The Two Point Conversion When Eight Down

[koolmoe]

I think one thing that may be missing in the analysis is that the difference in score after the two-point conversion will greatly influence the offensive and defensive strategy of the opposing team. Most coaches seem to play very conservatively and predictably when ahead by 7 or more, but would be more aggressive when ahead by 6. The players may also lack a sense of urgency when they do not sense the immediate danger of losing. On defense, the behavior is similar, and it seems much easier for teams to move the ball on the opposing defense when trying to tie the game as opposed to taking the lead.

Even so, the math reveals that the two decisions are close enough that the impact on a season will be almost irrelevant. While a coach should still be aware of what the math says, fans (including the mathematical types) ought to acknowledge that the job of a head coach goes far beyond gametime decisions. The impact of such decisions are simply magnified since most of the real work of a coaching staff occurs during the week and behind the scenes. Even if you found the best in-game decision* maker as a coach, it is unlikely that he would have an edge over the coach that had assembled the best talent, or the coach that designed the best game plan.

*By decision I mean strategic decisions like, should I go for it on 4th down, should I go for the two point conversion, should we try a surprise onside kick, etc. and not decisions like whether to play cover 2, blitz, run over the left side of the offensive line, etc.

[Sherman]

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First, a 50-50 OT proposition is a huge mistake IMO.

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I strongly disagree. With the state of offense and the structure of OT in the NFL, I think a 50-50 proposition is very fair and you can toss momentum out the door here.

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Shouldn't home field advantage be structured in OT considerations? I think assuming OT is 50-50 is only fair on a neutral field. I am pretty sure data supports that home teams win more OT games than away teams.

[erb2000]

Should the Chargers have gone for a two-point conversion after they scored the touchdown with 8:35 left in the game? The extra point put them up by eight: 21-13. Going for the two point conversion would leave them up by either seven or nine, depending on its success.

[jstnrgrs]

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Should the Chargers have gone for a two-point conversion after they scored the touchdown with 8:35 left in the game? The extra point put them up by eight: 21-13. Going for the two point conversion would leave them up by either seven or nine, depending on its success.

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Basically the choice is "Do we go for 2, or do we let our opponent go for 2?" so:

If the chances of San diego making the 2 point conversion are greater than the chances of the Pats failing on a 2 point attempt, then they should go for it. If not, then they shouldn't.

Convntional wisdom says that you are less than 50/50 to make a two point conversion (which would mean that San Diego was correct to take 1), but the NFL statistics for this year indicate that the decision may be much closer.

All of this assumes that there is only enough time left for the Pats to score once more. Since there is more time left, it is a little more complicated.

[jackaaron]

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I've written about this before and I'm sure I am not the only one who has thought of it. But I felt it was important to bring it up with this group because so many people have a hard time fully grasping that serious decision making errors are made by mathematical illiterate "experts" regardless of the amount of experience they have. This most often occurs when the situation doesn't arise often enough for mere observation to be a reliable guide. Sometimes you just have to do the math. (I can hear some of you saying that if the situation rarely comes up, who cares. But what about if many different types of situations requiring math come up?)

The particular example I use here occurs when your football team scores a touchdown in the final minutes of the game when down by 14 points. Aside from extreme circumstances they should now go for two. (And then two again if they miss and score later.)

The math that proves this is amazingly easy and I will get back to that in a minute. But first I want to discuss the often stated objection that a coach might use. Namely "you haven't taken into account the psychological deflation a failed attempt will cause". My reply is twofold. First I do not for a minute believe this to be true. Players know the overall strategy which includes a miss now and a success later. To think that a miss psychologically deflates players to the point where it makes up for a fairly significant increase in the theoretical chances of winning doesn't seem right. I can't prove that though.

But the bigger problem with the coaches statement is that it was a RATIONALIZATION after the fact. If it was said by someone who understood the math and legitimately felt it should be rejected, fine. But this kind of thing is usually said by coaches AND ALL SORTS OF SUPPOSED EXEPERTS IN MYRIAD FIELDS to defend their stupidity. They didn't have any idea that theoretically the two point conversion or any of the myriad of mathematically based conclusions experts in other fields are unaware of, is the right decision. So they scramble to justify their ignorance. (Another weak excuse is that "my owner would fire me because he doesn't know the math". So spend three minutes explaining it to him.)

I changed my mind about doing the calculation. Anybody on this forum who can't do it should be ashamed of themselves.
Assume a two point attempt is 42%, a one point attempt is 98%, overtime is a 50-50 proposition, and there is time for one more score at best.

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So, are you trying to avoid overtime?

According to your example, I just scored a TD, and I'm down by 8 (if I kick the EP, I'm down by 7). I have a few minutes to go, and I'm hoping to score one more time.

What difference does it make to win the game in regulation versus overtime?

Using your example, if I go for 2 now, and miss, I HAVE to go for 2 on the next score in order to even get in OT!?! If I miss that, I'm done.

I understand that mathematically you can prove that you score often enough to go for 2...it's just that it's an unnecessary risk. I would rather win the game in overtime.

[jstnrgrs]

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I've written about this before and I'm sure I am not the only one who has thought of it. But I felt it was important to bring it up with this group because so many people have a hard time fully grasping that serious decision making errors are made by mathematical illiterate "experts" regardless of the amount of experience they have. This most often occurs when the situation doesn't arise often enough for mere observation to be a reliable guide. Sometimes you just have to do the math. (I can hear some of you saying that if the situation rarely comes up, who cares. But what about if many different types of situations requiring math come up?)

The particular example I use here occurs when your football team scores a touchdown in the final minutes of the game when down by 14 points. Aside from extreme circumstances they should now go for two. (And then two again if they miss and score later.)

The math that proves this is amazingly easy and I will get back to that in a minute. But first I want to discuss the often stated objection that a coach might use. Namely "you haven't taken into account the psychological deflation a failed attempt will cause". My reply is twofold. First I do not for a minute believe this to be true. Players know the overall strategy which includes a miss now and a success later. To think that a miss psychologically deflates players to the point where it makes up for a fairly significant increase in the theoretical chances of winning doesn't seem right. I can't prove that though.

But the bigger problem with the coaches statement is that it was a RATIONALIZATION after the fact. If it was said by someone who understood the math and legitimately felt it should be rejected, fine. But this kind of thing is usually said by coaches AND ALL SORTS OF SUPPOSED EXEPERTS IN MYRIAD FIELDS to defend their stupidity. They didn't have any idea that theoretically the two point conversion or any of the myriad of mathematically based conclusions experts in other fields are unaware of, is the right decision. So they scramble to justify their ignorance. (Another weak excuse is that "my owner would fire me because he doesn't know the math". So spend three minutes explaining it to him.)

I changed my mind about doing the calculation. Anybody on this forum who can't do it should be ashamed of themselves.
Assume a two point attempt is 42%, a one point attempt is 98%, overtime is a 50-50 proposition, and there is time for one more score at best.

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So, are you trying to avoid overtime?

According to your example, I just scored a TD, and I'm down by 8 (if I kick the EP, I'm down by 7). I have a few minutes to go, and I'm hoping to score one more time.

What difference does it make to win the game in regulation versus overtime?

Using your example, if I go for 2 now, and miss, I HAVE to go for 2 on the next score in order to even get in OT!?! If I miss that, I'm done.

I understand that mathematically you can prove that you score often enough to go for 2...it's just that it's an unnecessary risk. I would rather win the game in overtime.

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I think you are not understanding the question. The object is to maximize the chance that you will win weather or not that involves overtime. If you assume a 42% 2 point conversion rate, a 98% one point rate, and a 50/50 chance, in overtime, then you will win more often by goin for 2 (including both games that go to overtime and games that end in regulation). If you can't figure this out, then you probably need to study statistics a bit more. You are not trying to avoid overtime, but you are not trying to get to overtime either. Weather or not there is overtime makes no differnece.

Weather or not these assumpitions are reasonable has been the subject of some debate in this thread.

[badbeat cjp]

All i know is,the Lions would miss the 2 point...give up another score on the ensuing kick off...and then have some interesting post game comments.

[RonMexico]

One poster points out how the "surprise factor" may make the expectation for said play even higher. But I'd like to make a point that I don't believe has been made here yet concerning NFL football. I suggest that even if Team A decides not to go for two at some point in the 2nd half, they should at least run the 2-point team out on the field after a TD. This usually results in the opposing team being surprised and having to waste a timeout. Suppose Team A either ties the game or takes the one point lead with very little time remaining in the game. Then timeouts for Team B clearly have more value now than they did at the beginning of the second half. Although the influence is probably small in general, I think this is another exploitable play in NFL football where many close end game situations could be significantly influenced by a single time out.

Value of a timeout and icing the kicker:
In Week 17 this season, Marvin Lewis' Cincinnati Bengals found themselves in a struggle with Pittsburgh for a potential shot at an AFC wild card. With 1:07 remaining in the game, Lewis decides to use one of his remaining two timeouts to "ice" Steelers kicker Jeff Reed. The attempt was from 35 yards, and it should be noted that Reed's career conversion rate from 30-39 yards was close to 90%. Reed converts the kick, tying the game at 17.

On the ensuing possession, Cincinnati completes a long pass which puts them in field goal range. However, in addition to using their final timeout, they also lose two valuable downs with QB spikes to stop the clock. The Bengals miss the kick and lose the game in OT, and as it later turned out, the final AFC playoff spot. Clearly the value of an additional timeout in this spot was substantial.

But what about "icing" the kicker? Has it been shown that this icing play significantly decreases the success rate on a kick? Most expert coaches accept this play as if it were some axiom of fundamental football strategy. My guess is that the numbers show no effect.

Dave's original post is correct, and it's not just one or two situations where coaches are missing value. I guess I'm most surprised at how long ignorance and hubris have prevailed when so much money is at stake.

[Magic_Man]

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One poster points out how the "surprise factor" may make the expectation for said play even higher. But I'd like to make a point that I don't believe has been made here yet concerning NFL football. I suggest that even if Team A decides not to go for two at some point in the 2nd half, they should at least run the 2-point team out on the field after a TD. This usually results in the opposing team being surprised and having to waste a timeout. Suppose Team A either ties the game or takes the one point lead with very little time remaining in the game. Then timeouts for Team B clearly have more value now than they did at the beginning of the second half. Although the influence is probably small in general, I think this is another exploitable play in NFL football where many close end game situations could be significantly influenced by a single time out.

Value of a timeout and icing the kicker:
In Week 17 this season, Marvin Lewis' Cincinnati Bengals found themselves in a struggle with Pittsburgh for a potential shot at an AFC wild card. With 1:07 remaining in the game, Lewis decides to use one of his remaining two timeouts to "ice" Steelers kicker Jeff Reed. The attempt was from 35 yards, and it should be noted that Reed's career conversion rate from 30-39 yards was close to 90%. Reed converts the kick, tying the game at 17.

On the ensuing possession, Cincinnati completes a long pass which puts them in field goal range. However, in addition to using their final timeout, they also lose two valuable downs with QB spikes to stop the clock. The Bengals miss the kick and lose the game in OT, and as it later turned out, the final AFC playoff spot. Clearly the value of an additional timeout in this spot was substantial.

But what about "icing" the kicker? Has it been shown that this icing play significantly decreases the success rate on a kick? Most expert coaches accept this play as if it were some axiom of fundamental football strategy. My guess is that the numbers show no effect.

Dave's original post is correct, and it's not just one or two situations where coaches are missing value. I guess I'm most surprised at how long ignorance and hubris have prevailed when so much money is at stake.

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I think icing the kicker is ridiculous. Unfortunately it is so common that there is probably very little data available in cases where they didn't ice the kicker. I've always wanted to do a study though.

[ebepse]

according to http://www.thesportjournal.org/2005J...o4/starkey.asp
"In the NFL the figures are 43% for the two-point conversion and 94% for the extra point, while in the NCAA the figures are 43.5% and 93.8% (Mallory & Nehlan, 2004)"