesson and oppose war in the future.

In Hong Kong, some groups held a commemorative gathering and called for an end to militarism in Japan.

During the eight years of war with Japan, more than 35 million Chinese lost their lives and the country suffered countless atrocities

(CRI.com August 16, 2004)


The west, aside from some economic plundering and marginal pretensions, has never engaged fully with nor understood China and its very unique and ancient civilization. This error alone is so immense and the consequences so long term that the blunder is incalculable. This started long before WW II (or WW I) but the wars focused it, the aftermaths verified it, and the present illustrates it more and more everyday.

-The House of Soong.

[Peter666]

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I read the whole link, and although the Germans were crushed in specific battles like Stalingrad, casualties were actually higher for the Russians in the overall campaign:

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Which campaighn are you talking about? Stalingrad has no operational relation to Kursk or Bagration as it happened well before these operations.

At the end of Bagration the casualties are given as:
Overall the near-total annihilation of Army Group Centre cost the Germans 2,000 tanks and 57,000 other vehicles. German losses are estimated at 300,000 dead, 250,000 wounded, and about 120,000 captured; overall casualties at 670,000. Soviet losses were 60,000 killed, 110,000 wounded, and about 8,000 missing, with 2,957 tanks, 2,447 artillery pieces, and 822 aircraft also lost.

Thats 300,000 dead for Germany 60,000 dead for the Soviets. You may want to stop using the casualty figures from wilky as it contradicts itself.

However the pertinant point is the difference in scale,advancement and destruction that the Soviets achieved in this operation compared to the slow ponderous advancement of the Western allies in west Europe.

You keep using the Soviet army in 41 as your frame of refrence without understanding the evolution that the Soviet army went through from 41-45. Its no wonder the Soviets suffered huge casualties in 41-42 but by 44/45 it was a totaly different beast. Why do you think the Western Allies let them keep Poland etc, coz they could sweet FA about it.

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That's it, I call you out as a minion of the Stalinist Propaganda machine. The same wiki statistics you claim are contradictory, are being fashioned into your own red image.

The total casualty figures clearly show for Bagration (a legitimate Soviet victory) 400,000 killed and 590,000 Russian wounded. The Germans had 260,000 confirmed kills, 587,308 KIA/MIA, and 250,000 wounded. The true ratio Germans to Russians killed is about 2:1. This is the only major battle where the Germans were outkilled by the Soviets. The other Soviet victory you mention, Kursk, had about 600,000 Russians killed compared to Germany's 500,000. Now if someone can provide sources other than wiki to back up these numbers, that would be great.

Although you are correct in asserting that the Soviets made great military improvements in the later years of the war, you are forgetting that the Germans too made great progress. By the end of the war, the Germans had invented the assault rifle, the best tank of any nation, rocketry, and even innovations such as night vision and night camo. However, they were low on supplies and surrounded, and thus lost the war.

But something that the Soviets were true experts at was raping and pillaging, the art of which they perfected in their final offensive. This aspect of WWII history has not been talked about enough.

[The once and future king]

Yes but your contetion is that the Western Allies could have taken the Soviets on after WW2 ended.

To put this in perspective, the western allies could never have inficted a defeat like Bagration on the Germans. So why could they then take on the force that had so totaly pawned the Germans from 43 onwards. It was the Soviets that defeated the Reich they bled it dry.

Also I am not making statements about there moral charachter, I am just asserting the objective facts about there combat power in 45. However it is also to been seen that the Germans where not very nice during there occupation of Russia.

If you can make a genuine case for the western allies being able to beat the soviets in a conventional war in june 45 then a metoric career in military history awaits you.

Also IS3 > King Tiger.

[Peter666]

"Also IS3 > King Tiger."

Da Da comrade. And we would rather drive a Lada than a Porsche, nyet?

Creative use of the atomic bomb in the autumn of 1945 could have solved the Red Menace. Also, the allies could have accepted the peace terms of the Wehrmarcht who wanted to join them in pushing back the Russians. This would have been ideal after Hitler was dead.

[Zeno]

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Creative use of the atomic bomb in the autumn of 1945 could have solved the Red Menace.

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Among other things. Too many people have pooh-poohed the great benefits of nuclear aggression. However, the US blew its wad on the two bombs dumped on the Japanese and no others where yet made at that time. Although production could have been began immediately on more bombs the Manhattan Project after the war ended was for a time in a precarious and strange position. In fact the US stockpile in late 1949 was still only about 200 bombs. That was pre H-bomb which is a much more beautiful weapon. See the Epilogue in Richard Rhodes excellent book, The Making of The Atomic Bomb.

-Zeno

[The once and future king]

Using your example a Lada was immune to frontal hits from 700m+. The Porshce could be killed frontaly from 15000m.

Give me the Lada.

Its funny that you accuse me of bias, when one could only hold your opinions if one wanted to ignore the historical record and objective weapons data in favour of some kind of wierd emotional attachment to Soviet inferiority.

Anyway, the T-34 85mm was a far superior tank to both mentioned above.

[bobman0330]

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Creative use of the atomic bomb in the autumn of 1945 could have solved the Red Menace.

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Among other things. Too many people have pooh-poohed the great benefits of nuclear aggression. However, the US blew its wad on the two bombs dumped on the Japanese and no others where yet made at that time. Although production could have been began immediately on more bombs the Manhattan Project after the war ended was for a time in a precarious and strange position. In fact the US stockpile in late 1949 was still only about 200 bombs. That was pre H-bomb which is a much more beautiful weapon. See the Epilogue in Richard Rhodes excellent book, The Making of The Atomic Bomb.

-Zeno

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Given the scarcity of atomic bombs at the time, why did the army waste one for test purposes? Was there concern about atomic technology falling into Japanese hands? (seems like a real stretch) Some other reason I can't think of now? Idle curiosity?

[MrMon]

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Given the scarcity of atomic bombs at the time, why did the army waste one for test purposes? Was there concern about atomic technology falling into Japanese hands? (seems like a real stretch) Some other reason I can't think of now? Idle curiosity?

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They tested it quite simply to see if it would work.

Two bomb designs were developed, popularly known as Fat Man and Little Boy. Little Boy, the Hiroshima bomb, used U-235 as the fission material. Very simple in design, it is a natural atomic bomb, put enough of it in one place and it will explode. The bomb basically consisted of two pieces of U-235, a target and a bullet. Shoot the bullet through a gun at the target, exceed critical mass, BOOM.

The problem with U-235 bombs is there isn't much of the stuff. It has to be extracted from uranium ore, which is mostly U-238. A costly, time consuming, expensive procedure, Little Boy was a one time deal, no one has ever produced another bomb using U-235. Simple, but costly, they knew this design would work, so no testing necessary, just getting the material was the challenge.

Fat Man is a Pu-239 (plutonium) bomb. The design of the bomb is much more complex, but the material can be manufactured from U-238, therefore it's much easier to come by and produce in large quantities. The challenge lies in the design. Most of what you hear about on the Manhattan Project is the challenge to get this bomb to work. For Fat Man, you had a hollow sphere of Pu-239 made up of two semi-spheres, surrounded by shaped charges. Set off precisely, these shaped charges will crush the Pu-239 core past the density required to cause a chain reaction. That's why they tested it, they needed to know if they had solved the problems of crushing the sphere precisely enough to cause the explosion. No sense dropping it on Japan and having it not work, so the Japanese can then see how to build one.

As an additional note, the Manhattan Project Office told the Army that seven additional bombs were to be ready by November 1, 1945, the proposed date for the invasion of Japan. So although there were only 3 to begin with, more were rapidly on the way.

[bobman0330]

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That's why they tested it, they needed to know if they had solved the problems of crushing the sphere precisely enough to cause the explosion. No sense dropping it on Japan and having it not work, so the Japanese can then see how to build one.


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Rereading my post, I'm not sure my question was clear. I'm somewhat familiar with the greater design complexity of a Pu bomb. What I was wondering is why they didn't "test" their first Pu bomb by dropping it in Japan. My first reaction was that they would be afraid of a fizzle giving Japan access to their design, but is that really an issue? Firstly, it seems wildly unlikely that Japan could use a non-functional bomb to build an entire nuclear program nearly from scratch in just a few months. Secondly, why not just attach a conventional bomb on a timer to the nuke in case it doesn't detonate?

I wasn't aware how quickly they expected to have more though. 1 out of an expected 10 seems like a more reasonable test expenditure than 1 out of 3.

[MrMon]

You have to remember that the people who built this were scientists at heart, they wanted to understand what they had. Dropping the first one on Japan would give them no chance to study and measure it up close. Recall they took bets on the size of the explosion, with one guy even wagering it would take out New Mexico. (I wonder how he was going to collect on it if it did.)

If it didn't work, or fizzled, they wanted the opportunity to study and fix it. The second bomb was already well on it's way to Tinian by the time of the test, so there would be an opportunity to make adjustments. And with seven available by November, they obviously would have one available in a few weeks to replace the test one.

Finally, the surrender came as something of a surprise. It was hoped the bombs would make the Japanese surrender, but it was widely believed that an invasion would still be necessary. They were even considering using the seven new bombs as a kind of super-artillery to take out troops defending the landing beaches - a disaster in the making considering the residual radiation no one had planned on.