Freewill

[madnak]

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I define free will as the belief that, although I just made choice C, I could have made choice !C.

In other words, I define "free will" as an experiential label, not a metaphysical property. This definition solves the "problem" of free will by converting it to a tautological psychologism.

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While this is my view, it dismisses the notion of free will as something incompatible with determinism. Therefore it's not relevant.

In terms of the common definition of free will, as some (usually supernatural) nondeterministic phenomenon, I think the answer "no" stands out as the most rational. There is certainly no evidence to the contrary, and that's about all I need. Of course, it's impossible to completely disprove free will, and given our current level of knowledge we can't even say that free will is necessarily implausible.