[Philo]

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I think the analogy with the computer generated string of output characters is a poor one.

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Of course you do. But that's only because it is, in fact, such a perfect example unpolluted with [censored] side issues. All you have are data, equally good (but differing in complexity) theories, and the ability to test them. I.E. a scenario where Ockham's razor is essentially the only relevant principle, and where it can be seen to be mathematically correct -- simple explanations will be more likely to be correct, all else being equal.

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A computer program is written by human beings who have knowledge of pi, and if the string of digits through the first 183,000 matched pi, that would be the reason one would believe that the next digit is likely to be the next digit of pi.

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Sigh. Actually, the assumptions going into these arguments are that the input program is randomly generated -- i.e. specifically not written by a human with knowledge of pi. Inductive inference and algorithmic probability are not results in psychology -- they are general logical and probabilistic conclusions resting on general principles.

Next you will argue that the programming language matters, or the specific type of computer -- no, it doesn't. An invariance theorem exists that shows that these arguments have the same content on essentially any computer in any language.

After that, you will object that computers have little or nothing to do with the universe or the rest of science. But from a physics point of view it turns out that the laws of the universe can be thought of more or less completely in the language of computing if you want to (quantum computing, specifically).

After that, the thread will probably just die because you'll shift the argument to some subtly different question that no one really cares about, but one where you're not quite so obviously and dramatically wrong.

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The programming example might be useful in saying something about induction (and I do believe that the assumption that nature is uniform or pattern-like is acceptable). If we see a pattern in nature that conforms to some law-like principle, then it's ok to postulate a 'law of nature' that relies on some principle like that nature is uniform. But being pattern-like is not the same thing as being more ontolologically parsimonious. Do you think justifying induction is the same thing as justifying OR?

If justifying OR is a straightforward empirical matter, why does it generate so much philosophical discussion, and why do philosophers offer various justifications that are non-empirical, like aesthetic, pragmatic, and deductive justifications? Are these philosophers all just thick-headed and ignorant, missing the easy-to-grasp point that OR is straightforwardly justified on empirical grounds?